Abstract
In litigation models, the parties’ probability to succeed in a lawsuit hinge upon the merits of the parties’ claims and their litigation efforts. In this paper we extend this framework to consider an important procedural aspect of the legal system: the standard of proof. We recast the conventional litigation model to consider how alternative standards of proof affect litigation choices. We analyze the interrelation between different standards of proof, the effectiveness of the parties’ efforts, and the merits of the case. We study how these factors jointly affect the parties’ litigation expenditures, the selection of cases brought to the courts, pretrial bargain solutions and preemptive strategies. Our results show that standards of proof are not only instrumental to balancing the competing goals of access to justice and judicial truth-finding, but they also play a critical role in affecting parties’ litigation investments and settlement choices, and in sorting the mix of cases that will actually be filed and defended in courts. The understanding of the sorting effect of standards of proof sheds light on their role as a policy instrument in civil litigation.
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Articles
- Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model
- Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability
- On Decay Centrality
- Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices
- The core of a strategic game
- Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms
- Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining
- Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products
- Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
- Retained Earnings, Interest Rates and Lending Relationship
- Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
- Conformity and Influence
- Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior
- Notes
- Eco-Firms and the Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation
- Vertical Contract and Competition Intensity in Hotelling’s Model
- Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers
- Irrelevance of the Strategic Variable in the Case of Relative Performance Maximization
- Critical Efficiencies as Upward Pricing Pressure with Feedback Effects
- On the Openness of Unique Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
- Forecast Dispersion in Finite-Player Forecasting Games
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Articles
- Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model
- Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability
- On Decay Centrality
- Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices
- The core of a strategic game
- Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms
- Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining
- Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products
- Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
- Retained Earnings, Interest Rates and Lending Relationship
- Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
- Conformity and Influence
- Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior
- Notes
- Eco-Firms and the Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation
- Vertical Contract and Competition Intensity in Hotelling’s Model
- Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers
- Irrelevance of the Strategic Variable in the Case of Relative Performance Maximization
- Critical Efficiencies as Upward Pricing Pressure with Feedback Effects
- On the Openness of Unique Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
- Forecast Dispersion in Finite-Player Forecasting Games