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Davidson, Truth, and Semantic Unity

  • Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Published/Copyright: March 19, 2010
SATS
From the journal SATS Volume 4 Issue 2

Abstract

In this paper I will introduce and discuss a series of problems associated with answering the question of semantic unity, and argue that the truth theoretical approach to semantics put forward by Donald Davidson suggests a possible solution. Although not put forward explicitly as such by Davidson, it is my belief that we in Davidson's interpretation of Tarski's definition of truth find the resources to illuminate and dissolve the problem of unity.

Published Online: 2010-03-19
Published in Print: 2003-11-01

© Philosophia Press 2003

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