Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis

The book provides a novel account of laws of nature via dispositions. Laws of nature play a paramount role in philosophy, science and everyday life. Understanding laws of nature is philosophically interesting on its own right but also many important notions belonging to philosophy of science, like causation, prediction and explanation, are intimately related to the laws of nature.

The book outlines the alleged characteristics of the laws of nature and introduces the main families of theories of laws of nature – neo-humean, ADT and dispositional theories. It then develops an account of dispositions the `triadic process picture of dispositions’ (TPD) and applies it to the debate about laws of nature. Finally, the (TPD) account of the necessity of the laws of nature is presented: laws of nature are naturally necessary and metaphysically contingent.

Thus the book provides an introduction to the debates about laws of nature as well as dispositions, while at the same time developing a novel theory and thus is interesting for the beginner as well as expert in these fields.

The issues of the nature and existence of God, time and infinity, respectively, and how they relate to each other, are some of the most complicated problems of metaphysics.This volume presents contributions of thirteen internationally renowned scholars who deal with various aspects of these complex issues. The contributions were presented and discussed during the international conference: God, Time, Infinity held in Warsaw, September 22—24, 2015.

This volume aims to apply ontological theories and arguments to theistic beliefs and theistic world views. After an introduction that traces out the complexity of the field by categorizing the multifaceted definitions of ontology and (theistic) believing, thirteen articles discuss specific aspects of the two terms as well as their interaction.

With contributions by Chris Daly, Gabriele De Anna, Michał Głowala, Christian Kanzian, Daniel Linford, Jason Megill, Uwe Meixner, Elisa Paganini, Eleonore Stump, Mirosław Szatkowski, William F. Vallicella and Peter van Inwagen.

Published in honor of Sergio Galvan, this collection concentrates on the application of logical and mathematical methods for the study of central issues in formal philosophy. The volume is subdivided into four sections, dedicated to logic and philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, metaphysics and philosophy of religion. The contributions adress, from a logical point of view, some of the main topics in these areas. The first two sections include formal treatments of: truth and paradoxes; definitions by abstraction; the status of abstract objects, such as mathematical objects and universal concepts; and the structure of explicit knowledge. The last two sections include papers on classical problems in philosophy of science, such as the status of subjective probability, the notion of verisimilitude, the notion of approximation, and the theory of mind and mental causation, and specific issues in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, such as the ontology of species, actions, and intelligible worlds, and the logic of religious belonging.

Is a lake’s surface made of water or air? When two extended objects are in contact, do their boundaries coincide? Is a new boundary created when an extended object is split? These and many other problems in the ontology of boundaries are grounded in the common assumption that boundaries are the outermost parts of extended objects. The author argues that this problematic assumption should be abandoned in favour of a relational view of boundaries.

A major goal for compatibilists is to avoid the luck problem and to include all the facts from neuroscience and natural science in general which purportedly show that the brain works in a law-governed and causal way like any other part of nature. Libertarians, for their part, want to avoid the manipulation argument and demonstrate that very common and deep seated convictions about freedom and responsibility are true: it can really be fundamentally up to us as agents to determine that the future should be either A or B.

This book presents a theory of free will which integrates the main motivations of compatibilists and libertarians, while at the same time avoiding their problems. The so-called event-causal libertarianism is the libertarian account closest to compatibilitsm, as it claims there is indeterminism in the mind of an agent. The charge of compatibilists, however, is that this position is impaired by the problem of luck. This book is unique in arguing that free will in a strong sense of the term does not require indeterminism in the brain, only indeterminism somewhere in the world which there plausibly is.

The book is a systematic study of the issue of self-individuation in the scholastic debate on principles of individuation (principia individuationis).

The point of departure is a general formulation of the problem of individuation acceptable for all the participants of the scholastic debate: a principle of individuation of x is what makes x individual (in various possible senses of ‘making something individual’). The book argues against a prima facie plausible view that everything that is individual is individual by itself and not by anything distinct from it (Strong Self-Individuation Thesis). The keynote topic of the book is a detailed analysis of the two competing ways of rejecting the Strong Self-Individuation Thesis: the Scotistic and the Thomistic one. The book defends the latter one, discussing a number of issues concerning substantial and accidental forms, essences, properties, instantiation, the Thomistic notion of materia signata, Frege’s Begriff-Gegenstand distinction, and Geach’s form-function analogy developed in his writings on Aquinas.

In the context of both the scholastic and contemporary metaphysics, the book offers a framework for dealing with issues of individuality and defends a Thomistic theory of individuation.

Central to Elements is an assay of the attributional union properties and relations have with their subjects, a topic historically left metaphorical. The work critiques eight Aristotelian assumptions concerning attribute dependence and ‘inherence’, per se subjects (‘substances’), attributes as agent-organizers, and unity-by-a-shared-one. Groups of these assumptions are seen to yield contradiction, vicious regress, or other problems. This analysis, joined with insights from an assay of ubiquitous structure, motivate ten theses explicating attribution and its primary ontic status. The theses detail: attributes proper as individuated instances, structure as instance-generated facts and their two forms of composition, the conditioning role and universal nature of instances’ component intensions, the primacy of attribute instances for generating all forms of composition and complex entities, and identity and indiscernibility criteria for the latter. Principal is the insight that attribution is intension-determined combinatorial agency. It is its systematizing implications that provide solutions to classic problems, e.g., Composition, Individuation, and Universals, and in net generate a comprehensive one-category structuralist ontology.

