Band 69, Heft 3

In this paper I defend the thesis that emotions are conceptual phenomena. It is assumed that the capacity to acquire a language and thereby the capacity to possess concepts in an exacting sense fundamentally changes the human mind and, ultimately, the human being as a whole, including in relation to its physical condition. Although emotions do not presuppose language, the capacity to use and understand a language can nonetheless change their content. In recent discussions on affective intentionality, emotions are conceived primarily as modes of qualitative awareness of something. In an emotion, one is connected sufficiently to a section of the world that one can feel this relation. With regard to the question of whether emotions are conceptual phenomena, a distinction between a conceptuality thesis and a propositionality thesis is made. In essence, the considerations speak in favour of the conceptual character of emotions without viewing them as linguistically or propositionally structured phenomena. Three understandings of the view that emotions are conceptual are elucidated. The view is defended that registering the content of emotions presupposes concepts, though these emotions are not therefore made up of concepts. Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um eine nur geringfügig veränderte deutsche Fassung des ursprünglich in englischer Sprache erschienenen Textes Demmerling (2021). Dem Verlag Routledge ist für die Genehmigung eines Abdrucks in deutscher Sprache zu danken.

In this paper the understanding of the term “stasis” in Plato’s works is investigated. This term usually characterizes internal conflicts among the Greeks and has been increasingly discussed in newer debates on political philosophy. To approach the concept of stasis, its difference from the concept of “polemos” (the Greek word for war) is discussed. The aim is to show the functions of the various differentiations of these terms, in order to draw essential lessons from Plato’s work for today’s research about violent conflicts within political orders.

This paper corrects a historical injustice that has been perpetrated against Kant for some time now. Mostly on good grounds, Kantian ethics have been accused of neglecting the role played by the emotions in moral deliberation and in morally informed action. However, the contemporary moral philosophers who have put forth such a claim tend to bypass textual sources, on the one hand, and to downplay the role played by the anthropological writings on Kant’s practical philosophy as a whole, on the other. Relying on highly relevant pre-critical texts in which Kant sketches future argumentative patterns and discusses the role of negative emotions like shame on the improvement of the human species, I address a mistaken conclusion about Kantian ethics as a whole that is common in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Finally, I raise some paradoxical conclusions that follow from Kant’s argument, once its implicit premises have been brought to light.

This paper examines the dynamic of belittlement and self-affirmation that is characteristic of hate. It argues that in hate we respond to a belittlement of our feeling of self-worth with an extreme form of self-affirmation which consists in regarding the other as evil and as deserving of being annihilated. Analyzing the origins and causes of hate, I develop a taxonomy of its main forms and distinguish between retributive, normative, malicious, and ideological hate. I show that all forms of hate aim at increasing our feeling of self-worth. This common aim, however, is not always achieved: while retributive and normative hate can lead to an enhancement of one’s feeling of self-worth, in malicious and ideological hate such enhancement remains illusory and subject to self-deception. Finally, I argue that hate can never be morally justified.

In the past few years, social and cultural theorists have pointed to the dynamic and performative character of forms of disparagement such as public shaming, humiliation, invective or hate speech. In this paper, I endorse a different route and focus on the distinctive affective and dialectical nature of what might be called the ‘politics of disparagement’. I will do so by elaborating on the affective intentionality of hatred, which can be seen as an affective attitude that paradigmatically encapsulates the dialectical antagonism at play in the politics of disparagement. I argue that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinctive in three interrelated ways: First, it has an overgeneralising, indeterminate affective focus, which typically leads to a certain collectivisation of its target. Secondly, short of a determinate affective focus, haters derive the indeed extreme affective powers of the attitude not in reaction to any specific features or actions of the targets or from some phenomenological properties of the attitude but, rather, from the sheer commitment to the attitude itself. Finally, in sharing this commitment to hate with others, hatred involves a certain negative dialectics and becomes entrenched as a shared habitus. Ultimately, I suggest that we can only counteract the politics of disparagement if we understand how a shared commitment to disparagement and hatred establishes its own normative logic, which not only concerns their victims but also, dialectically, sanctions their enactors.

Populism and degradation are closely related. Not only is the insulting and slandering of political opponents part of the standard repertoire of populists, but the experience of degradation is also one of the most important sociopsychological conditions for the emergence of contemporary populism. Accordingly, the populist politics of degradation must be understood as a response to their own experiences of degradation. However, this strategy leads into an aporia because it systematically undermines the solidarity and recognition it seeks. I will therefore ask what a political solution to the challenge of populism might look like and argue that radical democratic republicanism is a remedy for populism because it allows the experience of degradation that underlies it to be both taken seriously and kept at a critical distance.

In this letter to our German colleagues we describe the situation, mentality, and organization of academic philosophy in the Netherlands in comparison to Germany. We proceed in five acts. In the first act, A wide beach , we set the stage and introduce the two academic landscapes; in the second act, Between controversy and frontal teaching , we compare the Dutch and German academic temper and practices. In the third act, Flat land, flat hierarchies , we parallelize the geography of the Netherlands and the organizational structure of Dutch universities. In the fourth act, Philosophers among merchants , we discuss the positive and negative sides of the liberal, transparent, competitive and progress-oriented spirit of Dutch academic philosophy. In the fifth and final act, Philosophy from the pragmatic point of view , we conclude what we can learn from our Dutch neighbours: We plea for a non-elitist, down to earth, straight-forward, and open-minded way of doing philosophy, where one is neither shying away from controversy nor too shy to come down from the ivory tower and mingle with the audience.