Volume 59, Issue 4

In Germany, Holm Tetens is an influential analytic philosopher of science, mind, and logic. For many years he had been arguing within the widely accepted framework of naturalism and atheism. It came, to put it mildly, as a surprise to the entire philosophical community in Germany when he published a book defending theism in 2015. In this book “Thinking God” he claims that physicalism is an incomplete account of reality, because the mental and ideal realm cannot be reduced to the physical realm. As an alternative, he develops a version of theistic idealism which stands in the tradition of “panentheism”. Human subjectivity is fully embedded into the all-encompassing divine subjectivity. In dealing with the problem of theodicy, he then argues that the hope for eternal life and salvation by a supremely good being makes life more meaningful, esp. because it offers a prospect for justice to the countless victims of history. To Tetens, the worldview of naturalism and the worldview of theistic idealism are on the one hand both equally rational and defensible. On the other hand, both cannot be defeated by knock-down arguments. In closing, he urges his peers in philosophy to take the question of God seriously again. Shortly after the publication of the book, the Catholic Academy of Bavaria and the Munich School of Philosophy jointly organized an international master class on Tetens’s views which was taught by himself. The papers published in this issue grew out of this master class. For each paper by a young scholar there is also a reply by Tetens. The following editorial addresses specifically the German-speaking audience. It was thus not translated into English. All original papers discussing Tetens’s views and his replies to these, however, were written in English for the sake of reaching a larger worldwide readership.

In his essay on rational theology Holm Tetens broaches the issue of God’s role as creator and additionally addresses the relationship of the absolute to the contingent world in a philosophical perspective. By making this a topic, the question arises as to whether or not God’s creative activities are limited by the laws of nature. According to Tetens, God as the infinite self-conscious subject must not just considered as free from all restrictions concerning his creative activities, but rather, characterized as the absolute, he must be thought of as the ultimate ground of all beings, and therefore also as the creator of natural laws. In this article I will give a brief sketch of how this task could be tackled in philosophical terms. In doing so I will both pick up some of Tetens’ main intentions and concepts and try to explore them in some detail, as well as attempt to link them with the principle of determinacy as the main characteristic of the absolute.

We briefly clarify Tetens’s concept of God and argue that there are some problems regarding both the precise formulation of his panentheism as well as its implications for sin and special divine action.

Holm Tetens develops in his book „Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie“ theoretical and practical arguments against a naturalistic and in favour of a theistic understanding of reality. In my paper I focus on Teten’s claim that we are rationally justified to hope for the truth of classical theism. I distinguish between rationally justified and unjustified forms of hope and argue that we are rationally justified to hope for the redemption of reality as promised by classical theism. However, this hope has a weaker basis of justification than Tetens seems to assume because serious objections to classical theism ought to be taken into consideration as well.

This paper presents a reconstruction and discussion of Holm Tetens’ new moral argument for theistic belief. The argument is a pragmatic one in that it intends to show that believing in God is rational because it has some morally desirable consequences. It asserts that the suffering of countless victims of evil in this world causes in atheists who try to be moral some morally questionable states of mind. By contrast, theists who have certain beliefs about the afterlife, judgment, and reconciliation are not subject to these bad states of mind. Therefore, Tetens argues, theistic belief is more rational than disbelief.

In this issue, four critical comments on my book “Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie” are published, I try to reply to. More strictly than it is accomplished in “Gott denken”, I outline systematically the fundamental questions and the most pertinent principles of a rational theology as an alternative to naturalism, predominant in our time. In the center of the following considerations, I try to establish a concept of God and a kind of a Kantian “moral” argument, why it would be more reasonable in one’s own life to hope to God as the creator and redeemer of the world and mankind instead of adopting a naturalistic point of view.

