Volume 69, Issue 6

In The Origins of Totalitarianism Hannah Arendt reads Hobbes’ Leviathan as a prefiguration of totalitarian politics. She does so in a unique manner, criticising not his overbearing sovereignty, but the incessant accumulation of power, which turns into an unstoppable process of destruction. Arendt claims that the ultimately self-annihilating accumulation of power is necessitated by bourgeois societies’ pursuit to increase property. This paper first clarifies the methodological assumptions which allow Arendt to read Hobbes’ theory as a clue to bourgeois history in general. It then reconstructs her portrait of the “power-hungry individual” as a result rather than starting point of Hobbes’ political model, and examines her verdict that the Hobbesian sovereign is inherently unstable. With the help of passages contained only in the expanded German version of Origins , Arendt’s more familiar Luxemburgian critique of territorial expansiveness is completed by a Benjaminian analysis of the temporality of accumulation: colonial catastrophe. Dieser Aufsatz ist im Rahmen des durch Horizon 2020 finanzierten MSCA-Projekts PhantomAiD, EU-Fördernummer 896973, entstanden.

As a commentary on the initial paragraph of Benjamin’s “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” this article shows that its characterisation of the “sphere of moral relations” as circumscribed by the poles of law and justice generates the rationale for the critique of violence. After describing how Benjamin reproduces the structure of Kant’s Metaphysik der Sitten , the article outlines the procedure whereby the initial definition of Gewalt as an “intervention” into moral relations is supplemented by an exposition of the situation in which law “encroaches” upon “the living” by presenting itself as an “expiation” ( Sühne ) of moral ambiguity; but inasmuch as the sphere of moral relations is constitutively split between the mutually repugnant poles of law and justice, the process of expiation intensifies the ambiguity of the situation law purports to resolve. Benjamin’s solution to this dilemma consists in claiming the reality of “de-expiation” ( Entsühnung ), which he associates with “pure” and thus “divine” violence.

Proceeding from a philosophical interpretation of negative theology as performatively undermining our seeming understanding of the absolute and thereby evoking a transformative experience, this paper emphasises the philosophical significance of negative theology by linking it to Karl Jaspers’ notion of the universal limit situation of existence. Against this background, an analysis of mystical and psychotic experiences shows how certain similarities between the two can be understood as constituting a particular mental state in which the universal limit situation is experienced personally. Moreover, experiencing the limit situation, be it through this mental state or through certain moods or feelings, can be transformative and may lead to an attitude of groundless trust that acknowledges the incomprehensibility of the human condition. The paper argues that this reading of negative theology provides a better understanding of the parallels between mysticism and psychosis and may be fruitfully applied in therapy.

How can a present or future event causally influence one in the past? Even though the case of such a relationship is often quickly dismissed as impossible, this paper suggests that this reaction is hasty and omits interesting as well as substantive arguments and considerations. In an introductory synopsis of the metaphysics of causality, we first present and discuss arguments for and against the possibility of backwards causation. On the other hand, we suggest that a probabilistic notion of causality according to Suppes need not exclude that causes occur temporally after their effects.

This article emphasises the relevance of Adorno’s concept of nature for contemporary debates in critical theory about the relationship between nature and society. Adorno identifies a twofold danger for a critical understanding of our relationship to nature. While the first is in the development of a mythical vision of nature, the second is in the development of a purely instrumental relationship to nature, which considers nature as an entity radically heterogeneous to social issues. Against this backdrop, Adorno develops his own concept of nature which can be described as negative (non-mythical) and minimal (non-instrumental).

There are two sides to Adorno’s idea of natural history: showing that what appears to be natural is in fact subject to social change (historicising nature), while exposing social change as recurrence of the ever same (naturalising history). Focusing on the second side, this article explains how such a naturalisation can contribute to social critique. What distinguishes Adorno’s use of biological vocabulary from social Darwinism is the critical intention. Rather than scorning nature, naturalisation starts with the conventional notion of nature in order to unmask it as a projection. ‘Nature’ in this sense is what we refuse to acknowledge about our own history. In so far as it does not establish any ontological claims about nature but aims at social transformation, Adorno’s strategy can be understood as a critical naturalism. In the process of demonstrating how human practices are part of nature, the underlying concept of nature is being transformed

This article demonstrates the ways in which Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s reflections on the dialectic of the domination of nature shed new light on recent discussions about the concept of the Anthropocene. A central motif is the fear of nature, which, according to Adorno, prevailed at the beginning of its mastery by humans in prehistoric times. Harnessing external nature enabled the stabilisation of internal nature and social relations. This link between nature’s relative stability and social relations was characteristic of the Holocene. In the Anthropocene, capitalist domination destabilises nature, which in turn destabilises social life. The natural terror of nature returns in the face of the socially produced climate catastrophe, adding a new aspect to Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s diagnosis of the domination of nature. The article concludes by suggesting a changed relationship to nature, which no longer would understand it as a mere object, but as a “subject in its own right”.

Natural history is a key concept in Adorno’s philosophy of history. In the second model of Negative Dialectics , he develops this concept following Marx’s critique of political economy, which, as a critique of ideology, criticises the appearance of natural necessity of social practices and relations. Starting from an irritation concerning a note by Adorno in which he reproaches Marx for “language mannerisms” and conceptual inability, this article argues that Adorno’s critique is based on a one-sided reading, preventing him from adequately considering the critical-emancipatory potential of the concept of natural history. This potential is not independent of linguistic and aesthetic mediation. Rather, Marx uses metaphors, caricatures, etc. in his depiction of social practices as natural history, enabling him to convey more than theoretical knowledge. His critical theory is emancipatory precisely in that it compels agents to self-criticism, which is a necessary condition for sustainably shattering the appearance of natural necessity.

The phenomenology of medicine is that part of the research field of the philosophy of medicine that asks about the subjective experience of illness. In contrast to the philosophy of medicine, the phenomenological approaches explicitly include medical and bioethical questions as part of their research interests. The paper provides an overview of the most important questions and topics of the phenomenology of medicine. Subsequently I will refer to the fundamental critique articulated by feminist positions in the field of phenomenology of medicine. In addition to the socio-political contextualisation of the experience of illness, this also includes the necessary recourse to empirical research.