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On the Openness of Unique Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium

  • Anna A. Klis ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 4. Januar 2018
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Aus der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Band 19 Heft 1

Abstract

This paper investigates whether small perturbations to a game with continuous strategy spaces and unique Nash equilibrium also yields a game with unique equilibrium. The answer is affirmative for games with smooth payoffs, differentiable strict concavity in own actions, and transversal intersection of best response curves. Though intuitive for games with unique interior equilibrium, this result holds even for equilibria at the boundaries of strategy sets.

Keywords: unique Nash equilibrium; pure strategies; open condition; differentiable strict concavity; transversal; game theory; univalence

Acknowledgement

I thank Dr. Maxwell Stinchcombe for his unfailing support, as well as three anonymous reviewers for the time and effort spent on my paper.

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Published Online: 2018-01-04

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Artikel in diesem Heft

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  2. Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model
  3. Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability
  4. On Decay Centrality
  5. Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices
  6. The core of a strategic game
  7. Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms
  8. Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining
  9. Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products
  10. Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
  11. Retained Earnings, Interest Rates and Lending Relationship
  12. Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
  13. Conformity and Influence
  14. Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior
  15. Notes
  16. Eco-Firms and the Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation
  17. Vertical Contract and Competition Intensity in Hotelling’s Model
  18. Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers
  19. Irrelevance of the Strategic Variable in the Case of Relative Performance Maximization
  20. Critical Efficiencies as Upward Pricing Pressure with Feedback Effects
  21. On the Openness of Unique Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
  22. Forecast Dispersion in Finite-Player Forecasting Games
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0065
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
unique Nash equilibrium; pure strategies; open condition; differentiable strict concavity; transversal; game theory; univalence

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Articles
  2. Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model
  3. Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability
  4. On Decay Centrality
  5. Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices
  6. The core of a strategic game
  7. Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms
  8. Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining
  9. Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products
  10. Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
  11. Retained Earnings, Interest Rates and Lending Relationship
  12. Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
  13. Conformity and Influence
  14. Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior
  15. Notes
  16. Eco-Firms and the Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation
  17. Vertical Contract and Competition Intensity in Hotelling’s Model
  18. Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers
  19. Irrelevance of the Strategic Variable in the Case of Relative Performance Maximization
  20. Critical Efficiencies as Upward Pricing Pressure with Feedback Effects
  21. On the Openness of Unique Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
  22. Forecast Dispersion in Finite-Player Forecasting Games
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