Volume 2, Issue 1

We are pleased to publish Volume 2, of the Journal for Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law. This volume, like the first volume, continues to raise new and important legal issues in the emerging field of biosecurity, biosafety and biodefense law.

As it is currently structured, Afghanistans biosecurity framework is weak and offers little to no protection to US troops against the threat of either infectious disease outbreaks or a biological weapons attack by terrorists. If fact, the only legitimate biosecurity practice of the Afghanistan government is to respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases. Such responses are debilitated by a devastated infrastructure, harsh and often times impassable landscape, and non-compliance by Afghan citizens.5 As such, US troops (and, indeed, Afghan citizens) are left susceptible to these endemic diseases to a degree beyond their own control. I believe an alternative biosecurity framework could be implemented that would alleviate this threat.6 Because Afghanistan remains a decentralized and tribal society, the crux of this proposal is that biosecurity measures are to be reallocated to the local, tribal level. I will further expound in greater detail on the reasons for this proposal in section four below.

Identifying and assessing biological weapons (“BW”) programs has been a fatal flaw in the United States defense posture since the Cold War. From the time when the Berlin Wall was torn down and the technology used to build BW proliferated worldwide, the BW threat has become more immediate, however the ability to identify hostile BW programs and assess their capabilities has received little attention. This paper seeks to identify ways to leverage information that might prevent a BW attack on the United States. It begins by looking at historical trends in the failure to assess, continues with a brief analysis of the intelligence collection cycle, and then looks to tailor the cycle to meet this unique threat.

This paper will consider a proposal for a new type of governmental agency to counter the threat of international public health concerns. Public health has increasingly become an international concern as a national security issue regardless of whether it involves an intentional release of a disease. September 11th and the Anthrax letters woke people up to the threat of bioterrorism. In addition, SARS, H1N1, and the Andrew Speaker incident have served to remind us that the threat of fatal disease occurs naturally and does not need to be turned into a weapon before it is a legitimate threat. The natural question that one must raise is whether existing government agencies are sufficiently equipped and prepared to deal with such challenges. The hypothetical government agency discussed in this paper will is one that combines aspects of a public health agency along with that of an intelligence organization. To begin the analysis of such a hypothetical agency, one must first consider where the world of public health intersects with espionage and law enforcement. Next, this paper will discuss the some of the government entities charged separately with different aspects of these duties. Finally, this paper will consider some of the legal limits of such a new agency.

Since the Bolshevik Revolution, Russian government has been involved in the development and weaponization of biological agents for offensive purposes. In 1972 the Soviet Union signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) banning the use, development, and possession of offensive biological weapons. But soon the world learned that the Soviets continued developing biological weapons in violation of the BWC. There are still many questions concerning whether Russia continues to dishonor its obligations under the BWC. This paper uses Russia as a case study to show that something needs to be done to ensure all BWC subscribing nations’ compliance with the BWC and then proposes a combination of measures aimed at improving international compliance.

The World Health Organization (WHO) is the premier global organization to monitor and protect global health, while the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) functions as an international nucleus for assistance in crime prevention and detection. In the event of a deliberate act of bioterrorism, the inevitable question is whether or not a jurisdictional “tug of war” would occur between WHO and Interpol. The following paper addresses the power, initiatives, and protocol regarding bioterrorism of both Interpol and WHO, recent collaborations between the two organizations, and a jurisdictional analysis of what may occur when the two organization work together in the aftermath of an act of bioterrorism.

This paper will focus on the potential threats to nations’ public water supplies and what actions the United States and the European Union have taken to reduce their vulnerability to those threats. The dangers, vulnerabilities, and regulations analyzed will be primarily those that pertain to the contamination of water supplies by biological agents. Water is crucial to public health and human survival. A nation’s water supply structure is one of the primary structures on which its overall prosperity is contingent. A country must not only have the means to supply water to its citizens for consumption, but also to support agriculture and industry. Over the past decade, many countries have determined that an attack on their water supply is not only likely, but, if accomplished, would have detrimental consequences. As a result, nations have begun to implement procedures for preventing biological attacks to their public water supply, detecting attacks, and responding to biological attacks.

