Volume 56, Issue 2

Based on an analysis of the Atomic Strike Plans of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe from the 1950s, the author presents the strategy of massive retaliation and its watering down by the United States during the course of the 1960s. The set-up of the Bundeswehr favoured the idea of a “limited war”. Since the Bundeswehr was not equipped for conventional and partial nuclear defence, the new concept increased the strategic dilemma of the Federal Republic and reduced its security. France, in particular, refused to engage in an alternative European security identity. Consequently, Bonn had to meet the requirements from Washington . The Federal Republic indeed became the fortress glacis of the Western nuclear powers, not despite but due to its conventional contribution. In an emergency, the latter would decide in a sovereign way on the fate of the Germans.

The history of the “Research Commission for German Prisoner of War History” is an incisive example for the particular conditions which shape the historiography of the recent past as opposed to the historiography of earlier periods. It was initiated by the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and the War Damaged in 1957 to investigate the history of German prisoners of war during the Second World War; its activities were however dogged by conflicts caused by the demands of the former prisoners organised in the Association of Repatriates on the one hand and by diplomatic considerations voiced especially by the Foreign Office on the other. The history of this project hitherto largely neglected by research is thoroughly investigated here for the very first time, and due consideration is also given to the conflicts between history, memory and politics. It becomes clear which limits contemporary historiography could encounter during the incipiency of the Federal Republic and which needs, considerations and interests created these constrictions. The analysis also allows for answers to the question of the impact of the “Past” on the early Federal Republic. It becomes clear that to a large extent experiences of the Interwar Period shaped the political and social debates in the founding years of the Federal Republic.

Dr. jur. Kurt Blanke (1900–1995) was head of the “Dejewification” department (Referat “Entjudung”) in the economics division of the German occupational authorities in France between September 1940 through August 1944 and, thus, a key-figure of anti-Jewish policy in France. Blanke was in charge of the economic persecution which, in collaboration with the Vichy authorities, resulted in the legalized robbery of Jewish property and served as a precursor of the deportations to Auschwitz. Blanke, a lawyer by training and a local dignitary in his hometown of Celle in Northern Germany, had protested against the November pogrom in 1938, known as Kristallnacht, by leaving the SA which he had joined in 1933. As a civil servant in the German occupation administration he nonetheless organised the economic persecution of the Jews with particular zeal and professional ability. The case of Kurt Blanke illustrates the crucial role of well educated middle-class elites without inclinations towards eliminationist Nazi ideology for the systematic persecution of the Jews. The distance vis-à-vis SS and SA and their plebeian attitudes served as an identity-generating link between perpetrator biographies and post-war careers, many of which were quite remarkable. Kurt Blanke, for example, not only never had to stand trial, but even served as mayor of Celle between 1964 through 1973. He was awarded the Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1969. Even today, a cul-de-sac in Celle is named Kurt Blanke Straße.

In Germany and elsewhere, many historians consider the 1970s to be a period of fundamental change, from the golden age of a “Keynesian” social model to a new, neoliberal model. The paper argues that, from an economist's point of view, this is far less clear. First, the period of high trend growth rates which lasted until the mid-1970s appears to be exceptional, in Germany even more so than in other countries, while economic dynamics observed since then are much more business as usual. Second, the change in the dominating paradigm that took place within the realm of economic theory does not coincide with the swing from boom to bust. Third, unlike in some other developed countries, there has been no fundamental change in economic and social policy in Germany, neither in the mid-1970s nor, at least in some areas of public policy, to date. Looking back, the years between World War II and the mid-1970s may in fact have been nothing but an interim period which has since then been gradually terminated by increasing international competition.

In the 1980s hardly anyone in the Federal Republic of Germany foresaw the downfall of the GDR. The interesting question how the West German secret service – the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) – evaluated the situation in Central and Eastern Europe at the time cannot be answered by consulting its records, as most of them will remain inaccessible for a long time to come. Therefore for the time being, we have to rely on information given by participants involved at the time. An interview with Hans-Georg Wieck, President of the BND between 1985 and 1990, contains valuable insights. His main focus is on three topics: 1. How was the geostrategic situation of the Soviet Union in relation to its satellite states in Europe perceived by the BND? 2. How was the economic and humanitarian situation of the GDR and the public sentiment of the East Germans with respect to national unity perceived by the BND? 3. How did the West German political leadership deal with the information it received from the BND regarding these questions?