Volume 2024, Issue 260 - Special Issue: How to build a lifeworld: In-between relevance and the encyclopedia; Guest Editors: Göran Sonesson† and Jan Strassheim

The article focuses on the ontological foundations of lifeworld as Being taken for granted and viewed as a communication phenomenon par excellence , conceptualized as signifying in the presence of others. It is argued that, because there is always a wider horizon of experience against which anything can appear, lifeworld as something continuous can only be thematized in discrete scientific forms. In the article, lifeworld is discussed through the perspectives of four different sciences. From the natural science perspective, lifeworld is conceptualized as an arrangement contingent on the interconnections of human and nonhuman beings. It takes the form of conversation and can be best examined by Conversation Analysis. From the social science perspective, lifeworld is conceptualized as an order that is constituted by symbolic interactions and guided by relevant types and rules that structure our experience. It takes the form of intersubjective action as a meaningful back and forth and can be best examined by Discourse Analysis. From the cultural sciences perspective, lifeworld is the realm of spirit passed from generation to generation that gives human culture its meaning. It takes the form of significant expressions and can be best examined by Textual Hermeneutic Analysis. And, from the philosophical perspective, lifeworld is constituted by phenomena that appear, or monstrate themselves, to consciousness. This lifeworld is of absolute reversibility and immediacy and can be best examined by Critical Analysis, i.e., by postulating our relation to any object through contemplation. Thus, as Being, lifeworld is said in many ways, each lifeworld being relevant in its own way by providing a valuable resource – physico-biological, normative, significational, and transcendental.

If we think of cognition and experience from the enactivist idea of a structural coupling between organism and environment, we see that this environment is first and foremost a semiotic environment, crowded with objects, norms, habits, institutions, and artefacts that shape our minds and represent the background of our perception of the world. This semiotic environment, which goes far beyond the opposition between nature and culture, (See Paolucci 2021. Cognitive semiotics: Integrating signs, minds, meaning, and cognition . Berlin: Springer: ch. 1.) is a semiotic lifeworld that is important to compare with the classic idea of lifeworld coming from phenomenology. In this paper, (i) we will first start with a comparison of the semiotic Lebenswelt and the phenomenological Lebenswelt ; (ii) we will follow the construction of the semiotic lifeworld coming from Peirce’s Anti-Cartesian essays; (iii) we will make a deep comparison between the phenomenology coming from Peirce (phaneroscopy) and the phenomenology coming from Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty; (iv) we will show how these very same principles also ground structuralism; (v) we will show how this new semiotic lifeworld grounded on phaneroscopy is neither pre-logical nor pre-categorial. Rather, it is founded on the primacy of “telling” over “showing,” and on the primacy of discourse over perception.

This analysis focuses on the role of appresentational orders in the “building of the lifeworld.” Based in phenomenology and the philosophy of culture, the article contributes to semiotics by further developing some of Göran Sonesson’s ideas on signs. Appresentation means that “absent” data is intended as co-present with a directly perceivable term within the unity of consciousness (Husserl). Alfred Schutz sees “marks,” “indications,” and “signs” as different types of couplings between “present” and “absent” data according to one single cognitive style or “subworld.” These appresentational relations contrast with the more complex “symbols,” which are couplings between different styles or subworlds. For instance, a crucifix may co-present a “Latin cross” given to everyday perception with meanings belonging to the world of religion, making it “symbolically pregnant” (Cassirer). Beyond a mere coupling, appresentation is constituted by appresentational orders , which can reflect high relational complexity. Although Schutz introduced the concept of these orders, he, like Sonesson, misses their full potential for understanding appresentation. Signs and sign-like relations (such as marks and indications), which make possible (life)worldly communication, spatial and temporal orientation, and social organization, can be further differentiated according to the appresentational orders “dominant” in each certain case. In contrast, symbols, which ensure an experience of the lifeworld as a whole (Voegelin), that connect subworlds such as religion, science, dreams, etc., are rather to be characterized by a relevance “annihilation” between appresentational orders.

This paper argues that human signification is governed by “agentive systems,” inspired by an extended framework that combines the Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems and Peircean semiotics. An agentive system encompasses both the efficient anticipation of resource utilization and the use of actual available resources, including bodily capacities in the form of embodied habits. These resources are allocated based on agendas (goals) pursued by human agents in their interactions with the environment. In this context, signification involves the meaning of actions embedded within their agentive system, encompassing the agent performing the actions, the action’s goal or agenda, and the available resources, whether bodily (skills, abilities, capacities) or non-bodily (objects, signs). After presenting the general framework in which the concept of an agentive system is approached, I develop a proposal drawing on insights from Göran Sonesson’s reflections on the importance of sedimentation and Lifeworld for semiotics. This proposal highlights how the acquisition of embodied habits facilitates and promotes the significance of cultural products, while their deployment allows for the emergence of situated signification.

This paper relates the concept of relevance to its biological foundations by combining Alfred Schutz’s social phenomenology and Helmuth Plessner’s theory of organic life and philosophical anthropology. Relevance interlinks human sign use with the human “lifeworld” (Husserl) as a whole. The biological foundations of relevance, in turn, interlink that lifeworld with the “world of life” that includes us among other lifeforms. I analyze human relevance as an interplay of two tendencies, termed “closedness” and “openness,” that underlies our production of “meaning” (Schutz). Relevance in this general sense involves not only the mind, but also the body of homo sapiens . To provide a unified theoretical framework, I reconstruct Plessner’s “philosophical biology.” According to Plessner, organic life consists in a tension between closedness and openness. This tension unfolds through the “levels” of plants, animals, and humans. Plessner’s analysis of humans as “excentric” animals helps explain the two tendencies that drive human relevance and distinguish our experience from that of our closest animal relatives. At the same time, Plessner traces a robust continuity between us and other lifeforms. The human “level” merely makes “explicit” certain elements (including the Cartesian distinction between “mind” and “body”) that all organisms implicitly possess.

