Abstract
We establish a relationship between decay centrality and two widely used measures of centrality, namely degree and closeness. We show that for low values of the decay parameter the nodes with maximum decay centrality also have maximum degree, whereas for high values of the decay parameter they also maximize closeness. For intermediate values, we provide sufficient conditions that allow the comparison of decay centrality of different nodes and we show via numerical simulations that in the vast majority of networks, the nodes with maximum decay centrality are characterized by a threshold on the decay parameter below which they belong to the set of nodes with maximum degree and above which they belong to the set of nodes with maximum closeness. We also propose a simple rule of thumb that ensures a nearly optimal choice with very high probability.
Acknowledgement
Part of this project was carried out while the author was at SUTD–MIT International Design Center at Singapore University of Technology and Design supported by grant IDG31300110.
Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Notice that decay centrality can be rewritten as
Proof of Proposition 2
If
Proof of Proposition 3
We need three direct observations to obtain the result. First, note that
where the last inequality is implied by
Proof of Proposition 4
If
and by continuity with respect to
Proof of Proposition 5
where
From the last expression is apparent that a sufficient condition, though not necessary, to satisfy
Proof of Proposition 6
Let
where
with the crucial observation being that
It is apparent from the last expression that a sufficient condition, though not necessary, to satisfy
Proof of Proposition 7
1.
2.
3. The result can also be implied by Rouché’s Theorem, but it is presented here with an independent proof, which follows a similar process to the one used for obtaining Cauchy’s Bound of Polynomial Roots. More specifically, observe that by Proposition 1 together with
Therefore, the polynomial has the same number of roots in
4. The proof is identical to that of condition 3, if one considers the alternative expression of difference between decay centralities,
Proof of Proposition 8
1. Consider again the reformulated expression with
2. The proof is identical to that of condition 1, if one considers the alternative expression of difference between decay centralities,
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Supplementary Material
The online version of this article offers supplementary material (DOI:https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0010).
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
- Articles
- Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model
- Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability
- On Decay Centrality
- Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices
- The core of a strategic game
- Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms
- Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining
- Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products
- Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
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- Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
- Conformity and Influence
- Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior
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- Vertical Contract and Competition Intensity in Hotelling’s Model
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- Critical Efficiencies as Upward Pricing Pressure with Feedback Effects
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