While post-Fregean logicians tend to ignore or even denigrate the traditional logic of Aristotle and the Scholastics, new work in recent years has shown the viability of a renewed, extended, and strengthened logic of terms that shares fundamental features of the old syllogistic. A number of logicians, following the lead of Fred Sommers, have built just such a term logic. It is a system of formal logic that not only matches the expressive and inferential powers of today’s standard logic, but surpasses it and is far simpler and more natural. This book aims to substantiate this claim by exhibiting just how the term logic can shed need light on a variety of challenges that face any system of formal logic.

This book is about “how things are.” It starts from the principles of a descriptive (i.e. “everyday ontological”) ontology of things to develop a theory about the title question that is based on the notion of “mode”. Modes are concrete, individual determinants of things. The power of the theory is then tested to determine its usefulness for developing an ontology of things.

The book God, Truth, and other Enigmas is a collection of eighteen essays that fall under four headings: (God's) Existence/Non-Existence, Omniscience, Truth, and Metaphysical Enigmas. The essays vary widely in topic and tone. They provide the reader with an overview of contemporary philosophical approaches to the subjects that are indicated in the title of the book.

Models are one of the main instruments in scientific research. Disciplines have developed a different understanding of the notion, function and purpose of models. We thus need a systematic approach in order to understand, to build and to use models. This book gives an insight into the disciplinary modelling know-how and is a starting point to develop a general model approach that generalises and combines for an interdisciplinary use.

This work is a detailed analytical study of different forms of silent doing. It explores a range of topics related to silence, including the theory of silent doing and its relationship to other forms of action and communication, silence and aesthetics, the ethics and politics of silence, and the religious dimensions of silence. The book, as an original contribution to analytical philosophy, should be of interest to philosophers and students.

The development of science, logic, mathematics, and psychology in the 19th century made it necessary to introduce a growing number of new entities, of which classical empiricism and strong extensionalism were unable to give a wholly satisfying account. One of the major issues confronting the 20th century philosophers was to identify which of these entities should be rationally accepted as part of the furniture of the world and which should not, and to provide a general account of how the latter are nevertheless subject to true predication. The 13 original essays collected in this volume explore some of the main approaches to this issue in the 20th century, including Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Carnap, Frege, Twardowski, Kotarbinski, Nicolai Hartmann, and realist phenomenologists.

The book defends that there is both teleological order (design) and chance in non-living and in living systems of nature including man. This is done by giving exact definitions of different types of order and teleological order on the one hand and of different types of chance on the other. For their compatibility it is important to notice that any definition of chance presupposes some kind of order relative to that we can speak of chance. Thus also in evolution which is some growth of some order and for which a detailed definition is given in chpt.13 chance and degrees of freedom play an essential role.
A further purpose of the book is to show that both the existing order and the existing chance in nature are compatible with a global teleological plan which is God’s providence. However concerning the execution of God’s plan not everything is done or caused by himself but “God created things in such a way that they themselves can create something” (Gödel, MAX PHIL). A reason for that is that God is neither all-causing nor all-willing although he is almighty. This is connected with the result of chpts.15 and 16 that also human freedom and evil are compatible with God’s providence.

The content of the volume is divided as follows: after presenting two rival approaches to substantiality and causality: a traditional (ontological) view vs. a transcendental one (Rosiak) there follow two sections: the first presents studies of substance as showing some causal aspects (Buchheim, Keinänen, Kovac, Piwowarczyk), whereas the other contains investigations of causality showing in a way its reference to the category of substance (Kobiela, Meixner, Mitscherling, Wroński). The last, short section contains two studies of
extension (Leszczyński and Skowron) which can be regarded as a conceptual background of both substantiality and causality. The book gives a very colourful picture of the discussions connected with substantiality and causality which may be of potential interest for the readers.

Since the millennium, the neurophysiological and psychological bases of moral judgements and actions have been the topic of much empirical research. This volume discusses the relevance and possible usage of this research for (meta-)ethics and action theory. An overview of the empirical research, followed by critical assessments of several of its results, provides orientation on the research and criteria for its reasonable usage.

This volume responds to and reassesses the work of Hector-Neri Castañeda (1924-1991). The essays collected here, written by his students, followers, and opponents, examine Castañeda’s seminal views on deontic logic, metaethics, indedicality, praticitions, fictions, and metaphysics, utilizing the critical viewpoint afforded by time, as well as new data, to offer insights on his theories and methodology.

Papers in the collection concentrate on different issues relevant for contemporary research within semantics, such as the linguistic and philosophical status of representations, reference theory and indexicals, situation semantics, formal semantics, normativity of meaning and speech acts, and different approaches to context and contextualism. The authors investigate the links between semantics and syntax, and between semantics, pragmatics, and speech act theory, and demonstrate that it is possible to integrate findings from different disciplines.

Recent studies often advocate a ‘pragmatic turn’ in the study of meaning and context; however, the papers in the volume show that semantics and meaning remain in the center of research carried out within contemporary linguistics and philosophy, especially the philosophy of language.

The volume includes contributions by: Brian Ball (St Anne’s College, Oxford), John Collins (University of East Anglia), Luis Fernández Moreno (Complutense University of Madrid), Chris Fox (University of Essex), Filip Kawczyński (University of Warsaw), Katarzyna Kijania-Placek (Jagiellonian University), Joanna Klimczyk (Polish Academy of Sciences), Paul Livingston (University of New Mexico), Mark Pinder (University of Bristol), Ernesto Perini-Santos (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais), Tabea Reiner (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich), Stefan Riegelnik (University of Zurich), Arthur Sullivan (Memorial University of Newfoundland), Massimiliano Vignolo (University of Genoa), and Marián Zouhar (Slovak Academy of Sciences).

The volume should be of interest to linguists, philosophers of language, and philosophers in general.

