Abstract
Terrorism involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons is as dangerous a threat in practice as it is controversial a topic in national security policymaking. While none seriously dispute the destructive potential of a successful CBRN attack, the rarity of such incidents raises important and contentious questions relating to the optimal levels of resource dedication required to deter, prepare for, and respond to these threats.
Published Online: 2020-08-12
© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
You are currently not able to access this content.
You are currently not able to access this content.
Articles in the same Issue
- Introduction
- Introduction to Volume XI
- Articles
- Vaccines and the Armed Forces: There “AIN’T” NO “Anti-vaxxers” in the Military
- Mandatory Incident Reporting as a Means to Counter C/B Terrorism: Moving from Accident-based to Incident-based Systems
- DIY Science: A Cure for Cancer of the Next Plague
- The Constitutionality of Mandatory Vaccinations: Eliminating Exemptions
- The Food Safety Fence: Gaps and Consequences
- Biosurveillance: A Modern Look
- The 2014 Global Health Security Agenda
- Let’s Make a (Smart) Deal: Biodiplomacy in the Age of Trump
Keywords for this article
incident-based systems;
accident-based systems;
incident reporting, terrorism
Articles in the same Issue
- Introduction
- Introduction to Volume XI
- Articles
- Vaccines and the Armed Forces: There “AIN’T” NO “Anti-vaxxers” in the Military
- Mandatory Incident Reporting as a Means to Counter C/B Terrorism: Moving from Accident-based to Incident-based Systems
- DIY Science: A Cure for Cancer of the Next Plague
- The Constitutionality of Mandatory Vaccinations: Eliminating Exemptions
- The Food Safety Fence: Gaps and Consequences
- Biosurveillance: A Modern Look
- The 2014 Global Health Security Agenda
- Let’s Make a (Smart) Deal: Biodiplomacy in the Age of Trump