This paper aims to single out some pathologies of current lexical semantics, which suffers from both the trauma of immanence and the opposite anxiety of rooting all knowledge in the pre-semiotic dimension, or entrusting sense-making entirely to context. To untangle these pitfalls, the dialogue with a phenomenological cognitive semiotics may prove fertile to focus on the lexicon as a type of storage and a  type of memory ; that is, a type of accumulated and sedimented knowledge based on the dynamical re-pertinentization of invariants. In particular, the perspective developed by Sonesson shows striking coincidences with De Mauro’s semiotic semantics, which already provides a solid foundation for rethinking the notion of lexical field drawing on an “authentic” Humboldtian and Saussurean heritage. Therefore, I will briefly review some principles of lexical structural semantics, with the aim of showing how these notions, once emancipated from the Saussurean vulgata , can not only be compatible with a cognitive phenomenological approach, but also facilitate the rehabilitation of a theoretical apparatus still valuable for both (lexical) semantics and semiotics. Although focused on lexical fields, some of the issues addressed can be extended to language and languages, as well as to other types of semiotic systems, to shed light on controversial themes such as the embodiment of signs and the autonomy of linguistics and semantics.

In the wave of Umberto Eco’s oppositional binomial Dictionary-Encyclopedia, the paper aims to apply the rhizomatic system to the practical case of the (ethno)racial lexicon as a broad semantic area of the word race , which previously involved both physical predisposition and cultural habits. Given its critical issues, the dictionarial approach is distinguished into two different stages, intra-dictionarial (properly dictionarial) and inter-dictionarial (resulting from the metaphorical chain of meanings). Originally, race referred to horses (stud and herds) and property (as ownership and essential attribute), which extended metonymically to other senses – general zoological-botanic, human (lineage, offspring) and typological qualitative ones. Comparing its correspondents in Romance and Germanic languages, reference to many different contexts and a continuous misalignment between lexeme and concept emerge. The liquidity within the semantic sphere of race (embracing the three semantic cores racial, ethnic, and typological) can be explained by taking a phenomenological and semiotic perspective. If the ethnic sense (people, nation, etc.) is connected to a socio-cultural Lifeworld in an interplay of identities and differences, the aporia of synonymy emerging from the inter-dictionarial analysis finds its balance in the local encyclopedic approach, which proves to be the real deterrent to Porphyry’s tree through the rhizome, conceived not in its entirety, but in the partiality and contingency of its branches.

Built on the results of collective experience expressed in language, cultural worlds are given to each of their inhabitants as integral ensembles constantly developing on the basis of unlimited semiosis via communication. Rooted in the very way of human intersubjectivity, communicative ability, and existence in time, historical narration serves as an important tool for increasing the meaningful potential and diachronic depth of cultural worlds. It should have integrity, thematic and plot certainty, problematic character, a chronotope system chosen by the author, as well as an efficient intrigue and composition focused on the intended reader who is able to decode its content. The historical narrative, unlike the literary one, should be based on truthful and reliable empirical data, despite the fact that the linguistic description in both cases assumes a connection between the past and the present. The historical narratives themselves, from the point of view of their epistemological status, have only greater or lesser reliability, since they depend on the interpretative intentions of their authors. The unpredictability of an event may trigger a confrontation between different kinds of narratives, undermining the power of the existing Encyclopedia that describes a cultural world. This problem can be fruitfully approached today on a cooperative platform of hermeneutics, semiotics, and analytical philosophy.

The paper examines deceptions employed during the Cold War with the purpose of exploring their underlying conceptions, mechanisms, and applications. It focuses on the interactions between the deceiver and the deceived, analyzing both sides’ perspectives. The examination centers on declassified guides, recently published as The Official C.I.A. Manual of Trickery and Deception , which contain detailed instructions concerning how spies should carry out their activities of deception. Three kinds of procedures were selected for analysis: behavior in public for men and women, group infiltration, and the use of secret recognition signals. To provide a practical visualization, the 2012 movie Argo , based on a real-life operation using the same principles, is complementarily analyzed. Merleau-Ponty’s approach to perception and sensation is considered along with Husserl’s concepts of sedimentation and lifeworld, while narrative semiotics and its framework guide the treatment of textuality and the approach to persuasion. The article conceives of sedimentation and contemplation of the lifeworld as mandatory components of a kind of deception that is primarily acted, reflecting upon how the spies’ interference affects the environment. The results indicate a common structure for deceptions that builds on what Greimas calls a “fiduciary contract.”

The World Wide Web has been a fundamental part of our daily lives for years. Its algorithmic framework ensnares our online journeys in an “endless recurrence” of the “same” by creating multiple filter bubbles. Digital algorithms establish a precise “order of discourse,” leaving little to no room for deviation. Functioning as a colossal machinic apparatus, the web embodies the culmination of Artificial Intelligence (AI), transforming every piece of posted content into a database that profiles our online behavior and activities. This article explores whether approaches that describe everyday human communication, such as the theories of relevance developed by Alfred Schutz, or by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, can be applied to the realm of digital algorithmic grammars governing the web, and to the semiospheres that animate it. The conclusions raise some doubts: a gap exists between algorithmic language and its historical counterparts, characterized by a disparity between logical-mathematical grammar and other linguistic-historical-natural ones. While these two types of languages coexist within the digital landscape, their relevance differs; what may be “relevant” in an algebraic context may not necessarily translate to our live conversational exchanges, and vice versa. Although merged in the digital sphere, these languages operate distinctly, and proficiency in one does not guarantee adeptness in interpreting the other accurately.