Quantum physics, in contrast to classical physics, allows non-locality and indeterminism in nature. Moreover, the role of the observer seems indispensable in quantum physics. In fact, quantum physics, unlike classical physics, suggests a metaphysics that is not physicalism (which is today’s official metaphysical doctrine). As is well known, physicalism implies a reductive position in the philosophy of mind, specifically in its two core areas, the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of action. Quantum physics, in contrast, is compatible with psychological non-reductionism, and actually seems to support it. The essays in this book explore, from various points of view, the possibilities of basing a non-reductive philosophy of mind on quantum physics. In doing so, they not only engage with the ontological and epistemological aspects of the question but also with the neurophysiological ones.

Induction, which involves a leap from the particular to the universal, has always been a puzzling phenomenon for those attempting to investigate the origins of knowledge. Although traditionally accepted as the engine of first principles, the authority of inductive reasoning has been undermined in the modern age by empiricist criticisms that derive notably from Hume, who insisted that induction is an invalid line of reasoning that ends in unreliable future predictions. The present volume challenges this Humean orthodoxy. It begins with a thorough consideration of Hume’s original position and continues with a series of state-of-the-art essays that critique the received view while offering positive alternatives. The experts assembled here draw on a perennial historical tradition that stretches as far back as Socrates and extends through such luminaries as Aristotle, Aquinas, Whewell, Goethe, Lonergan, and Rescher. They inquire into the creative moment of intellectual insight that makes induction possible, consider relevant episodes from the history of science, advance scholarly exegeses of historical interpretations of inductive reasoning, and reflect critically on the scientific and logical ramifications of epistemological and metaphysical realism.

This collection focuses on the ontology of space and time. It is centred on the idea that the issues typically encountered in this area must be tackled from a multifarious perspective, paying attention to both a priori and a posteriori considerations. Several experts in this area contribute to this volume:
G. Landini discusses how Russell’s conception of time features in his general philosophical perspective; D. Dieks proposes a middle course between substantivalist and relationist accounts of space-time; P. Graziani argues that it is necessary to provide an account of the “synthetic procedures” implicit in the recourse to diagrams in Euclid’s Elements, while E. Mares comes to the conclusion that in Euclid’s Elements we should treat the parallel postulate as empirical and the postulate that space is continuous as a priori.
M. Arsenijević/M. Adžić present an important formal result concerning two theories of the infinite two-dimensional continua, which sheds new light on the current dispute between gunkologists and pointilists; F. Orilia discusses two problems for presentism, one regarding the duration of the present and the other related to Zeno’s paradoxes. A. Iacona delves deep into logical matters by focusing on the so-called T×W modal frames in order to deal with the deteterminism-indeterminism controversy. D. Mancuso outlines a non-standard temporal model compatible with time travel, and V. Fano/G. Macchia discuss time travels in the light of an important foundational principle of modern cosmology, Weyl’s Principle.

The present volume investigates the legacy of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein in contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics. These philosophers inspired both the development of analytic philosophy and various philosophical approaches to the study of language. They have influenced technical discussions on truth, proper names, definite descriptions, propositions and predication, sense and reference, truth, and philosophical and linguistic inquiries into the relations between language, mind and the world. The studies gathered in this volume discuss most of these issues and aim to show that the results of this research are still of utmost importance, and that the three philosophers have significantly contributed to the linguistic turn in philosophy and the philosophical turn in the study of language.

The volume includes contributions by: Joachim Adler (Zurich), Maria Cerezo (Murcia), Pawel Grabarczyk (Lodz), Arkadiusz Gutt (Lublin), Tom Hughes (Durham), Gabriele Mras (Vienna), Carl Humphries (Cracow), Gary Kemp (Glasgow), Siu-Fan Lee (Hong Kong), Jaroslav Peregrin (Prague), Ulrich Reichard (Durham), Piotr Stalmaszczyk (Lodz), Piotr Szalek (Lublin), Mieszko Talasiewicz (Warsaw).

The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as inaugurated by Brentano and worked out in a very sophisticated way by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. Their criticism is, in the epistemological regard, directed against introspectionism, and in the ontological regard, against an internalist and qualia-friendly, non-functionalist (or: broadly dualistic/idealistic) conception of the mind. The book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hacker, Dennett, and other authors, reconstructing their arguments, and pointing out where they fall short of their aim. In defending Husserl against his Wittgensteinian critics, the book also offers a comprehensive fresh view of phenomenology as a philosophy of mind. In particular, Husserl’s non-representationalist theory of intentionality is carefully described in its various aspects and elucidated also with respect to its development, taking into account writings from various periods of Husserl’s career. Last but not least, the book shows Wittgensteinianism to be one of the effective roots of the present-day hegemony of physicalism.

A Chance for Possibility defends the view that the objective modal realm is tripartite: truths about possible worlds supervene on modal truths, which in turn supervene on truths about objective chances.
An understanding of supervenience in terms of grounding is developed which — unlike the standard modal characterization — allows the question of what modal truths supervene on to have a non-trivial answer. Relying on this understanding, a negative result is established: modal truths do not supervene on truths about possible worlds, whether possible worlds are conceived of as Lewisian concreta or as abstract objects of some kind. Instead, a conception of pleonastic possible worlds is developed that reverses the direction of supervenience. On the basis of linguistic considerations concerning our use of natural language ‘might’ and ‘might have’ sentences, Steinberg finally argues that truths about objective chances are able to provide a supervenience base for modal truths.
A Chance for Possibility is an investigation in analytic metaphysics, drawing on related work in the philosophy of logic and language as well as linguistics. It provides a detailed case study for the fruitful use of a notion of grounding in the clarification and evaluation of longstanding philosophical issues.

