International Food Regulations: Susceptibility to Deliberate Contamination
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Bradley Anderle
The perceived threat of biological weapons and biological warfare is growing. The increase in terrorist activity, coupled with the ease of development of biological weapons, is one of the main driving factors of this shift. Several factors support that idea that a deliberate contamination could potentially produce far more devastation than a natural outbreak. This paper analyzes part of the current structure of international food regulation to determine its susceptibility to a deliberate contamination. The analysis focuses on the affects food regulation organizations have on the ability of members to create and implement a security measure to address the threat of deliberate contamination. I have focused on two organizations: the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the World Trade Organization, specifically the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Sections 2 and 3 of this paper provide an overview of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures under the World Trade Organization. Section 4 lays out the hypothetical scenario in which we will analyze the issues throughout the paper. Sections 5 and 6 are the analysis of the issues that affect susceptibility to a deliberate contamination.
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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- Introduction: Volume 2 of the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety & Biodefense Law
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- Endemic Disease in Afghanistan: How an Improved Biosecurity Framework Could Alleviate the Threat to U.S. Troops
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- International Health and Intelligence Gathering: One in the Same or Rival Factions?
- Cold Cooperation: Biodevelopment and The Legal Landscape
- Tug of War? A Jurisdictional Analysis of WHO and Interpol
- Regulatory Frameworks in Global Biosecurity Threats to Food and Water
- Public Water Supplies in the United States and the European Union: International Security Procedures and Vulnerabilities
- International Food Regulations: Susceptibility to Deliberate Contamination
- France and a Biosecurity Perspective
- International Bioterrorism Search and Seizure Issues: A Comparative Analysis of American and French Search and Seizure Law as it Relates to the Global War on Terror
- The Plague in Modern Times and the Role of Law
- Biological Weapons Convention Perspectives in Law and Social Sciences
- The Biological Weapons Convention: Creation and Problems with Enforcement
- A Survey of Priorities and Impediments for a Biosecurity Code of Conduct as a Confidence Building Measure for the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention
Articles in the same Issue
- Introduction: Volume 2 of the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety & Biodefense Law
- Global Biosecurity and Intelligence Challenges in Policy and Law
- Endemic Disease in Afghanistan: How an Improved Biosecurity Framework Could Alleviate the Threat to U.S. Troops
- BioIntel: Leveraging Information to Prevent Biological Weapons Attacks
- International Health and Intelligence Gathering: One in the Same or Rival Factions?
- Cold Cooperation: Biodevelopment and The Legal Landscape
- Tug of War? A Jurisdictional Analysis of WHO and Interpol
- Regulatory Frameworks in Global Biosecurity Threats to Food and Water
- Public Water Supplies in the United States and the European Union: International Security Procedures and Vulnerabilities
- International Food Regulations: Susceptibility to Deliberate Contamination
- France and a Biosecurity Perspective
- International Bioterrorism Search and Seizure Issues: A Comparative Analysis of American and French Search and Seizure Law as it Relates to the Global War on Terror
- The Plague in Modern Times and the Role of Law
- Biological Weapons Convention Perspectives in Law and Social Sciences
- The Biological Weapons Convention: Creation and Problems with Enforcement
- A Survey of Priorities and Impediments for a Biosecurity Code of Conduct as a Confidence Building Measure for the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention
