Startseite Precautionary Effort Investment under Cross Risk Aversion
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Precautionary Effort Investment under Cross Risk Aversion

  • Yuqing Tao , Jie Mei , Wen Cheng EMAIL logo und Sijie Zou
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 18. September 2019
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Abstract

This paper deals with the effort problem under multiple risks in bivariate utility setting. We identify preference conditions to insure positive or negative effect of a background variable uncertainty on effort in the presence of other risks. We allow for the simultaneous presence of wealth and background variable uncertainties. We investigate the joint effect of two-source uncertainties on effort when two risks are either small or positive quadrant dependent. Our work extends the previous model of effort to bivariate utility framework and presents new insights into the issue of optimal effort under uncertainty.


Supported by the College Excellent Young Talents Program of Anhui (gxyq2017243) and the College Natural Science Foundation of Anhui Provincial Education Department (KJ2017A851)


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Appendix

Proof of Theorem 2

Using second-order two-variable Taylor expansion around the point (, ȳ), where = Ex̃ and ȳ = Eỹ, the bivariate function u(x, y) is approximated as

u(x,y)u(x¯,y¯)+u(1,0)(x¯,y¯)(xx¯)+u(0,1)(yy¯)+12[u(2,0)(x¯,y¯)(xx¯)2+2u(1,1)(x¯,y¯)(xx¯)(yy¯)+u(0,2)(yy¯)2].(14)

By the above Taylor approximation (14), we get

Eu(x~,y~)Eu(x~,Ey~)12u(0,2)(x¯,y¯)Var(y~)+u(1,1)(x¯,y¯)Cov(x~,y~),(15)

where Var(⋅) and Var(∵) are variance and covariance operators, respectively. It is easily seen from (15) that, for small risks and with Cov(, ) ≥ 0, Eu(, ) ≤ Eu(, Eỹ) if u(0,2) ≤ 0 and u(1,1) ≤ 0.

Proof of Theorem 3

By the Taylor approximation (14) in the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain

Eu(x~,y~)u(Ex~,Ey~)12u(2,0)(x¯,y¯)Var(x~)+12u(0,2)(x¯,y¯)Var(y~)+u(1,1)(x¯,y¯)Cov(x~,y~).(16)

This implies that, for small risks and with Cov(, ) ≥ 0, Eu(, ) ≤ u(Ex̃, Eỹ) if u(0,2) ≤ 0, u(2,0) ≤ 0 and u(1,1) ≤ 0.

Proof of Proposition 1

For the effect of initial background variable uncertainty, by (4) and the concavity of objective problem, we have

ee1Eu(x~2,y~2)Eu(x~1,Ey~1)ϕ(e)0,(17)

So, by (3), we obtain ee1Eu(1, 1) ≤ Eu(1, Eỹ1). By Theorem 1, for independent 1 and 1, the inequality Eu(1, 1) ≤ Eu(1, Eỹ1) holds if, and only if, u(0,2) ≤ 0.

For the effect of final background variable uncertainty, by (5) and the concavity, we get

ee2Eu(x~2,y~2)Eu(x~1,y~1)ϕ(e)0,(18)

So, by (3), we have ee2Eu(2, 2) ≤ Eu(2, Eỹ2). By Theorem 1, for independent 2 and 2, the inequality Eu(2, 2) ≤ Eu(2, Eỹ2) holds if, and only if, u(0,2) ≤ 0.

Proof of Proposition 2

From the proof of Proposition 1, it is obvious that ee1Eu(1, 1) ≤ Eu(1, Eỹ1) (ee2Eu(2, 2) ≤ Eu(2, Eỹ2)). By Theorem 2, we get that, for small risks with Cov(1, 1) ≥ 0 (Cov(2, 2) ≥ 0), Eu(1, 1) ≤ Eu(1, Eỹ1) (Eu(2, 2) ≤ Eu(2, Eỹ2)) holds if u(0,2) ≤ 0 and u(1,1) ≤ 0.

Proof of Proposition 3

For the joint impact of initial two-source uncertainties, by (6) and the concavity, we obtain

ee3Eu(x~2,y~2)u(Ex~1,Ey~1)ϕ(e)0.(19)

Therefore, by (3), we have ee3Eu(1, 1) ≤ u(Ex̃1, Eỹ1). By Theorem 3, for small risks with Cov(1, 1) ≥ 0 the inequality Eu(1, 1) ≤ u(Ex̃1, Eỹ1) holds if u(0,2) ≤ 0, u(2,0) ≤ 0 and u(1,1) ≤ 0.

For the joint impact of final two-source uncertainties, by (7) and the concavity, we obtain

e4eu(Ex~2,Ey~2)Eu(x~1,y~1)ϕ(e)0.(20)

Thereby, by (3), we have e4eEu(2, 2) ≤ u(Ex̃2, Eỹ2). By Theorem 3, for small risks with Cov(2, 2) ≥ 0, the inequality Eu(2, 2) ≤ u(Ex̃2, Eỹ2) holds if u(0,2) ≤ 0, u(2,0) ≤ 0 and u(1,1) ≤ 0.

Proof of Proposition 4

From the proof of Proposition 3, it is evident that ee3Eu(1, 1) ≤ u(Ex̃1, Eỹ1) (e4eEu(2, 2) ≤ u(Ex̃2, Eỹ2)). From Theorem 4, we capture that, for PQD(1, 1) (PQD(2, 2)), the inequality Eu(1, 1) ≤ u(Ex̃1, Eỹ1) (Eu(2, 2) ≤ u(Ex̃2, Eỹ2)) holds if, and only if, u(0,2) ≤ 0, u(2,0) ≤ 0 and u(1,1) ≤ 0.

Proof of Proposition 5

For the case of initial risks, by (10) and the assumption of SOC, we get êe^1 if, and only if,

[Eu(x~2c(e^),y~2)Eu(x~1c(e^),Ey~1)]c(e^)[(1e^)Eu(1,0)(x~1c(e^),Ey~1)+e^Eu(1,0)(x~2c(e^),y~2))]0.(21)

Hence, by (9), we obtain êe^1 if, and only if,

Eu(x~1c(e^),y~1)+(1e^)c(e^)Eu(1,0)(x~1c(e^),y~1)Eu(x~1c(e^),Ey~2)+(1e^)c(e^)Eu(1,0)(x~1c(e^),Ey~1).(22)

For convenience, it is useful to define a bivariate function:

f(x,y)=u(xc(e^),y)+(1e^)c(e^)u(1,0)(xc(e^),y).(23)

Thereby, (22) can be rewritten as Ef(1, 1) ≤ Ef(1, Ey͠1). From Theorem 1, we know that, for independent (1, 1), Ef(1, 1) ≤ Ef(1, Ey͠1) ⇔ f(0,2) ≤ 0.

Since

f(0,2)(x,y)=u(0,2)(xc(e^),y)+(1e^)c(e^)u(1,2)(xc(e^),y),(24)

when u(0,2) ≤ 0 and u(1,2) ≥ 0, we have

f(0,2)(x,y)0u(1,2)(xc(e^),y)u(0,2)(xc(e^),y)1(1e^)c(e^).(25)

That is to say, êe^1.

For the case of target risks, from (11) and the SOC, we have êe^2 if, and only if,

[Eu(x~2c(e^),Ey~2)Eu(x~1c(e^),y~1)]c(e^)[(1e^)Eu(1,0)(x~1c(e^),y~1)+e^Eu(1,0)(x~2c(e^),Ey~2))]0.(26)

Therefore, by (9), we capture êe^2 if, and only if,

Eu(x~2c(e^),Ey~2)(e^)c(e^)Eu(1,0)(x~2c(e^),Ey~2)Eu(x~2c(e^),y~2)e^c(e^)Eu(1,0)(x~2c(e^),y~2).(27)

Define the bivariate function:

g(x,y)=u(xc(e^),y)e^c(e^)u(1,0)(xc(e^),y).(28)

Accordingly, (27) can be rewritten as Eg(2, Ey͠2) ≥ Eg(2, 2). From Theorem 1, we see that, for independent (2, 2), Eg(2, Ey͠2) ≥ Eg(2, 2) ⇔ g(0,2) ≤ 0

Because

g(0,2)(x,y)=u(0,2)(xc(e^),y)e^c(e^)u(1,2)(xc(e^),y),(29)

we obtain

u(0,2)0andu(1,2)0g(0,2)(x,y)0.(30)

In other words, êe^2.

Proof of Proposition 6

From the proof of Proposition 5, it is evident that êe^1Ef(1, 1) ≤ Ef(1, Ey͠1). By Theorem 2, for small risks with Cov(1, 1) ≥ 0, the inequality Ef(1, 1) ≤ Ef(1, Ey͠1) holds if f(0,2) ≤ 0 and f(1,1) ≤ 0.

In addition,

f(1,1)(x,y)=u(1,1)(xc(e^),y)+(1e^)c(e^)u(2,1)(xc(e^),y),(31)

when u(1,1) ≤ 0 and u(2,1) ≤ 0, we get

f(1,1)(x,y)0u(2,1)(xc(e^),y)u(1,1)(xc(e^),y)1(1e^)c(e^).(32)

Thus, if u(0,2) ≤ 0, u(1,1) ≤ 0, u(1,2) ≥ 0 and u(2,1) ≥ 0, then (25) and (32) imply êe^1.

On the other hand, êe^2Eg(2, Ey͠2) ≥ Eg(2, 2). By Theorem 2, for small risks with Cov(2, 2) ≥ 0, we have Eg(2, Ey͠2) ≥ Eg(2, 2) if g(0,2) ≤ 0 and g(1,1) ≤ 0.

