Volume 74, Issue 3

The green transition of the economy has consequences for employees and employers. Job profiles and labour demand are already changing, and these developments are likely to intensify in the future. This study presents the results of a survey on several aspects of this topic. The study focuses on the attitudes and expectations of the population, particularly employees, with regard to the ecological transformation of the labour market. Among other things, the results aim to answer information needs in relation to the transformation process in order to avoid welfare losses. The results show first that environmental protection and climate change are perceived as significant challenges. Second, the green transition has so far only played a minor role for occupational changes. Employees expect an increase of such changes due to the green transition, and a rising need to expand their skills. Respondents would like to see more support from the state and employers and an acceleration of the green transition of the economy. This is considered to be compatible with other social goals. Analyses broken down by age, gender and education illustrate the social dimension of the green transition of the labour market.

Over the past ten years, German defense spending has been significantly below the growth path that would have been appropriate to meet NATO targets. The 2 percent target was not achieved until 2024. However, no credible budget plan to stabilize this spending has ever been presented. The new NATO target is now to be achieved more quickly. A quota of 3.5 percent is already being targeted for 2028 or 2029. However, this increase will be achieved exclusively through new borrowing of up to over 100 billion euros per year, which will account for two-thirds of total defense spending. A sustainable fiscal policy should aim to finance current defense costs from tax revenues and reduce borrowing.

Die Verteidigungsausgaben werden in den nächsten Jahren substantiell steigen. Dieser Artikel greift auf Ergebnisse der finanzwissenschaftlichen Forschung zurück, um Herausforderungen für eine effiziente Finanzierung dieser Ausgaben zu identifizieren. Zentrale Ergebnisse sind: (i) Die Bereitschaft für höhere Verteidigungsausgaben Steuern zu zahlen, hängt auch vom Design des Sozialstaats ab. (ii) Sowohl „Pareto-Effizienz“ als auch „Politische Realisierbarkeit“ setzen der Möglichkeit Grenzen, zusätzliche Verteidigungsausgaben durch Ausgabenkürzungen an anderer Stelle zu finanzieren.

The Russian war against Ukraine and the strategic assertiveness of China have ended the illusion of a lasting peace dividend in Europe. Germany and its European partners must adapt to an era of global rearmament. Defense spending will have to rise to five percent of GDP, requiring additional annual resources of 135 billion euros in Germany alone. This article explores financing options, including budget reprioritization, targeted debt instruments, and European burden-sharing. Drawing on conservative economic principles, it argues that defense is not discretionary expenditure but the primary responsibility of the state. Just as West Germany’s society and economy bore the costs of defense during the Cold War, today’s generation must again assume collective responsibility.

The ship financing crisis of 2008 to 2019 is one of the biggest financial crises in post-war Germany. Two hundred thousand private investors suffered substantial losses. The German merchant fleet was halved. Banks collapsed. What were the causes and what economic policy conclusions can be drawn? Four factors seem to play decisive roles: private capital flows were (in good years) directed by government incentives into critical uses from which they could not be removed in time. The chosen financial structures did not allow for enough governance. Political influence on state banks (“Landesbanken”) facilitated the misallocation of capital. Financing industries with a high level of corruption is dangerous because corruption rubs off and spills over.

The Climate Dividend, introduced as compensation for the CO 2 price in Germany, is part of the current political debate. It is intended to provide financial relief to citizens – but can it truly offset the financial burden caused by the CO 2 price? This article critically examines the effectiveness of the Climate Dividend and argues from a behavioral economics perspective why full compensation is not achievable. Even if the CO 2 price is refunded to citizens in equal amounts, an analysis using the concepts of loss aversion and related effects, mental accounting, and present bias demonstrates that the Climate Dividend would not be perceived as positively as intended.