Band 213, Heft 4

In this paper, models are derived to discuss the basic determinants and patterns of the development of innovations in private industries. Special attention is paid to the impact of market structure and nonperfect appropriability conditions on the incentives to engage in research and development. The results of the models are used to explain the development of hybrid rye in Germany. Zusammenfassung In diesem Aufsatz werden Modelle hergeleitet, mit deren Hilfe die grundsätzlichen Bestimmungsgründe und Muster der Entwicklung von Innovationen in privaten Unternehmen diskutiert werden. Besondere Beachtung finden dabei Effekte, die aus der Marktstruktur und aus den unvollständigen Möglichkeiten zur exklusiven Nutzung der Erträge der Forschungsaktivitäten resultieren. Die mit Hilfe der Modelle deduzierten Ergebnisse werden verwendet, um die Entwicklung von Hybridroggen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu erklären.

In this paper a standard two-stage Coumot-oligopoly game is used to analyze some aspects of the economics and politics of international common property. In stage 1, governments which host firms using the commons decide on optimal input taxes. In stage 2, profit maximizing firms choose the level of a variable input. Private decisions in this stage imply the well-known overexploitation of the commons. The “tragedy of the commons”, however, is further aggregated by the policy decisions of welfare maximizing governments in stage 1, since governments have incentives to implement policies to shift rents from foreign to domestic firms. On the other hand, governments behaving cooperatively could set input taxes such that the commons is used efficiently. Coordination of tax policies, retaliatory mechanisms in situations of repeated interaction, and international firm ownership are discussed as potential solutions to this twofold problem of the commons. Zusammenfassung In diesem Papier werden auf der Basis eines zweistufigen Cowrnot-Oligopolspiels ökonomische und wirtschaftspolitische Aspekte eines internationalen Allmendegutes analysiert. Auf der ersten Stufe bestimmen nationale Regierungen optimale Inputsteuern, während auf Stufe zwei die oligopolistischen Nutzerfirmen ihre variablen Inputmengen festlegen. Es zeigt sich, daß rational handelnde Regierungen das aus den Entscheidungen der Privaten resultierende Problem der Übernutzung der gemeinsamen Ressource durch die Gewährung von Inputsubventionen verschärfen. Auf der anderen Seite könnten die Regierungen bei kooperativem Verhalten Inputsteuern derart festlegen, daß eine effiziente Nutzung erreicht wird. Als denkbare Lösungen dieses zweifachen Allmendeproblems werden die Koordination nationaler Steuern, die Gestaltung von Vergeltungsmechanismen und die Existenz grenzüberschreitenden Unternehmenseigentums diskutiert.

Mundell-Fleming models show that in an exchange rate union public expenditure increases of one member will only be successful at the cost of the partner country. This result hinges on the assumptions that capital mobility is perfect, the exchange rate union is a small country and finally that no change of the exchange rate is expected. We show in our contribution that the Mundell-Fleming results crucially depend on an inconsistent analytical framework for both the assumed perfect capital mobility and the interrelationsship between the financial and real sector of each economy.

We conjecture that interventions into existing property rights may make the future course of economic policy unpredictable. Interventionism thus creates a climate of “institutional uncertainty” which works as a brake upon capital formation, innovation and growth. Using a stochastic intertemporal optimization framework we show that an increased level of uncertainty exercises a negative effect on the level of economic development and the rate of technical progress. Finally, we conduct a cross-section analysis of the long-term growth performance of Sub-Saharan African countries. We find support to our hypothesis that differences in economic development can be related to different degrees of institutional uncertainty.

The study focuses on people with extremely unstable employment careers. Direct transitions to stable occupations are very rare, mainly realized by persons with formerly stable employment. If persons reach at least a „semi-stable“ state of employment, chances for a later transition into a stable occupation are much higher. This form of indirect transition is also much easier to reach, if persons have formerly experienced a stable occupation. Therefore, the insider/outsider concept concerning internal labor markets has to be extended. Insiders in a wider sense are - regardless of their present occupation - all persons with experience in the internal labor market.