Introduction: Ex Uno Plures. Welfare Without Illusion
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Geoffrey Brennan
Abstract
Two competing visions of federalism have long held sway. The first is centered on the idea of an administrative system of delegation based on a geographic partitioning of the polity. The second view sees federalism as a bottom-up structure in which the larger polity is a construct of the smaller polities of which it is composed. In this edited collection, the object is to use these rival visions of a federal structure as a lens through which to analyze the various interconnections between the welfare state and its financing. Specifically, the claim is that the effects of federalism cannot be fully understood without consideration of the vision of federalism that the participants in their various roles adopt. The works collected in this special issue represent a selection of the papers presented at the conference “Ex Uno Plures. Welfare without Illusion,” held in September 2009 at the Faculty of Economics of Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, organized by the European Center for the Study of Public Choice (ECSPC).
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Article
- Introduction: Ex Uno Plures. Welfare Without Illusion
- Polycentric Polity: Genuine vs. Spurious Federalism
- Fiscal Equity In Federal Systems
- Federalism, Budget Deficits and Public Debt: On the Reform of Germany's Fiscal Constitution
- How Federalism Protects Future Generations from Today's Public Debts
- Raising vs. Leveling in the Social Organization of Welfare
- The Influence of Public Institutions on the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Investigation for OECD Countries
- Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box: The Relevance of Expressive Voting
- Federalism as an Effective Antidote to Terrorism
Articles in the same Issue
- Article
- Introduction: Ex Uno Plures. Welfare Without Illusion
- Polycentric Polity: Genuine vs. Spurious Federalism
- Fiscal Equity In Federal Systems
- Federalism, Budget Deficits and Public Debt: On the Reform of Germany's Fiscal Constitution
- How Federalism Protects Future Generations from Today's Public Debts
- Raising vs. Leveling in the Social Organization of Welfare
- The Influence of Public Institutions on the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Investigation for OECD Countries
- Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box: The Relevance of Expressive Voting
- Federalism as an Effective Antidote to Terrorism
