Volume 91, Issue 2 -

The detailed examination of the sources presented here have indicated that the prevailing opinion, according to which Wilusa is to be identified with Homeric (F)ilios and Taruisa with Troas, should be abandoned. In our opinion, Wilusa was most probably an inland vassal state between Hatti, Lukka, Seha and Millawanda. Its only possible location, being in full agreement with the Hittite texts, should be in the upper course of the Meander. It is not mere coincidence that in this specific area a pre-Hellenic toponym, that is very similar to Wilusa, survived as the seat of a bishop until the early Christian period, namely Ilouza (’Ίλουζα). Wilusa/Ilouza should be identified with the prehistoric city of Beycesultan, where one of the most important administrative centres of the Bronze Age and subsequently an Early Christian city flourished. Accordingly, the next member of Aššuwa coalition T(a)ruisa can tentatively be identified with the pre-Hellenic site of Trysa, in south Lycia.

Greek and Roman authors often state that it was allowable for Persians to marry mothers, daughters and other very close relatives, claims that many modern scholars accept as valid for the Achaemenid, as well as for later years. This article re-examines the ancient sources for such marriages in the Achaemenid era, both the general statements and the tales of specific unions, and argues that the evidence for marital alliances between parent and child, and those between full siblings, is exceedingly weak. It thus lends support to the views expressed by Brosius in her brief discussion of the issue, views which others have ignored or even rejected.

A few lines from the Middle Roman Empire chronicler Julius Africanus reveal that Alexander had the Macedonian army adopt the Lacedaemonian helmet, the ubiquitous pilos . Numismatic iconography of the end of Alexander’s reign confirms the words of Julius Africanus. The pilos is the forerunner of the kônos , the pre-eminent helmet of the Macedonian army during the Hellenistic period. The introduction of the pilos is part of the re-equipment of Macedonian troops during the Asian campaign, made possible by the immense treasures amassed by the Great King. It is probably between the years 330/329 and 325 BC, that the Macedonian army was thus equipped or re-equipped from head to toe. In addition to a standard type helmet, various other clues seem to support the theory of introduction of a uniform amidst the Macedonian army under the reign of Alexander the Great, particularly within the infantry.

There are two main hypotheses about the adoption of the shield by the Hellenistic cavalry. Some scholars think that the Greeks borrowed the shield from Italy via Pyrrhus’ army, others suppose that it was borrowed from the Galatians. However, the hypotheses are theoretical, without proven arguments. According to the iconography, in the Hellenistic epoch the majority of Greek mounted shield-bearers were armed with large round shields of four various kinds, and a few of them carried oblong shields. The round shield was untypical for the Celts and therefore the Greeks borrowed it not from them but from Italy. As the dates of monuments depicting the cavalrymen have not been precisely determined, one can say only that the adoption happened during the third century BC. The Graeco-Macedonian cavalry had been using oblong shields of the Celtic type since the 270s BC. However, as far as we know, this type of shield was not widespread among the Hellenistic cavalry.

Modern historiography on the Hellenistic period refers the word Epigonoi to the second generation of kings after Alexander the Great, the sons of the so-called Diadochoi . Actually, the passages from Strabo, Diodorus and Appian (upon which this interpretation is based) show that this word is referring to all the generations of kings following the Diadochoi and not to the first one alone. Hence the author seizes the chance for reconsidering titles and contents of the historical works written by Hieronymus from Cardia (FGrH 154) and Nymphis from Heraklea (FGrH 432).

The explanation of the Pontic policy of Mithridates II as offered in our scanty sources is hardly satisfactory. After the battle of Ankyra (240–239 BC), Mithridates’ position appeared ambiguous to modern and ancient authors alike (Section I–II). A revision of all the evidence would be welcome. If the chronology proposed here is correct (notably, it puts the date of the Pontic attack on Sinope at c. 228 BC instead of the widely accepted 220 BC), the aggressive policy of Mithridates in Asia Minor can be revised. The siege of Sinope should not be understood as an isolated episode in the endless Anatolian warfare; it was part of a premeditated policy which well accorded with the ambitious schemes of Antiochos Hierax (Section III). However, after Hierax’ defeat, Mithridates reverted to a policy of good relations with the main branch of the Syrian dynasty (Section IV).