The book Ontological Proofs Today, apart from the introduction, consists of six parts. Part II comprises papers each of which pertains either to historical ontological arguments, or to some other, rather new, ontological arguments, but what makes them stand out from the other papers in this volume, is the fact that they all treat of the omniscience or the omnipotence of God. Part III includes papers which introduce new ontological arguments for the existence of God, without referring to omniscience and omnipotence as the transparent attributes of God. The issue of the type of necessity with which ontological proofs work or may work is raised in the articles of Part IV. In Part V the semantics for some ontological proofs are defined. Part VI consists of papers which, although quite different from each other in terms of content, all explore some ontological issues, and formal ontology may be considered the link between them. Part VII comprises two articles, by R. E. Maydole and G. Oppy, mutually controversial and different in their assessment of some ontological proofs.

In this book I investigate the necessary structure of the aether – the stuff that fills the whole universe. Some of my conclusions are. 1. There is an enormous variety of structures that the aether might, for all we know, have. 2. Probably the aether is point-free. 3. In that case, it should be distinguished from Space-time, which is either a fiction or a construct. 4. Even if the aether has points, we should reject the orthodoxy that all regions are grounded in points by summation. 5. If the aether is point-free but not continuous, its most likely structure has extended atoms that are not simples. 6. Space-time is symmetric if and only if the aether is continuous. 7. If the aether is continuous, we should reject the standard interpretation of General Relativity, in which geometry determines gravity. 8. Contemporary physics undermines an objection to discrete aether based on scale invariance, but does not offer much positive support.

Reason and rationality represent crucial elements of the self-image of human beings and have unquestionably been among the most debated issues in Western philosophy, dating from ancient Greece, through the Middle Ages, and to the present day. Many words and thoughts have already been spent trying to define the nature and standards of reason and rationality, what they could or ought to be, and under what conditions something can be said to be rational. This volume focuses instead on the relationships of reason and rationality to some relevant specific topics, i.e., science, knowledge, gender, politics, ethics, religion, aesthetics, language, logic, and metaphysics, trying to uncover and clarify both the connections and differences in their various characterisations and uses.

Issues of subjectivity and consciousness are dealt with in very different ways in the analytic tradition and in the idealistic–phenomenological tradition central to continental philosophy. This book brings together analytically inspired philosophers working on the continent with English-speaking philosophers to address specific issues regarding subjectivity and consciousness. The issues range from acquaintance and immediacy in perception and apperception, to the role of agency in bodily ‘mine-ness’, to self-determination (Selbstbestimmung) through (free) action. Thus involving philosophers of different traditions should yield a deeper vision of consciousness and subjectivity; one relating the mind not only to nature, or to first-person authority in linguistic creatures–questions which, in the analytic tradition, are sometimes treated as exhausting the topic–but also to many other aspects of mind’s understanding of itself in ways which disrupt classic inner/outer boundaries.

Contemporary analytic philosophy can generally be characterized by the following tendencies: commitment to first-order predicate logic as the only viable formal logic; rejection of correspondence theories of truth; a view of existence as something expressed by the existential quantifier; a metaphysics that doesn’t give the world as a whole its due. This book seeks to offer an alternative analytic theory, one that provides a unified account of what there is, how we speak about it, the underlying logic of our language, how the truth of what we say is determined, and the central role of the real world in all of this. The result is a robust account of reality. The inspiration for many of the ideas that constitute this overall theory comes from such sources as Aristotle, Leibniz, Ryle, and Sommers.

Menschen haben eine Fülle von moralischen Überzeugungen. Wodurch sind diese Überzeugungen aber gerechtfertigt? In diesem Buch wird dafür argumentiert, dass verschiedene Arten von Gründen zur Rechtfertigung von moralischen Überzeugungen beitragen können: Gründe, die ihrerseits Überzeugungen sind, aber auch Gründe, die selbst keine Überzeugungen sind wie etwa Intuitionen, Emotionen und Wünsche. Die These lautet: Wenn derartige Gründe als Inputs in eine verlässliche Überzeugungsbildungsfähigkeit eingehen, sind die daraus resultierenden moralischen Überzeugungen gerechtfertigt.

This book is a collection of essays in systematic ontology. The parts of its title – “Things” and “Ways They Are” – are indicative of two broadly and intensively discussed issues in current ontology, namely, what categories of entities there are and in what ways they are relevant for our discourses. The three sections of the volume correspond to focuses of ontological research: “Before Ontology” is dedicated to conceptual, methodological, and meta-ontological issues; “Ontology at Work” raises general topics of categorial ontology, and the final section “Ontology in Application” discusses questions such as those relating to free will and our conception of the human being. The book is a tribute to Edmund Runggaldier on the occasion of his 65th birthday. Its seventeen papers are authored by such distinguished scholars as Lynne Rudder Baker, Franz von Kutschera, E. J. Lowe, Otto Muck, Paul Weingartner, Timothy Williamson, and many others.

This volume comprises original articles by leading authors – from philosophy as well as sociology – in the debate around relativism in the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. Its aim has been to bring together several threads from the relevant disciplines and to cover the discussion from historical and systematic points of view. Among the contributors are Maria Baghramian, Barry Barnes, Martin Endreß, Hubert Knoblauch, Richard Schantz and Harvey Siegel.

