Volume 4, Issue 2

It is argued that C. Wright's worry over the Basic Argument for Quitism is misplaced since the argument is incoherent. An even more basic argument is considered, and some consequences traced for, inter alia, the Tractarian view in metaphysics and Dummett's Metaphor Thesis, connecting ontology and semantics. In the course of the argument, work by, primarily, C. Peacocke and J. McDowell is touched upon.

The terms “morality” and “ethical life” refer to the relationship between Kant's universalistic and Hegel's “contextualised” account of morality. In this essay, the problem of universalism and contextualism will be addressed to Apel's and Habermas's positions. I will divide the theme into three main topics: 1) The historical reconstruction of the rational conditions of discourse ethics within Habermas's position: in which sense could this approach lead to a contextualism? 2) The difficulty with establishing a non-contextual justification of the discursive, rational conditions. Habermas's reconstructive approach will be confronted with Apel's “strict reflectional” approach which relies on stronger universalistic presuppositions. 3) This last topic will focus on the main difference between Habermas's and Apel's perspectives. This is connected to the double function of the rational “symmetry and reciprocity” -conditions: they are seen as consensual and simultaneously meta-normative conditions. Their meta-normative character is Apel's main concern, and seen as vital to social criticism.

The paper examines the question whether the perceptual and discriminatory capacities of a creature and its disposition to react to things and events determine the nature and limits of what it is able to communicate and understand. Does a significant divergence in perceptual and discriminatory sensibilities of two creatures threaten the possibility of their mutual comprehensibility? It is argued, with the help of Donald Davidson's recent idea of ‘triangulation’, that this is indeed the case. By introducing into his theoretical framework the notion of triangulation as a necessary precondition of mastering a language, Davidson is forced to admit the possibility of a breakdown of communication between creatures that do not have sufficiently similar evolutionary histories—his own claims to the contrary nothwithstanding. And this, in turn, seems to threaten his claims about the impossibility of the notion of a language that we could not interpret in our own terms.

I den moderna straffrättsliga diskussionen framhålls det ofta att straff ska utdömas på rationella och inte emotionella grunder. Rättssystemet ska sålunda inte hänge sig åt “primitiva hämndaktioner” utan systematiskt arbeta för att förebygga brott och mänskligt lidande. Förutom att ett sådant synsätt har tydliga utilitaristiska förtecken så innehåller det också starka retoriska inslag eftersom det sätts likhetstecken mellan brottsprevention och rationalitet, medan moralisk indignation och krav på rättvisa endast beskrivs i termer av primitiva, emotionella hämndbegär. I den här artikeln har jag för avsikt att genom en analys av vedergällningsbegreppet visa att vedergällningens logik är rotad i vårt sätt att förhålla oss moraliskt till varandra – att den är ett uttryck för vår livsform. Jag kommer vidare att försöka åskådliggöra att vedergällningen är moraliskt sofistikerad snarare än primitiv. Slutligen kommer jag att framhålla att vedergällningens logik är en viktig komponent i vårt straffbegrepp, men att vedergällning och straff ändå måste särskiljas. Jag vill redan nu klargöra att jag i artikeln utgår från en analys av vår “vardagliga” användning av begreppsom ‘hämnd’, ‘vedergällning’ och ‘straff’. Det betyder att jag högst medvetet har valt att inte utgå från en teoretisk filosofisk diskussion om straffets rättfärdigande. Jag vill heller intepresentera någon ny form av retributivistisk teori, utan nöjer mig med att göra anmärkningar om hur vi faktiskt använder de begrepp som här särskådas.

In this paper I will introduce and discuss a series of problems associated with answering the question of semantic unity, and argue that the truth theoretical approach to semantics put forward by Donald Davidson suggests a possible solution. Although not put forward explicitly as such by Davidson, it is my belief that we in Davidson's interpretation of Tarski's definition of truth find the resources to illuminate and dissolve the problem of unity.

Dewey provides a useful analysis of what he calls historic liberalism and an interesting version of liberalism. A doctrine that he believes is useful for his time. This is a reconstituted liberalism with a holistic approach to society and nature. Dewey's “transactional” approach sees the fault of traditional liberalism as separating the individual as an entity outside an evolving social and natural context. This doctrine, while attending to greater individual freedom like all liberalism, emphasizes cooperation in a constantly evolving context guided by and modelled upon science.