The paper argues that the 16 th century reformations have to be understood as a spiritual revolution. Their key idea was to put God alone radically at the center (solus deus) and construe faith, justification, salvation and everything else not in terms of divine-human cooperation but as a creative divine gift that changes the sinner from being destined to death to becoming a saved sinner. The paradigm is Christ’s change from the death on the cross to his resurrected life with God. The one-sided divine activity in the change from death to life is the key to understanding God’s creative activity and human deep passivity.

I offer reflections on the doctrine of justification by faith alone in the light of the many challenges of globalization. I briefly characterize globalization as the new context of contemporary theology in the first part, and go on in the second part to defend its relevance as a radical and total critique of life today in its nihilistic pursuit of creaturely arrogance, greed, and pleasure, and argue for the particular urgency of promoting the love and solidarity of Others beyond the conventional boundaries of identity in a world increasingly suffering from unreconciled pluralism of all sorts, ethnic, religious, cultural, and economic. In the third, longest part I offer a new perspective on the soterioriological significance of „good works“ on the basis of a new relationship between creator and creature, a concrete anthropology of action as mediation between subjectivity and objectivity, and the irreducible involvement of the free and responsible subject in the very believing relationship to God. I try to reinstate „good works“ as the human way, as a free and responsible being, of „participating“ in God’s own redemptive work, not as „cooperating with“ divine grace or as „contributing to“ God’s redeeming work, or as „causing“ one’s own redemption.

Against the backdrop of the debates on the appropriate understanding of the Reformation in the context of the 500 year anniversary of the Reformation the attempt is made to elaborate the continuing promise of the Reformation with regard to the understanding of justice and freedom. The view of justice as a creative gift and the understanding of freedom as promise presuppose that the character of the Reformation can be understood as the reconfiguration of the traditional theological authorities. The understanding of reality as rooted in the creative justice of God who alone is free because God is his own future is applied in the Lutheran art of making distinctions which relate God’s creative being and action to the created being and action of humans. The continuing promise of the Reformation is the discovery of this unconditional promise and of the way it is witnessed in the Church. As the creature of God’s justifying word the life of the church has the character of an embodied promise.

In Part One of this essay, I linked Marion’s concept of infinite distance to Aquinas’s doctrine of relation. Part one was published in the last issue. Now in Part Two I will draw his concept of the saturated phenomenon (specifically, the event) into this conversation about relation. If real relation makes sense of the saturated phenomenon, saturation, in turn, radicalizes real relation. We can begin to describe a third type of relation: a relation not by logical correspondence or by similitude, but a relation by excess, saturation and hyperbole.

Zusammenfassung Die Mystik gilt im interreligiösen Dialog als diejenige Dimension von Religion, die gemäß dem Essentialismus den gemeinsamen Kern der Religionen darstellt. In Unterschied dazu vertritt der Kontextualismus die These, dass Mystik nur in spezifischen religiösen Kontexten entsteht und so seine unverwechselbare Eigenheit erhält. Saeed Zarrabi-Zadeh vergleicht in seiner Arbeit Meister Eckhart und Rumi methodisch so miteinander, dass er die jeweiligen Stärken des Essentialismus und des Kontextualismus nutzt und ihre Schwächen vermeidet. Auf der Grundlage dieses methodischen Neuansatzes und eines weitgefassten Mystikbegriffs, der Ethik, Praxis, Spekulation und Dogmatik umfasst, kommt er zu neuen Differenzierungen im religionsphänomenologischen Vergleich und legt zugleich erhebliche Differenzen im theologischen Deutehorizont der jeweiligen Mystiker offen. Darüberhinaus arbeitet er mit seiner Interpretation der abegescheidenheit Eckharts, die dem Fana Rumis entspricht , den psychologischen Mechanismus heraus, der dem practical mysticism sowohl Eckharts wie Rumis zu Grunde liegt. Insgesamt gesehen ordnet er damit Eckhart einem „Mysticism of intellect-based detachment“ zu, während Rumi zum Typus „Mysticism of love-based annihilation“ zu rechnen ist.