Truth: Its criteria and conditions is an in-depth critical-and-constructive inquiry in almost equal measure. The theories of the nature of empirical truth critically considered include two forms of the traditional correspondence theory; truth as appraisal; truth as identity of proposition and truth; en emotive theory of truth; P.F. Strawson’s performative theory, and N. Rescher’s novel theory of a coherentist criterion of truth. The constructive parts include an analysis of the concept of “a fact,” the meaning and uses of ‘true’ and ‘false’ in empirical statements, together with the various sorts of conditions for their correct application; the appraisive/evaluative uses of true and false statements; and the performative-cum-cognitive uses of ‘true’ empirical statements; and the conditions of the performative uses of ‘true.’ A significant claim about the concept of truth is its indefinablity; albeit for quite different reasons from Gottlob Frege’s reason based on his argument against the correspondence theory of truth.

In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call Externalism and Internalism about property possession. Monaghan argues that it is impossible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property. He provides replies to variety of objections one might raise against his account.

This volume breaks new grounds by bringing together a great variety of innovative contributions on triangulation, epistemology, and mind. The notion of “triangulation”, developed by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) during the last two decades of his life, has changed our understanding of the relationship between subjective, intersubjective, and objective, and shed new light on concepts such as externalism, internalism, communication, interpretation, and language. At the same time, however, it has been strongly criticized for several aspects. The papers collected in this volume—written by established contributors—aim to provide new insights into the contemporary debate on triangulation. The upshot is not only a deeper understanding of Davidson’s ideas but also a new appreciation of some central problems of epistemology and the philosophy of mind with regard to adjoining disciplines such as, for instance, cognitive sciences and the philosophy of language.

Der vorliegende Band diskutiert neben den metaphysischen Aspekten einer Zeittheorie wie Persistenz und Indexikalität auch die soziale bzw. institutionelle Dimension des Zeitbegriffs. Was bedeutet es von einer Entität, sei es einem gewöhnlichen Ding oder einer Institution, zu behaupten, dass es bzw. sie in der Zeit existiert? Was muss eine Zeittheorie leisten, um die Persistenz solcher Entitäten in dynamischen Veränderungsprozessen adäquat zu beschreiben? Und wie ist diese Persistenz zu erklären?
Ein zentrales Problem jeder Zeittheorie ist auch die Erklärung des Gegenwartsbezugs. Der indexikalische Ausdruck „jetzt“ zeigt die subjektbezogene Gegenwart seines Benutzers an. Wie erklären wir uns dann den gemeinsam hergestellten Bezug auf eine objektive Gegenwart? Und welcher Typ von Ontologie ist für die Erklärung der Leistungen unseres temporalen Repräsentationssystems adäquat?

Die Rekonstruktion zeitontologischer Annahmen weist auch eine formale Dimension auf: Welche Art von Zeitlogik ist ausdrucksstark genug, unsere tempushaltigen Sätze (Tempora verbi und zeit-indexikalische Ausdrücke) zu formalisieren? Wie verhält sich eine prädikatenlogische Zeitlogik zu einer modallogischen?

The essays collected in this volume are all concerned with the connection between fiction and truth. This question is of utmost importance to metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical logic and epistemology, raising in each of these areas and at their intersections a large number of issues related to creation, existence, reference, identity, modality, belief, assertion, imagination, pretense, etc. All these topics and many more are addressed in this collection, which brings together original essays written from various points of view by philosophers of diverse trends. These essays constitute major contributions to the current debates that the connection between truth and fiction continually enlivens, and give a sense of the directions in which research on this question is heading.

Today, quantum field theory (QFT)—the mathematical and conceptual framework for contemporary elementary particle physics—is the best starting point for analysing the fundamental building blocks of the material world. QFT if taken seriously in its metaphysical implications yields a picture of the world that is at variance with central classical conceptions. The core of Kuhlmann’s investigation consists in the analysis of various ontological interpretations of QFT, e.g. substance ontologies as well as a process-ontological approach. Eventually, Kuhlmann proposes a dispositional trope ontology, according to which particularized properties and not things are the most basic entities, in terms of which all other entities are to be analysed, e.g as bundles of properties. This book was chosen for the 2009 ontos-Award for research on analytical ontology and metaphysics by the German Society for Analytical Philosophy.

The book discusses the fate of universality and a universal set in several set theories. The book aims at a philosophical study of ontological and conceptual questions around set theory. Set theories are ontologies. They posit sets and claim that these exhibit the essential properties laid down in the set theoretical axioms. Collecting these postulated entities quantified over poses the problem of universality. Is the collection of the set theoretical entities itself a set theoretical entity? What does it mean if it is, and what does it mean if it is not? To answer these questions involves developing a theory of the universal set. We have to ask: Are there different aspects to universality in set theory, which stand in conflict to each other? May inconsistency be the price to pay to circumvent ineffability? And most importantly: How far can axiomatic ontology take us out of the problems around universality?

The belief is widely held that the physical world is causally-driven. The world is one because a tangled web of causally-driven processes keeps it together. However, both the psychological and the social worlds cannot be articulated in causal terms only. Hereby, “motivation” is used as the most general term referring to whatever keeps (synchronically) together and provides (diachronic) reasons explaining the behavior of psychological and social systems. In order to systematically address these problems, a categorical framework is needed for understanding the various types of realities populating the world and their multifarious interrelations. The papers collected in this volume dig into some of the intricacies presented by these problems. The papers here presented have been selected from those presented at the workshops bearing the very same name, “Causality and Motivation” organized in Bolzano and Rome.

This book models and simulates metaphysics by presenting the metaphysics of a model. The small size of the model makes it possible to treat metaphysical matters with a more than usual systematicity and comprehensiveness. In the mirror of sustained analogy, simulation-metaphysics offers a wealth of insights on the real thing: on the doctrines, the methods, and the epistemology of metaphysics.

