Volume 28, Issue 1

In this paper I put forward a new interpretation of the “Exordium” and “Eulogy for Abraham” sections in Fear and Trembling. It reads them in tension, as mutually incompatible approaches to the biblical narrative of Abraham. I argue this tension is productive insofar as it reveals and critiques the failure of each section to respond to Abraham as a religious exemplar of faith. Drawing on the work of Paul Ricœur, I argue that this failure consists in the absence of the hermeneutical moment of refiguration, which takes up what is understood in the narrative in the lived experience of the reader. By enacting this irreconcilable contrast within his text, Silentio poses a hermeneutical critique of faith by highlighting the importance of narrative refiguration in the life of faith, that is, the lived experience of those who understand Abraham to be a religious exemplar.

Kierkegaard՚s The Concept of Anxiety deserves to be treated as a central text on sin, but not because it introduces an ingenious intermediate psychological determination that helps to approach an explanation of the „Fall.“ Its real relevance lies in the way the text enacts the noetic effects of sin through a theoretical reflection on the possibility of sin. This essay unfolds this thesis and assigns a central hermeneutical role to Caput 4.

In this essay I explore Kierkegaard’s description of the vision of the lover carrying out the work of love in forgiveness in “Love Hides a Multitude of Sins.” I do so by turning to the notion of anamorphosis with the associated movement, (dis)position, and eccentricity involved in reconstitution of an anamorphic image. My argument is not only that such a dynamic can be seen in Kierkegaard’s deliberation, but also that drawing the connection between anamorphosis and Kierkegaard’s account highlights the movement and disposition involved in forgiveness as well as the manner by which the forgiving lover becomes an eccentric.

In this paper, I propose a study of the figure of the philistine ( Spidsborgeren ) as the embodiment of spiritlessness in Kierkegaard. Indeed, although the pseudonyms aim at representing all the possibilities of existence, declining at the same time the diverse degrees of inwardness, the philistine appears throughout the whole work as the very paradigm of the lack of inwardness. While this figure stands as a kind of antipseudonym , I thus argue that it plays a decisive role in Kierkegaard, because it enables him to constitute and to structure, in a negative way, his philosophy of existence.

This article examines the Kierkegaard reception of the Danish theologians K. Olesen Larsen and Johannes Sløk, who both understood Kierkegaard as attempting to radically subvert the freedom of the human being. Initially, I show how current Kierkegaard research on the question of subjectivity, freedom and indirect communication differs from the readings of Olesen Larsen and Sløk. Subsequently, and in contrast to this, Olesen Larsen’s somewhat ambivalent attempt to read Kierkegaard as undermining human freedom is presented. Third, I show how Sløk arrives at a somewhat similar result, though in a more coherent way. In conclusion, the article offers a brief discussion on the plausibility of this interpretation.

This paper argues for a Kierkegaardian account of personal identity in dialogue with MacIntyre, Korsgaard, Frankfurt, Ricœur, and Marion. I engage with the scholarly debate on Kierkegaard’s relationship to practical and narrative accounts of the self and argue that he criticizes the ideal of self-authorship because authentic selfhood must be co-authored with others and embedded in the narrative setting and history that is provided by facticity. Moreover, this relation to facticity requires ethical commitment and existential faith. The phenomenology of the call can show how such commitment and faith overcomes self-alienation by synthesizing the passive and active aspects of selfhood.

How are we to understand the earnest thought of death as developed in Kierkegaard’s discourse “At a Graveside”? Through a careful examination of this signed writing, I shall argue that readers nevertheless encounter an indirect, un-authorized discourse, which presents the occasion for both a variety of moods and the cultivation of spirit. The thought of death calls forth either a certain negative mood or presents a call to action for the good. However, this distinction is problematic insofar as we consider the textuality of Kierkegaard’s discourse, which leaves existing individuals always caught in between the dialectic of mood and spirit.

This article introduces a rhetorical theory of narrative in reading Kierkegaard, comparing Kierkegaard’s praxis to Phelan’s definition of “somebody telling somebody else that something happened on some occasion and for some purpose(s).” Use of pseudonyms problematizes “the somebody” telling and makes apparent the differing purposes of author and narrator. In the early authorship, the purpose is usually a life-view. The “something happened” may seem irrelevant in Kierkegaard, but it evokes questions of lived experience and life-view. The “occasion” for telling is textually mediated, and thus draws a novel connection to literary history. Finally, I examine Kierkegaard’s real and authorial readers.

Kierkegaard’s distinction of chatter from silence gives forgiveness a linguistic spin. How can forgiveness be spoken? Is forgiveness something to be said and heard? Is saying it aloud saying too much, or too little? What is said when (and if) forgiveness is said? Should forgiveness be chatted away, or reserved in silence? For Kierkegaard, the answer(s) is (are) neither/nor: forgiveness can only be said indirectly, kept (almost) indistinguishable from resentment or indifference, as if discarded in the face of offense—if it is to happen.

