Band 11, Heft 1

As many of you may remember from your first-year Tort and Constitutional Law courses, courts recognize the right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment, even if necessary to save their lives; this generally includes the right to refuse immunizations from diseases, particularly if the vaccine has not yet been approved by the Food & Drug Administration. As you also undoubtedly know, servicemembers are different. To maintain the strength and readiness of the armed forces, military personnel must undergo necessary medical treatment. Otherwise, if they become casualties to disease or other treatable disabilities, servicemembers become burdens on their units, and their jobs must be assumed by others—often leaving their units short-handed. Their illnesses or disabilities thus affect the ability of their units to accomplish their missions and may jeopardize the safety and lives of their fellow servicemembers. Indeed, until World War II, the majority of combat deaths in military units engaged in combat were due to infectious diseases rather than direct combat injuries.

Terrorism involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons is as dangerous a threat in practice as it is controversial a topic in national security policymaking. While none seriously dispute the destructive potential of a successful CBRN attack, the rarity of such incidents raises important and contentious questions relating to the optimal levels of resource dedication required to deter, prepare for, and respond to these threats.

A twenty-something college student with an interest in science sits in his garage. He is tinkering with genetic materials and gene editing. He has ordered materials over the internet, has all the items he could want, and even has his own test subject—himself. He could inject himself with whatever products his experimentation manufactures. Our hypothetical college student has all the materials in his hands to make the next greatest discovery in the fight against cancer, or to create—intentionally or by accident—a genetically modified disease that could be incredibly lethal to the entire globe. This twenty-something college student is one of many emerging do-it-yourself scientists (“DIYers”). The reality of do-it-yourself (“DIY”) science is here, and it might be severely under regulated. This type of research could pose significant risks to all of humanity if an appropriate regulatory scheme is not developed. Conversely, too much regulation could prevent innovation.

Life-threatening diseases have been the biggest fear of individuals dating back to the beginning of time. Taking the lives of millions, it was almost inevitable that one disease or another would completely knock out the human population. Fortunately, Edward Jenner developed the first successful vaccine in 1796 to combat a deadly smallpox outbreak. The creation of vaccinations is among the greatest achievements in the history of public health. Today, there are few measures that compare with the amount of lives saved due to vaccines. In fact, many life-threatening diseases in the United States have been reduced by more than 99%. In addition to saving the lives of children, there have been a drastic economic benefit as well that has resulted in our society saving almost $69 billion. The benefits of vaccinations have not gone unnoticed by legislatures. Today, all 50 states have enacted some form of compulsory vaccinations for children who plan on attending school in order to decrease the spread of diseases among our youth.

In this world, there are many potential hazards that could lead to a nationwide biosecurity threat. On the one hand, there are the unintended perils that result from natural outbreaks, such as with domestic food contamination. On the other hand, there are the intentional actions that lead to incidents of agroterrorism, which can reap significant economic loss, widespread destruction of crops and livestock, as well as increased human illness and death. For these reasons, the United States government has implemented various mechanisms over time in order to combat the food-borne threats imposed by both intentional and unintentional biosecurity hazards. For the purpose of this paper, these mechanisms will be referred to as the “food safety fence.”

The early part of the twenty-first century saw a revolution in the field of Homeland Security. The 9/11 attacks, shortly followed thereafter by the Anthrax Attacks, served as a wakeup call to the United States and showed the inadequacy of the current state of the nation’s Homeland Security operations.   Biodefense, and as a direct result Biosurveillance, changed dramatically after these tragedies, planting the seeds of fear in the minds of Americans.   They were shown that not only could the United States be attacked at any time, but the weapon could be an invisible disease-causing agent.

The Global Health Security Agenda is a comprehensive and multilateral action plan that is designed to “achieve a world safe and secure from infectious disease threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberately released.” The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) involves various organizations spanning across over 50 nations. Many of these nations also have multiple agencies that have a role in furthering the objectives of the GHSA.

North Korea poses significant risks to national security as it continues to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). On February 28, 2019, United States President Donald Trump announced that he would be departing his second summit with Kim Jong Un without having reached a deal regarding the denuclearization of North Korea. This anticlimactic outcome followed weeks of media buildup surrounding the two leaders’ meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam; however, negotiators from both countries have pledged to continue their efforts at crafting a deal. As they continue this endeavor, those with a seat at the negotiating table must recognize that the most prudent path forward for the United States is to ensure that any such disarmament deal also address North Korea’s capacity to develop of biological weapons (BWs) in addition to nuclear and chemical capabilities as part of a comprehensive strategy.