Fester Bestandteil unserer Alltagswelt sind Dinge. Was aber sind, genau genommen, Dinge? Wie heben sich Dinge ab von anderen konkreten Individuen? Sind Dinge eine ontologische Kategorie? Welche Unterscheidungen können wir innerhalb der Dinge anstellen und begründen?, etwa: Worin unterscheiden sich künstlich hergestellte Dinge (Artefakte) von Lebewesen? Kann man unter den Lebewesen nochmals eine besondere Gruppe festmachen, die traditionell Personen genannt werden? Was sind Personen? Derartigen Fragen geht diese Monographienach und versucht einen ontologischen Rahmen zu entwickeln, vor dessen Hintergrund die damit verbundenen Probleme einer Lösung zugeführt werden können. Der hier verfolgte Ansatz ist systematisch und problemorientiert, nicht exegetisch-historisch und nicht gegen andere ontologische Zugangsweisen gerichtet. Er bekennt sich zu methodischen Vorgaben einer „deskriptiven-“ oder Alltagsontologie.

The two eminent metaphysicians Armstrong and Grossmann exchanged letters for ten years in which they discussed crucial points of their respective ontologies. They have a common basis. Both do metaphysics proper and not linguistic philosophy. Both advocate universals and acknowledge the key position of the category of states of affairs. However, they differ on the simplicity of universals and the nature of states of affairs. There is also a fundamental methodological disagreement between them. Armstrong accepts only the evidence of natural science and has a materialist view on mind while Grossmann is a dualist and grants also the same evidential status to the phenomenological data of perception and introspection. The letters are grouped into three phases. The first is the issue of universals, the second the ontological analysis of laws of nature and the third the ontology of numbers. The book contains also longer comments and reviews, partly not published until now.

Dieser Band ist eine Sammlung von Vorträgen, die auf einer Tagung mit dem Titel "Aktuelle Probleme der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung" gehalten wurden, die im Sommer 2007 an der Universität Siegen stattfand. Der Band verfolgt das Ziel, den Reichtum und die Lebendigkeit von wichtigen gegenwärtigen Debatten in der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung zu dokumentieren. Die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung spielt in verschiedenen philosophischen Kerndisziplinen - in der Metaphysik, in der Erkenntnistheorie, in der Philosophie des Geistes - eine ganz wesentliche Rolle. Die in diesem Band versammelten Aufsätze beschäftigen sich mit zentralen Aspekten grundlegender philosophischer Fragestellungen dieser Kerndisziplinen.

States of affairs raise, among others, the following questions: What kind of entity are they (if there are any)? Are they contingent, causally efficacious, spatio-temporal and perceivable entities, or are they abstract objects? What are their constituents and their identity conditions? What are the functions that states of affairs are able to fulfil in a viable theory, and which problems and prima facie counterintuitive consequences arise out of an ontological commitment to them? Are there merely possible (non-actual, non-obtaining) states of affairs? Are there molecular (i.e., negative, conjunctive, disjunctive etc.) states of affairs? Are there modal and tensed states of affairs? In this volume, these and other questions are addressed by David M. Armstrong, Marian David, Herbert Hochberg, Uwe Meixner, L. Nathan Oaklander, Peter Simons, Erwin Tegtmeier and Mark Textor.

The texts of the book are concerned with G. Bergmann's open and new problems and their active role on issues in contemporary metaphysics, like the ontology of ties, connexions and relations, problems of exemplification, substrates and tropes theories, particulars, persistence and the metaphysics of space, time and existence. Papers deal with these themes by themselves, or discuss them in an associated way: some of them aim to clarify the complicated conceptual Relations Bergmann have enlarged with major themes of philosophers like Aristotle, Brentano, Meinong and Sellars. The purpose of the book is to provide some light on his central interests, but also in regard of the evolution of the actual scope of his thought.

Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987) was, arguably, one of the greatest ontologists of the twentieth century. In 2006 and 2007, after a period of relative neglect, international conferences devoted solely to Bergmann's work were held at the University of Iowa in the USA, Université de Provence in France, and Università degli Studi di Roma Tre in Italy. The fifteen papers collected in this volume were presented at the third of these conferences, in Rome, and are here divided into three sections: "Categories of a realistic ontology", "World, mind, and relations", "Metaphysics of space and time".

The present volume contains a selection of papers presented at the Fifth Conference on Collective Intentionality held at the University of Helsinki August 31 to September 2, 2006 and two additional contributions. The common aim of the papers is to explore the structure of shared intentional attitudes, and to explain how they underlie the social, cultural and institutional world. The contributions to this volume explore the phenomenology of sharedness, the concept of sharedness, and also various aspects of the structure of collective intentionality in general, and of the intricate relations between sharedness and normativity in particular. Concepts of Sharedness shows how rich and lively the philosophical research focused on the analysis of collective intentionality has become, and will provide further inspiration for future work in this rapidly evolving field.

In this collection of papers by Laird Addis, published over approximately a quarter century, the main topics are the ontology of mind and the role of mind in the explanation of behavior. Addis defends a theory of natural signs, by which there is, in every conscious state including emotional states, an intrinsically intentional entity. He also argues that explanations of behavior by dispositional mental states, while not themselves causal explanations, presuppose the possibility of such explanations. The theory of dispositions is applied also to the theories of Chomsky and Freud. In broad strokes, Addis holds that, while there is a distinct realm of mental properties, behaviors admit of purely physical explanations.

The ontological debate on the nature of properties is alive as ever. Mainly, they are viewed either as universals or tropes (abstract particulars), an alternative with an immediate impact on what events are taken to be. Although much inquiry in philosophy of mind is done without a full awareness of it, some recent works suggest that the choice may have far-reaching consequences on central topics of this discipline, e.g., token physicalism, multiple realizability, mental causation, perception, introspection, self-awareness. This book explores the extent to which this is true with novel contributions by philosophers who have played a major role in bringing to the fore this interplay of foundational metaphysics and philosophical psychology and by other experts in these fields.