Occupying a seemingly minor role in the authorship of Kierkegaard, the concept of “the sublime” has not received much attention in the reception, compared to that of other more prominent concepts. This could essentially imply one of two things: either that the sublime is not an important theme for Kierkegaard, or that it is so pervasively present, that the reader does not know how to conceive it, let alone get a hold of a tangible definition of it. Proceeding from the latter assumption, this article expounds in what sense the sublime occupies a pivotal role in Kierkegaard’s philosophy mediating between the aesthetic and the religious sphere. Using the Kantian conceptual framework of the sublime as my continual point of reference, I wish to show how Kierkegaard both remains loyal to certain aspects of this heritage, and at the same time transports the sublime to an entirely new plateau. Setting the stage for a modern discourse of the sublime will enable us to see in what sense the sublime enters a central position in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, being the feeling that awakens the individual from his social immurement and propels him into his path of self-realization.

The article aims at giving an account of and comparing Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s critique of contemporary culture by focussing on the category of seriousness. Both thinkers diagnose a general tendency of downplaying, in fact, suppressing or even abolishing consciousness of sin and a concomitant disappearance of seriousness in what they consider „the modern age of reflection.“ First, the concept of seriousness is spelled out within their respective philosophies of religion, and this in relation to the reality of sin as a misguided and distorted relationship to God. Second, the idea of seriousness is analysed with special reference to the different forms and stages of spirit (in Hegel), on the one hand, and „dialectical seriousness“ (in Kierkegaard) on the other hand. Third, major similarities and differences in both accounts are pointed out, in order, finally, to draw some, partly critical, consequences regarding current and future Kierkegaard research.

Kierkegaard is well known for his quick wit and sharp polemics against his opponents. One of his favorite targets was the poet, dramatist, and philosopher, Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1791 – 1860). Perhaps the best-known element of his critique was Heiberg’s outspoken Hegelian campaign. Before Kierkegaard’s famous criticisms of Heiberg, he learned the craft of literary polemics by reading the lively discussions in the Danish journals of the time. In this article it is argued that the role of the journal Kjøbenhavnsposten for Kierkegaard has never been appreciated. This journal was edited by Andreas Peter Liunge (1798 – 1879), who was a great adversary of Heiberg and his Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post. The article shows that the often satirical use of Hegel by Kjøbenhavnsposten to criticize Heiberg anticipates Kierkegaard’s strategy of critique with regard to Heiberg and other figures in the Danish Hegelian movement.

The article examines the explicit and implicit role that Kierkegaard played in the cultural criticism developed in the literary circle of the Danish journal Heretica (1948 – 1954). The cultural criticism of Kierkegaard and eminent Danish post-war authors (Martin A. Hansen, Vilhem Grønbech, Bjørn Poulsen, Tage Skou-Hansen and Ole Wivel) is contextualized in the tradition of Western cultural criticism. An analysis of central concepts such as crisis, rationality, spirit and reflection as well as alienation, individuality and community, demonstrates the original contributions these authors make to the modern understanding of culture. Furthermore, the article addresses the reservations that some of the Heretica - authors had towards Kierkegaard. The accusation of solipsism, however, turns out to be unwarranted. Rather, it becomes clear that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the individual, like the post-war authors’ critique of fascism, is directed against the power of the masses and the increasing bureaucratization of life. Finally, Kierkegaard as well as the 20 th century authors depict neighbor love as decisive for a post-restitutive, forward-oriented way out of a severe cultural crisis.

Early in the 1950s, Kierkegaard’s philosophy had already been introduced to the academic circle of Hong Kong, which was an in-betweener between Chinese and Western cultures. Nevertheless, while Kierkegaard was frequently discussed by the Japanese philosophers of the Kyoto school, Hong Kong Chinese philosophers (remarkably New Confucians) from the 1950s to the 2010s rarely appreciate Kierkegaard’s philosophy. This paper argues that these Chinese philosophers are uninterested in Kierkegaard because their major concerns are the preservation of traditional Chinese culture in Hong Kong, and Kierkegaard’s philosophy seems to be irrelevant to their visions and missions, and Kierkegaard’s Christian ontology seems to be inconsistent with New Confucian ontology.

This paper discusses Habermas’s characterization of Kierkegaard as a religious author in his main profession and as an existential philosopher on the side. I would like to argue that Kierkegaard is primarily an existential philosopher, also in his function as a religious author. At first, I would like to interpret his religious authorship as a form of indirect communication, and after that I discuss indirect communication as a method of existentialism. In this way, the article aims to demonstrate that Kierkegaard becomes the precursor of existential philosophy not least by his religious authorship as a theory and practice of indirect communication.

This second part of a two-part article (the first part of which appeared in the Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2022) surveys the varying uses made of Kierkegaard’s writings by four twentieth- and, in two of their cases, also twenty-first-century contributors to Religionswissenschaft: Joachim Wach, Mircea Eliade, Wendy Doniger, and Bruce Lincoln, all four of whom happen to have taught at the University of Chicago Divinity School. Far from being irrelevant or being regarded as a theologically-inclined persona non grata by comparatists of religion, Kierkegaard was embraced in three main capacities by these influential contributors to the field: as a datum (mostly in the history of theology and/or philosophy), as a theorist, and, in one case, as an existential soulmate. In Lincoln’s case, the reduction to memes—the memeification—of certain ideas ascribed to Kierkegaard comes under consideration.