Volume 60, Issue 3

The claim about the resurrection of Jesus Christ is marked by relative semiotic indeterminacy. The lack of an experiential reference for this claim means that we have to see it as the result of an abductive interpretation. Against a backdrop founded on a pragmatist semiotic theory that includes the analytical differentiation between contexts of discovery and contexts of justification, the claim about the resurrection is analyzed with reference to the categories revelation, experience, and recognition. Abduction is at work with regard to all of these categories. Among the consequences emerging from this approach is that there is no way to prove the fact of the resurrection: it remains an interpretation of signs.

Zusammenfassung Nach Luther soll das Evangelium nicht nur in der persönlichen Meditation des Wortes, sondern auch in der öffentlichen Verkündigung, erfahrbar werden. Dies verlangt von der Verkündigung, kritisch zu rechtlichen und sozialen Verhältnissen Stellung zu nehmen. In Spannung zu diesem Anliegen tritt Luthers Instrumentalisierung des Sprachhumanismus für sein Interesse an der objektivierenden Absicherung seiner Lehre durch die äußere Klarheit der Schrift. Der darin gründende Machtanspruch lässt einen antidialogischen und aggressiven Kommunikationsstil und eine feindselige Haltung insbesondere gegen das Judentum und seine eigenständige Schriftauslegung herrschend werden. Der Humanismus verliert damit seinen wesentlichen Gehalt. Doch eine Deutung der Schrift und der Wirklichkeit im Sinne der Christus-Mystik gewinnt erst durch einen offenen Prozess der Interpretation, durch Kontextualisierung, Selbstkritik und durch Dialog an Plausibilität. Die von Luther in der Christologie geforderten Perspektivenwechsel können nur so gelingen und ihre befreiende und Solidarität stiftende Kraft entfalten. Eine Abwertung des Judentums als Bundesvolk ist damit prinzipiell unvereinbar.

Zusammenfassung Eckharts Abendmahlverständnis ist prägendes Summarium seines philosophisch-theologischen Denkens. Autor des Abendmahles ist der ganze Christus, auch der leidende. Das Sakrament signalisiert die Einheit der Kirche. Durch das Sakrament wird Leben zugeteilt. Im Sakrament wird Christus in affectu und in intellectu begriffen.

In the recent discussion, several authors have argued for the claim that propositional faith need not be doxastic, but also can be “non-doxastic”. Notable proponents of this view are William Alston, Robert Audi, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and J. L. Schellenberg. In this paper, I focus on Christian faith and consider whether its cognitive aspect can be understood solely in terms of Alston’s and others’ non-doxastic accounts. I argue for a negative answer. In my view, the cognitive aspect of Christian faith calls for, as a minimum, “a sub-doxastic attitude”. As there is no shared terminology on this topic, a proportion of this paper deals with conceptual clarifications.

Discussions on soul origins are perceived as antiquated at best. However, there is a recent resurgence of interest in the nature and origins of the mind. This is due in part to the recent developments on the nature of “emergent” properties and/or substances in the contemporary literature on the philosophy of mind. As a contribution to this discussion, I examine the two most prominent theories of mental origins (e. g., Timothy O’Connor and William Hasker) and find that each encounter some noteworthy problems. With these in mind, I recommend that some form of Creationism deserves our attention. It provides a solution to the various philosophical and theological concerns associated with the previously mentioned emergence theories of the mind. Finally, I lay out a more satisfying theory of the soul’s creation in a way that accounts for the benefits of emergentism.

Mats Wahlberg argues that evolutionary theodicies fail to show how an evolutionary process was necessary in order to reach the goal(s) God is said to have had when creating our world. The authors of this article argue that Wahlberg‘s critique fails if one takes into consideration the distinction between type- and token-values. The question that guides Wahlberg‘s discussion is whether or not unique type-values require an evolution in order to be instantiated or not. He does not, however, discuss whether unique token-values require evolution. This article will address this question, and argue that the theodicies he claims to fail does not do so for the reasons put forward by Wahlberg if interpreted as focusing on token-unique values. The authors will also argue that theodicies other than those evaluated by Wahlberg succeed in identifying type-unique values that can only be brought about through evolution.

It is usually supposed that biological design arguments (where biological complex order is seen as evidence of a Creator) are made obsolete by Darwinian evolutionary theory. However, philosopher Alvin Plantinga and others have defended the continued possibility of a rational “design discourse”, in which biological order is taken as a sign of God’s purposeful action. In this article, I consider two objections to design discourse: (1) a theological objection to biological design based on the problem of natural evil, and (2) the evolutionary objection, according to which evolutionary theory removes the justification for any biological design perception. Whereas Plantinga’s own response utilizes the arguments of the Intelligent Design movement, I argue in favor of utilizing “design discourse” as part of a theistic evolutionist view.

Cosmological arguments for the existence of God defend God as a necessary being against (among others) the alternative that the universe came from nothing. “Nothing” is an ambiguous term, but when clarified it can be argued that a strong sense of the term is self-contradictory and thus impossible. This article discusses the arguments Lorenz B. Puntel has put forth in favour of this conclusion. The arguments herein rely on Puntel’s understanding of theoretical frameworks in explanations, which is also discussed. This article finds that there are good arguments against the possibility of nothing in a strong sense of the term, ending by considering this argument’s relevance to cosmological arguments for the existence of God.