The aim of the book is to clarify the concept of omniscience. This is done first by discussing basic questions on omniscience (chs.1-12) and secondly by offering a theory of omniscience as an axiomatic system in which also a definition of omniscience is given (ch.13). The twelve chapters deal with questions like whether everything is true what God knows, whether God´s knowledge is bound to time, whether it concerns singular truths or only laws, whether it extends also to contingent future events.etc. The book is neither a book about the existence of God nor about proofs for his existence. It is a book about the possibility of a consistent concept of omniscience which can be attributed to God. And it invalidates opposite claims and shows that they are based on wrong or very doubtful premises. The pros and cons at the beginning of each chapter represent different positions and objections which are clarified and discussed in the answer to the objections.

This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume’s metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume’s account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one’s character that constitutes one’s identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one’s character and one’s identity as a person. But also central is one’s body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one’s body is essential to one’s identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.

The problem of persistence is as old as the tradition of systematic ontology. How can we explain that the middle-sized standard objects of everyday’s life are regarded normally as remaining 'the same', even if they change their properties and their material constituents? The aim of this edition is to present new arguments, perspectives, and theoretical backgrounds concerning 'persistence': There is much more to consider than the classical distinction between 'endurantism' and 'perdurantism'.

The volume includes contributions authored by S. Barker, P. Dowe, A. Chrudzimski, P. Grenon, B. Smith, L. Jansen, E.J. Lowe, U. Meixner, K. Miller, E. Runggaldier, J. Seibt, and E. Tegtmeier.

Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987) was, arguably, the greatest ontologist of the twentieth century in pursuing the fundamental questions of first philosophy as deeply as any philosopher of any time. In 2006 and 2007, international conferences devoted solely to Bergmann’s work were held at the University of Iowa in the USA, Université de Provence in France, and Università degli Studi Roma Tre in Italy. The papers in this volume were presented at the first of these conferences, in Iowa City, where Bergmann taught for nearly four decades after escaping from Europe, following the dissolution of the Vienna Circle of which he had been the youngest member. There are nine philosophical papers, reminiscences of three of his students, and a complete bibliography of his published writings.

These essays bring together forty years of work in ontology. Intentionality, negation, universals, bare particulars, tropes, general facts, relations, the myth of the 'myth of the given', are among the topics covered. Bergmann, Quine, Sellars, Russell, Wittgenstein, Hume, Bradley, Hochberg, Dummett, Frege, Plato, are among the philosophers discussed. The essays criticize non-Humean notions of cause; they criticize the notion that besides simple atomic facts there are also negative facts and general facts. They defend a realism of properties as universals, against nominalism; bare particulars; a (qualified) realism with regard to logical form; a Russellian account of relations; and an account of minds and intentionality, which is opposed to materialism, but is also a form of (methodological) behaviourism. In general, the ontology is one of logical atomism and empiricist throughout, rooted in a Principle of Acquaintance.

The essays collected in this volume concern the general question of truthmaking. Most of them also bear upon the metaphysical nature of truthmakers (moments, tropes, property-instances, Aristotelian substances, states of affairs, meanings or essences ? ). Taking as their starting point a famous seminal paper by K. Mulligan, P. Simons and B. Smith, as well as D. Armstrong’s outstanding contribution to the subject, they offer a fresh assay of the main concepts involved, in order to assess the explanatory value of truthmakers and truthmaker necessitarianism, and explore such delicate issues as contingent truth, bare possibility, tensed propositions, the ontological irreducibility of relations, the subsistence of facts and the epistemic role of negative truths. The collection as a whole provides a comprehensive and thought-provoking survey of the current debate about truthmaking theory and deserves to be read carefully by anyone interested in the relationship between language, thought and reality.

With contributions from David ARMSTRONG, Stefano CAPUTO, François CLEMENTZ, Pascal ENGEL, Herbert HOCHBERG, Philipp KELLER, Jonathan LOWE, Jean-Maurice MONNOYER, Kevin MULLIGAN, Stephen MUMFORD, Frederic NEF, Peter SIMONS, Barry SMITH, Jonathan SIMON

Metaphilosophy is philosophy’s poor and neglected cousin. Philosophers are on the whole too busy doing philosophy to take time to stand back and consider reflectively how the project itself actually works. And they lead tend to produce texts without too much consideration of how this looks from the standpoint of the consumer. All this, it seems to be, affords good reason for attending to philosophical hermeneutics, reflecting on the issue of how philosophical texts are to be understood and interpreted.

Universality is not sufficient to distinguish laws of nature from accidental regularities. A multitude of additional defining features have been suggested. Yet, once it is acknowledged that exceptionless universality is not the only criterion for lawhood it is possible to start questioning whether it is necessary.
Markus Schrenk's The Metaphysics of Ceteris Paribus Laws takes this bold step and it's provocative conclusion is that existing theories - especially David Lewis's and David Armstrong's - are, in fact, strong enough to guarantee lawhood even if there are instances that do not conform to the laws. Schrenk also advances two novel theories for special science ceteris paribus laws. His unorthodox exploration has the potential to stimulate a new debate about laws, lawhood and exceptions.

This work has received the Award for Furthering Research in Ontology of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP).

The aim of this volume is to explore new approaches to the problem of the constitution of the various aspects of sociality and to confront these with received ideas. Therefore many of the contributions to this volume are devoted to a rather holistic and antireductionist conception of social objects, groups, joint actions and collective knowledge. The topics, that are dealt with are: a) the question of the ontological status of social objects and their relation to physical objects, b) collective agency and c) the question whether there can be shared knowledge and shared beliefs - a rather new topic in the discussion of the social aspects of personal life.

