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We bridge the organisational economics and industrial economics literatures on the vertical boundaries of the firm by contextualising the transaction cost approach to the make-or-buy decision within an oligopolistic market structure. Firms invest in the quality of the intermediate resulting in the endogenous determination of the price of the intermediate and marginal production cost of the final good. We highlight new strategic incentives to outsource and/or vertically integrate and show how these incentives can result in asymmetric-mode-of-operations, investment and costs. We apply our model to a number of different international trading setups.

Some industries have consumers who seek novelty and firms that innovate vigorously and whose organizational structure is loosely coupled, or easily adaptable. Other industries have consumers who take comfort in the traditional and firms that innovate little and whose organizational structure is tightly coupled, or not easily adaptable. This paper proposes a model that explains why the described features tend to covary across industries. The model highlights the pervasiveness of equilibrium inefficiency (innovation can be insufficient or excessive) and the nonmonotonicity of welfare in the equilibrium amount of innovation.

This paper presents a model of portfolio management with reputation concerns in imperfect capital markets. Managers with financial constraints raise funds from investors and select a project that is characterized by the degree of risk. Managers differ in their ability to determine the probability of success. Based on past performance, all agents revise beliefs about managers’ ability, and the beliefs affect the availability of funds in the future. This provides motivation for managers to build reputation by manipulating their performance through project selection. We show that the quality of investor protection changes fund flows, thereby influencing managers’ project selection. Our model predicts that strong investor protection causes risk-taking behavior, whereas weak investor protection leads to risk-averse behavior.

Building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s framework of dynamic psychological games and the progress in the modeling of dynamic unawareness by Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a) we model and analyze the impact of asymmetric awareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by reciprocity and guilt. Specifically we characterize extensive-form games with psychological payoffs and simple unawareness, define extensive-form rationalizability and, using this, show that unawareness has a pervasive impact on the strategic interaction of psychologically motivated players. Intuitively, unawareness influences players’ beliefs concerning, for example, the intentions and expectations of others which in turn impacts their behavior.

This article analyzes the conditions under which better product quality implies higher or lower product price. In an optimal control framework, I make the following assumptions: The firm sets the dynamic pricing and product innovation policies; product innovation raises quality, which drives production cost, and consumers are sensitive to price and quality. I derive a rule of price-quality relationship that stresses the influence of quality on price through the effects of cost (positive), sales (negative), and markup (positive). This article shows that, while maximizing profit and despite a quality and cost increases, the firm may decrease product prices because of the possibility of generating more sales as a result of combining better quality with lower price. This sales effect solves the puzzle of a negative price-quality relationship. More generally, the sales effect mitigates the ability of price to convey information about quality.

This paper investigates the possibility of licensing between rival firms in a Cournot duopoly market. Unlike Heywood, Li, and Ye (2014. “Per Unit vs. Ad Valorem Royalties under Asymmetric Information.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 37:38–46), the cost information of the licensee is private in the pre-licensing stage. If inspection of the licensee’s technology is not possible by the licensor i) technology is never transferred from the low-cost firm (licensor) to the high-cost firm (licensee) via fixed-fee and ii) in the case of royalty licensing technology will be transferred only if the cost difference between the firms is sufficiently high. Moreover, under fixed-fee and royalty licensing, the licensee will always allow the licensor to inspect its technology, if inspection is possible. If inspection is undertaken by the licensor, technology will be transferred i) if the cost difference is low via fixed fee and ii) always via royalty.

This article presents a model to analyze the effects of first and second-moment statistical discrimination on the labour market. Second-moment statistical discrimination occurs when risk-averse managers make decisions regarding wage and hiring based on productivity variances. We provide a framework exploring managers’ discrimination based on differences in average productivity and in variance of productivity. Furthermore, since discrimination is composed of two types (wage and hiring discrimination), our model allows for the interdependence between hiring practices and wages. Using our model, we examine the effects of various anti-discrimination policies along with changes to the labour market structure. We show that managers’ behaviour may be driven by anti-discrimination policies and labour market structures. A firm reduces hiring when required to implement anti-discrimination policies to address wage inequality. A firm applying policies to promote employment equity must stimulate minority participation. A change in labour market structure does not alter the efficiency of policies promoting employment equity, but it does alter the efficiency of policies aimed at reducing wage differences.

Multiplicity of equilibria naturally obtains in search models of money with price posting: buyers’ money holdings depend on posted prices, which, in turn, depend on buyers’ money holdings. I show that this multiplicity of equilibria exists in general even when money is replaced with a dividend-bearing asset, as long as the asset is useful as a medium of exchange. If the fundamental value of the asset is sufficiently high, there is a unique equilibrium, in which the price of the asset equals its fundamental value. For lower fundamental values, there is a continuum of bubble equilibria, in which the price of the asset exceeds the fundamental value. For very low fundamental values, the equilibrium is again unique but the asset is not used as a medium of exchange. I characterize the set of symmetric and asymmetric bubble equilibria for both positive and negative fundamental values.

I analyze the welfare effects of a policy of modern sector enlargement (MSENL), and a policy of increasing the efficiency of on-the-job search from the urban informal sector (IEOS) in a generalized Harris-Todaro model. I show that MSENL causes a Lorenz worsening of the income distribution and IEOS causes a Lorenz improvement. In a rare direct application of the Atkinson theorem, I conclude that MSENL decreases social welfare and IEOS increases social welfare for all anonymous, increasing and Schur-concave social welfare functions.

A previous study finds that increased competition in health care markets improves social welfare, although consumers use “too much” health care when they have health insurance. The analysis assumes that consumers have a constant Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion . This note shows that this finding can be extended to the case where consumers are simply risk averse. Furthermore, if insurers offered insurance policies with slightly lower usage prices than the equilibrium level, social welfare would be improved.

We extend Becker’s model of discrimination by allowing firms to have discriminatory and favoring preferences simultaneously. We draw the two-preference parallel for the marginal firm, illustrate the implications for wage differentials, and consider the implied long-run equilibrium. In the short-run, wage differentials depend on relative preferences. However, in the long-run, market forces drive out discriminatory but not favoring firms.