Moreover,

g(1,1)(x,y)=u(1,1)(xc(e^),y)e^c(e^)u(2,1)(xc(e^),y).(33)

Then,

u(1,1)0andu(2,1)0g(1,1)(x,y)0.(34)

From (30) and (34), we know that u(0,2) ≤ 0, u(1,1) ≤ 0, u(1,2) ≥ 0 and u(2,1) ≥ 0, imply êe^2.

Proof of Proposition 7

For the joint impact of initial risks, from (12) and the SOC, we obtain êe^3 if, and only if,

[Eu(x~2c(e^),y~2)u(Ex~1c(e^),Ey~1)]c(e^)[(1e^)u(1,0)(Ex~1c(e^),Ey~1)+e^Eu(1,0)(x~2c(e^),y~2)]0.(35)

Thus, from (9), we obtain êe^3 if, and only if,

Eu(x~1c(e^),y~1)+(1e^)c(e^)Eu(1,0)(x~1c(e^),y~1)u(Ex~1c(e^),Ey~1)+(1e^)c(e^)u(1,0)(Ex~1c(e^),Ey~1).(36)

By (23), we can write (36) as Ef(1, 1) ≤ f(Ex͠1, Ey͠1). By Theorem 3, for small risks with Cov(1, 1) ≥ 0, the inequality Ef(1, 1) ≤ f(Ex͠1, Ey͠1) holds if f(0,2) ≤ 0, f(2,0) ≤ 0 and f(1,1) ≤ 0.

Due to

f(2,0)(x,y)=u(2,0)(xc(e^),y)+(1e^)c(e^)u(3,0)(xc(e^),y),(37)

when u(2,0) ≤ 0 and u(3,0) ≥ 0, we have

f(2,0)(x,y)0u(3,0)(xc(e^),y)u(2,0)(xc(e^),y)1(1e^)c(e^).(38)

Thus, if u(0,2) ≤ 0, u(2,0) ≤ 0, u(1,1) ≤ 0, u(1,2) ≥ 0, u(2,1) ≥ 0 and u(3,0) ≥ 0, then (25) and (32) imply êe^3.

For the joint impact of target risks, from (13) and the SOC, we have êe^4 if, and only if,

[u(Ex~2c(e^),Ey~2)Eu(x~1c(e^),y~1)]c(e^)[(1e^)Eu(1,0)(x~1c(e^),y~1)+e^u(1,0)(Ex~2c(e^),Ey~2)]0.(39)

By (9), we capture êe^4 if, and only if,

u(Ex~2c(e^),Ey~2)e^c(e^)u(1,0)(Ex~2c(e^),Ey~2)Eu(x~2c(e^),y~2)e^c(e^)Eu(1,0)(x~2c(e^),y~2).(40)

By (28), write (40) as g(Ex͠2, Ey͠2) ≥ Eg(2, 2). By Theorem 3, we observe that, for small risks with Cov(2, 2) ≥ 0, the inequality g(Ex͠2, Ey͠2) ≥ Eg(2, 2) holds if g(0,2) ≤ 0, g(2,0) ≤ 0 and g(1,1) ≤ 0.

Owing to

g(2,0)(x,y)=u(2,0)(xc(e^),y)e^c(e^)u(3,0)(xc(e^),y),(41)

we have

u(2,0)0andu(3,0)0g(2,0)(x,y)0.(42)

From (30), (34) and (42), it is easily seen that u(0,2) ≤ 0, u(2,0) ≤ 0, u(1,1) ≤ 0, u(1,2) ≥ 0, u(2,1) ≥ 0 and u(3,0) ≥ 0 imply êe^4.

Proof of Proposition 8

From the proof of Proposition 7, it is obvious that êe^3Ef(1, 1) ≤ f(Ex͠1, Ey͠1). By Theorem 4, we know that, for PQD(1, 1), the inequality Ef(1, 1) ≤ f(Ex͠1, Ey͠1) holds if, and only if, f(0,2) ≤ 0, f(2,0) ≤ 0 and f(1,1) ≤ 0, which are guaranteed by the conditions that u(0,2) ≤ 0, u(2,0) ≤ 0, u(1,1) ≤ 0, u(1,2) ≥ 0, u(2,1) ≥ 0 and u(3,0) ≥ 0, (25), (32) and (38).

On the other hand, it is evident that êe^4g(Ex͠2, Ey͠2) ≥ Eg(2, 2). By Theorem 4, for PQD(2, 2), the inequality g(Ex͠2, Ey͠2) ≥ Eg(2, 1) holds if, and only if, g(0,2) ≤ 0, g(2,0) ≤ 0and g(1,1) ≤ 0, which are insured by the conditions that u(0,2) ≤ 0, u(2,0) ≤ 0, u(1,1) ≤ 0, u(1,2) ≥ 0, u(2,1) ≥ 0 and u(3,0) ≥ 0. This ends the proof.

Received: 2019-01-01
Accepted: 2019-03-27
Published Online: 2019-09-18
Published in Print: 2019-09-25

© 2019 Walter De Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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