Startseite Wirtschaftswissenschaften Federalism, Budget Deficits and Public Debt: On the Reform of Germany's Fiscal Constitution
Artikel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert Erfordert eine Authentifizierung

Federalism, Budget Deficits and Public Debt: On the Reform of Germany's Fiscal Constitution

  • Lars P. Feld und Thushyanthan Baskaran
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 31. Dezember 2010
Veröffentlichen auch Sie bei De Gruyter Brill

Abstract

In 2009, new debt restrictions in the Grundgesetz (the German constitution) and in federal legislation passed both chambers of the German parliament by two-thirds majorities, imposing a more rigid debt regime on federal and Länder (states’) fiscal policies than previous constitutional provisions entailed. In this paper, the new provisions are evaluated against the background of the problems of German fiscal federalism that they are supposed to solve, as well as the possible solutions discussed in constitutional economics. We thereby mainly draw on recent evidence from Switzerland. This reform is an important step to remedy the shortcomings of German fiscal federalism, but we argue that it needs to be complemented by tax autonomy for the German Länder.

Published Online: 2010-12-31

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 2.1.2026 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.2202/1555-5879.1537/html
Button zum nach oben scrollen