In previous research, the discessio , i.e. the vote at the end of a session of the Roman senate, has been interpreted as a procedure to create simple majorities that were the basis for collective and binding decisions. In regard to the voting results of senate sessions given in the sources, it appears, however, that generally the senate made decisions in a quite unanimous way. In terms of the standards involved, this unanimity corresponded to how the political order described itself as proceeding smoothly. This conclusion qualifies previous interpretations in that the procedure is explained as a performative act that accounts for, and resulted into, the senate’s unanimity. During the discessio , the senators noticed which choice was made by their more influential peers and tended to join this group, even if their initially preferred choice was different from theirs.

Cn. Pompeius Magnus is undoubtedly best known for his great commands of 67 and 66 BCE and his subsequent role as ally, then enemy, of Iulius Caesar. Nonetheless, comprehensive scrutiny of Pompeius’ track record from 79 to 70 BCE reveals that this was perhaps the most remarkable and ground breaking stage of his career. In 78, in the face of yet another civil war, the Senate charged Rome’s first ever eques triumphalis with an independent propraetorian commission, under the auspices of the consul Q. Lutatius Catulus. In 77, Pompeius flatly ignored Catulus’ direct orders to disband his army, eager to secure a major role in the war against Sertorius and his Spanish associates. After a long and acerbic debate, the Senate eventually decided to have the People appoint Pompeius to an extraordinary proconsulship. By virtue of an unprecedented provision, the equestrian proconsul was, moreover, authorized to command in Spain on an equal footing with the consular proconsul Metellus Pius, the princeps ciuitatis of the time. In 71, Pompeius boldly decided to stand for the consulship of 70, in collusion with M. Licinius Crassus. As he ran on a decidedly popular platform and, once again, refused to disband his legions, the conscript Fathers had little choice but to grant dispensation from the Cornelian Law as well as a second public triumph. This paper will argue that, in political and constitutional terms, Pompeius played an instrumental role in burying Sulla’s constitutional settlement, and that his extraordinary career in the seventies BCE set a fateful example for the next couple of decades.

Caesar’s decision to go for Gaul is often seen as the exclusive result of the politics in the city of Rome. Both Caesar’s activities in Hispania ulterior – his propraetorship in 61/60 BC in particular – and the transfer of two Hispanic legions to Aquileia – originally brought to Italy in order to present them during the triumph that was eventually prevented by Cato – lead to a new understanding of Caesar’s choice of Gaul.

During the fourth century A. D. it was not extraordinary that certain public manifestations, like imperial panegyrics, in consideration of the coexistence of pagan and Christian population groups, used an eminently practical and political intentionality, and a deliberate ambiguous tone in religious affairs, and all of that independently of the historical context, which is defined by the encomiastic discourse and even by the author’s religious feeling.

The Vita et passio Cypriani , most likely written by the Carthaginian presbyter Pontius, strives for several goals: In addition to its panegyrical and pedagogical intention a strong apologetic task must be supposed. Pontius deals extensively with the accusations against Cyprian because of his abscondence in the Decian persecution. This apologetic intention is largely responsible for the composition of the first part of Pontius’ work, in which the traditional literary genre passio is enlarged by the description of the Saint’s life. In Latin literature Pontius’s writing holds a particular position, because later Christian authors continued to write mere passiones .

One canon issued by the council of Hippo in 393 AD forbade sons of bishops and priests to offer spectacles or to be present at them. In this work, we study the textual transmission of this canon, disappeared in its original version and known thanks to the abridged form preserved in the Breuiarium Hipponense . We also try to offer an explanation that clarifies what motivated its promulgation. In our opinion, this promulgation was the result of the imperial legislation, which obliged the sons of ancient decurions, who had quitted the curia to enter the clergy, to take charge of their fathers’ obligations. These obligations included the organization and presidency of the public shows, manifestations the Church had always disapproved.