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The aim of this study is to analyze the effect of unauthorized use of famous brand names on their brand equity dimensions. In addition, we explored the moderation effect of similarity between the unauthorized brand (junior brand) and the famous brand. An experimental design with four real famous brands and sixteen fictitious junior brands was applied to 617 undergraduate students from a large university in Ecuador. Hypotheses about the effect on brand equity dimensions and overall brand equity construct were tested using structural equation models. Results showed that awareness of a famous brand was not diluted by consumers’ exposure to junior brands. However, associations, perceived quality, loyalty and an overall construct of brand equity were diluted. There was evidence that similarity between famous and junior brands attenuated dilution. Therefore, considering that brand equity dimensions have desirable consequences on consumer behavior and firm value, this paper’s results highlight the importance of protecting brands against unauthorized use.

Brand equity has been a perennial topic in marketing. Among all types of measures, price premium is widely accepted due to its simple yet efficient characteristics. However, there is some disagreement regarding whether this measure captures enough facets of brand equity and whether price premium is an appropriate measure to reflect the market position of a brand. With current technique developments, more sophisticated brand equity measures have been developed. A natural question arises as to whether more sophisticated measures are better than price premium. Using large-scale national scanner data covering 47 major U.S. markets, we employ the aggregated demand model to estimate a complex brand equity measure and compare it with price premium. Our results suggest that the simple price premium is consistent with the complex measure under certain conditions. We provide managers with suggestions regarding choosing the most appropriate brand equity measures to signify their brands’ values.

While impulse buying has been conceptualized as a product of impulses, this study proposes that both reflective and impulsive determinants can outline impulse buying. Following a dual-system model that distinguishes between a reflective and an impulsive system, we hypothesized that unhealthy snack impulse buying can be differentially influenced by either impulsive system or reflective system as a function of self-regulatory resources. Participants in the experiment were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the two-group design (self-regulatory resources depletion vs. control condition); then they were given the opportunity to take part in a mock store spontaneous buying situation. While the impulsive system was represented by impulse buying tendency and unhealthy snack buying habit, dietary restraint represented the reflective system. The dependent variables were the number of unhealthy snacks purchased and the percentage of unhealthy snacks purchased. The results provided the first empirical foundation for reflective and impulsive aspects of impulse buying behavior. The findings showed that self-regulatory resources moderate the impact of both reflective and impulsive determinants on unhealthy snack impulse buying. While the reflective system (dietary restraint) only determined the behavior in the high self-regulatory resource condition, the impulsive system (impulse buying tendency and habit) associated with the behavior when self-regulatory resources were diminished. There was one exceptional case in which habit determined the percentage of unhealthy snacks purchased even in the high self-regulatory resource condition.

We investigate firms’ remanufacturing strategies for the case of a duopoly. On the one hand, remanufactured products cannibalize sales of new products of the same firm thereby hurting its profits. On the other hand, they can be part of a profitable marketing strategy that targets different customer preferences by providing a larger number of alternatives to customers. This paper studies the tradeoff between these effects and how it is influenced by competition. We develop a model where demand functions for new and remanufactured products of each firm are derived from utility maximization by a representative consumer. This allows us to capture preference and substitution effects between all offered products in the market. We discuss how equilibrium strategies are affected by factors such as competition, substitutability, production cost as well as remanufacturing cost. For example, when competitive intensity between new and new products, and remanufactured and remanufactured products, is (high), both (neither) firms offer remanufactured products in a symmetric equilibrium. If substitution between new and remanufactured products of the same firm is low, but the remanufactured product has a lower margin than the new product, firms can be worse off from remanufacturing.

The present study hypothesized the concept of transaction utility that consumers receive from end-user piracy and assumes that it is positively associated with the difference between the price of original good and cost of copying the pirated product. We assume two groups of consumers – one enjoying transaction utility from piracy and the other not enjoying the same. The results show that a monopolist producing information-goods will adopt a low-price low-quality strategy in presence of transaction utility. An increase in the quality of the pirated product will also induce the firm to continue with the low-price–low-quality strategy. However, an increase in the proportion of the consumers not receiving transaction utility from piracy will increase the price and quality of the original good. In addition, with an increase in the average and marginal willingness-to-pay parameter of the consumers, the price, quality and profit of the original good will increase. The expected piracy rate is observed to be decreasing in transaction utility parameter when the upper boundary of willingness-to-pay parameter of the consumer is below a critical level.