The perceived threat of biological weapons and biological warfare is growing. The increase in terrorist activity, coupled with the ease of development of biological weapons, is one of the main driving factors of this shift. Several factors support that idea that a deliberate contamination could potentially produce far more devastation than a natural outbreak. This paper analyzes part of the current structure of international food regulation to determine its susceptibility to a deliberate contamination. The analysis focuses on the affects food regulation organizations have on the ability of members to create and implement a security measure to address the threat of deliberate contamination. I have focused on two organizations: the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the World Trade Organization, specifically the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Sections 2 and 3 of this paper provide an overview of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures under the World Trade Organization. Section 4 lays out the hypothetical scenario in which we will analyze the issues throughout the paper. Sections 5 and 6 are the analysis of the issues that affect susceptibility to a deliberate contamination.

This Article will focus on the Plague as a biological weapon to be used in a bioterrorism attack. Two different hypotheticals will be discussed in Part II regarding bioterrorism threats at airports in both the United States and France. Emerging technologies in biological warfare detection are discussed in Part III. United States search and seizure law will be discussed in Part IV, while French search and seizure law will be detailed in Part V. Part VI of this Article will analyze the differences between both country’s law enforcement agents and their ability to combat bioterrorism threats in their respective countries. Finally, this Article will discuss which country is better prepared to face a potential bioterrorism attack through its airport security procedures, anti-terrorism measures, biosecurity laws, and search and seizure laws and limitations.

The aim of this paper is to analyze and understand the role of law with regard to the plague in modern times with an international perspective. The paper will proceed by giving an overview of the different relevant legal regulations, studying the most recent significant cases of the plague, and considering how international law has dealt with them. Finally, this paper will attempt to address if the current international law system would be efficient in addressing the potential of massive plague outbreak and how it would be possible to improve it.

Prior to examining ways to prevent biological warfare, it is important to gain a clear understanding of what some of the most likely biological weapons are. Knowing the potential effect of a weapon is an important step as it will aid in laying down a basis for regulations. After understanding the types of weapons available, the conversation logically turns towards a question of preventative action that can be taken to avoid this potential catastrophe from taking place. Prevention is primarily attempted through the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). It is through this convention that the majority of the world’s nations agreed to either cease or not begin a biological weapons program. However, as with many other treaties, the Biological Weapons Convention is left with several problems when it comes to its enforceability. This problem with the convention is serious enough to render the entire BWC ineffective. By considering these weapons, the measures to prevent their use, and the problems surrounding the BWC, it is possible to better understand the actual threat posed by biological warfare and the current state of measures being taken to ensure that such an attack cannot occur. While the potential list of biological weapons is numerous, there are a handful of weapons that are considered to be of particular concern. These have been termed as class A agents, which pose a high national security risk and will be the primary focus of this paper.

The Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC), signed in 1972, is the express sense of 162 nations that as a world community, we agree to the end of the use of biological weapons by state parties. However, the increasing numbers of biological, pharmaceutical and public health facilities, coupled with the biotechnology revolution in the latter part of the 20th century, made the development of preventative code of conduct a priority. Biosafety and biosecurity codes of conduct became a topic for consideration by the BTWC in 2005. To develop this new focus, the BTWC conference held a series of expert meetings culminating with the 2011 Review Conference.Codes of conduct encourage a community approach to formulate acceptable, effective, and reasonably related principles in order to achieve its goals. In order to achieve a collective definition of the priorities or impediments for a biosecurity code of conduct among the representatives of the States Parties, a survey was designed. The survey instrument was designed to be answered during one of the days of the regular intersessional Meetings of Experts of the BTWC on August 27, 2009. This article provides a review and assessment of results of this survey.