Structure or system is a ubiquitous and uneliminable feature of all our experience and theory, and requires an ontological analysis. The essays collected in this volume provide an account of structure founded upon the proper analysis of polyadic relations as the irreducible and defining elements of structure. It is argued that polyadic relations are ontic predicates in the insightful sense of intension-determined agent-combinators, monadic properties being the limiting and historically misleading case. This assay of ontic predicates has a number of powerful explanatory implications, including fundamentally: providing ontology with a principium individuationis, demonstrating the perennial theory that properties and relations are individuated as unit attributes or ‘instances’, giving content to the ontology of facts or states of affairs, and providing a means to precisely differentiate identity from indiscernibility. The differentiation of the unrepeatable combinatorial and repeatable intension aspects of ontic predicates makes it possible to properly diagnose and disarm the classis Bradley Regress Argument aimed against attributes and universals, an argument that trades on confusing these aspects. It is argued that these two aspects of ontic predicates form a ‘composite simple’, an explanation that sheds light on the nature and necessity of the medieval formal distinction, e.g., the distinctio formalis a parte rei of Scotus. Following from this analysis of ontic predication there is given a number of principles delineating realist instance ontology, together with a critique of both nominalistic trope theory and modern revivals of Aristotle’s instance ontology of the Categories. It is shown how the resulting theory of facts can, via ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ composition, account for all the hierarchical structuring of our experience and theory, and, importantly, how this can rest upon an atomic ontic level composed of only dependent ontic predicates. The latter is a desideratum for the proposed ‘Structural Realism’ ontology for micro-physics where at its lowest level the physical is said to be totally relational/structural. Nullified is the classic and insidious assumption that dependent entities presuppose a class of independent substrata or ‘substances’, and with this any pressure to admit ‘bare particulars’ and intensionless relations or ‘ties’. The logic inherent in realist instance ontology-termed ‘PPL’-is formalized in detail and given a consistency proof. Demonstrated is the logic’s power to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate impredicative definitions, and in this how it provides a general solution to the classic self-referential paradoxes. PPL corresponds to Gödel’s programmatic ‘Theory of Concepts’. The last essay, not previously published, provides a detailed differentiation of identity from indiscernibility, preliminary to which is given an explanation of in what sense a predicate logic presupposes an ontology of predication. The principles needed for the differentiation have the significant implication (e.g., for the foundations of mathematics) of implying an infinity of logical entities, viz., instances of the identity relation.

This book presents a comprehensive, non-model-theoretic theory of ontic necessity and possibility within a formal (and formalized) ontology consisting of states of affairs, properties, and individuals. Its central thesis is that all modalities are reducible to intrinsic (or "logical") possibility and necessity if reference is made to certain states of affairs, called "bases of necessity." The viability of this Bases-Theory of Modality is shown also in the case of conditionals, including counterfactual conditionals. Besides the ontological aspects of the philosophy of modality, also the epistemology of modality is treated in the book. It is shown that the Bases-Theory of Modality provides a satisfactory solution to the epistemological problem of modality. In addition to developing that theory, the book includes detailed discussions of positions in the philosophy of modality maintained by Alvin Plantinga, David Lewis, Charles Chihara, Graeme Forbes, David Armstrong, and others. Among the themes treated are: possibilism vs. actualism; the theory of essences; conceivability and possibility; the nature of possible worlds; the nature of logical, nomological, and metaphysical possibility and necessity.

C. D. Broad's writing on various philosophical issues spans more than half a century. Rather than attempt to trace the development of his thought throughout these fifty years this book considers his most representative work, namely, The Mind and Its Place in Nature. Nor does the scope of this study encompass the whole of that book, but only some of the issues he discusses in it. Specifically, Oaklander considers what Broad has to say about such fundamental issues as substance, universals, relations, space, time, and intentionality in the contexts of perception, memory and introspection. L. Nathan Oaklander studied philosophy at the university of Iowa. He is a student of Gustav Bergmann, one of the most distinguished ontologist in 20th century philosophy.

Interest in the age-old problems of universals and individuation has received a new impetus from the current revival of ontology in the analytic tradition, the development of theories of individual properties (and the related application of mereological calculi to the analysis of predication), and the particular problems posed by relational predication and the nature of particulars. The essays explore aspects of the history of the issues and attempt to deal with the issues and with challenges to the distinctions that give rise to them. They continue the debates stemming from the revival of metaphysics rooted in Freges realism, the Austrian tradition of Brentano-Husserl-Meinong, and the early 20th century revolt against idealism embodied in writings of Moore and Russell and culminating in Wittgensteins Tractatus.

Jeder wissenschaftlichen Theorie und jedem alltäglichen Weltbild liegen "ontologische Festlegungen" zugrunde, also Annahmen betreffend die Existenz bestimmter Gegenstände. Manchmal widersprechen implizite Existenzannahmen expliziten Überzeugungen und sind in diesem Sinne unerwünscht. Unerwünschte ontologische Festlegungen werfen unter anderem die folgenden Fragen auf: Nach welchen Kriterien kann entschieden werden, worauf jemand ontologisch festgelegt ist? Gibt es so etwas wie ein "ontologisch neutrales" Sprechen? Gibt es verschiedene "Weisen des Seins"? Wie können unerwünschte Festlegungen (etwa auf abstrakte, fiktive oder vergangene Gegenstände) vermieden werden? Welche Rolle spielen dabei Paraphrasierungen, nicht-gegenständliche Deutungen der Quantifikation oder existenzfreie Logiken?