Fiscal Equity In Federal Systems
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Geoffrey Brennan
Abstract
This paper examines the normative foundations of fiscal equalization – an issue handled, apparently decisively, in a classic paper by James Buchanan (1950). Contrary to Buchanan's claims, we argue that fiscal equalization requires extremely strong value judgements – at least in the case where fiscal differences arise from the interaction of public goods provision under different population size – effectively committing one to a Rawlsian maximin rule. Much weaker forms of the 'social welfare function' in this public goods case will generate the requirement that private consumption levels be equalized, but specifically not public consumption levels – in which sense private goods equalization seems normatively weaker than public goods equalization, If this is so, the hope of justifying federal fiscal equalization on the basis of relatively uncontroversial individualistic norms seems illusory.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
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- Introduction: Ex Uno Plures. Welfare Without Illusion
- Polycentric Polity: Genuine vs. Spurious Federalism
- Fiscal Equity In Federal Systems
- Federalism, Budget Deficits and Public Debt: On the Reform of Germany's Fiscal Constitution
- How Federalism Protects Future Generations from Today's Public Debts
- Raising vs. Leveling in the Social Organization of Welfare
- The Influence of Public Institutions on the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Investigation for OECD Countries
- Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box: The Relevance of Expressive Voting
- Federalism as an Effective Antidote to Terrorism
Articles in the same Issue
- Article
- Introduction: Ex Uno Plures. Welfare Without Illusion
- Polycentric Polity: Genuine vs. Spurious Federalism
- Fiscal Equity In Federal Systems
- Federalism, Budget Deficits and Public Debt: On the Reform of Germany's Fiscal Constitution
- How Federalism Protects Future Generations from Today's Public Debts
- Raising vs. Leveling in the Social Organization of Welfare
- The Influence of Public Institutions on the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Investigation for OECD Countries
- Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box: The Relevance of Expressive Voting
- Federalism as an Effective Antidote to Terrorism
