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Irreality of Fact

  • Stig Alstrup Rasmussen
Published/Copyright: March 19, 2010
SATS
From the journal SATS Volume 4 Issue 2

Abstract

It is argued that C. Wright's worry over the Basic Argument for Quitism is misplaced since the argument is incoherent. An even more basic argument is considered, and some consequences traced for, inter alia, the Tractarian view in metaphysics and Dummett's Metaphor Thesis, connecting ontology and semantics. In the course of the argument, work by, primarily, C. Peacocke and J. McDowell is touched upon.

Published Online: 2010-03-19
Published in Print: 2003-11-01

© Philosophia Press 2003

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