Volume 13, Issue 2

In this article, I demonstrate that electrum is an unusual material for a monetary medium and that the common explanation that this material was chosen for the manufacture of the first coins to make a profit does not suffice. Electrum as raw material was typically used to produce luxury items, which rather connects with two elements of Lydian culture, namely the feudal character of its society and the offering of gifts to ensure support. Therefore, I connect the appearance of coinage with the switch from gift exchange to market exchange, the war-permeated Middle Lydia period and the rise of mercenaries. In conclusion, I sketch the change over from gift to monetary medium.

Thucydides’ account of the prodigious Athenian losses during the Egyptian expedition has long seemed implausible to many historians and thus potentially inconsistent with his stated commitment to accuracy. Most have taken a reductionalist position, finding one reason or another to regard the historian’s report as technically correct if somewhat slanted. This paper attempts to explain the reasons why the Athenian historian described the campaign as he did. In order to foreshadow the blunder of the Sicilian expedition in the sharpest possible terms, thus indicting the Athenian leaders who followed Pericles for failing to follow his strategy, Thucydides highlights the disaster as far as the facts will allow, while at the same time omitting all mention of Pericles’ possible complicity so as to preserve that statesman’s reputation.

Increasingly, scholars have recognised the significance of volunteers in the Roman army during the middle Republic (c. 264–146 BCE). Whilst studies have noted the phenomenon of individual volunteers, during the 190 s veterans volunteered for service in the armies sent to the eastern Mediterranean from a recognised, cohesive and famed military collective: Scipio Africanus’ veterans from Spain and Africa. It is suggested that Scipio’s veteran volunteers brought experience, skill and esprit de corps , aspects of professionalism only otherwise found in the legions of the late Republic and Principate. This provides another explanation for Rome’s extraordinary military successes in the eastern Mediterranean between 200–188.

In the middle 90 s, the geopolitical interests of Pontus, Armenia, Rome, and Parthia in the Near East converged on the minor kingdom of Cappadocia in Anatolia. Although there were many different motivations, intentions, and perspectives concerning this emerging international affair in Cappadocia, this phenomenon reflects the increasingly complex geopolitical realties of the international environment of the Near East at this time. Cappadocia was not only within the edges of the Parthians’ and Romans’ separate spheres of influence, but it also became a target of the ascending powers of Pontus and Armenia. The emergence of Tigranes II as the Parthians’ vassal king of Armenia in the middle 90 s, adjacent to Cappadocia, gave Mithridates VI of Pontus a new opportunity to control the region, and the two kings agreed to work together against their common regional rival. Although it is important to consider the place of Parthia within the contexts of the wider Cappadocian affair, one should not overestimate the involvement or cooperation of Parthia in the progressively tense geopolitical atmosphere surrounding the region. That said, these developments facilitated the first official meeting between the Parthians and Romans, even though neither side had much interest in such a meeting nor appreciated its potential implications. For centuries, the origin and impact of the first meeting of the Parthians and Romans in Cappadocia have been exaggerated and diluted by the anachronistic and myopic perspectives of the surviving Greco-Roman sources. Because of this, the focus of scholarship has been and continues to be on the agency of the Romans at the expense of the agency of other important eastern actors. Yet with a renewed focus on the Cappadocian affair, this article will challenge Rome-centric understandings of these developments, emphasizing instead new interpretations that highlight the considerable agency and motivations of various eastern actors.

This article revisits and refines the reconstruction of Nile flood levels during the Roman period, using a multidisciplinary approach to integrate textual, numismatic, and epigraphic sources with environmental data and comparative Islamic-era Nilometer records. The Nile flood was a linchpin of agricultural prosperity and socio-economic stability for both Roman Egypt and the wider Mediterranean, yet systematic annual flood data remain absent for the Roman period. By expanding upon Bonneau’s pioneering 1971 study, this research reanalyzes her dataset in light of recent papyrological and epigraphic discoveries and new interpretations and scientific proxies. The study underscores a transition from stable and abundant Nile floods in the early Imperial period to weaker inundations after the mid-second century CE, correlating these changes with broader climatic cooling trends. Comparative analysis with Islamic-period flood data highlights long-term hydrological trends and emphasizes the interplay of climatic variability and annual Nile flood heights.

The fourth-century usurper Magnus Maximus is typically treated as little more than a footnote in Roman history. This essay argues, however, for his importance as an exemplar of the increasingly complex relationship between Roman emperor and Christian bishops in the period between Constantine and Theodosius. From the beginning of his reign, Maximus sought to present himself as a Christian emperor according to a radically different model than that employed by previous rulers. This essay argues that this self-presentation is best understood in the context of the Arian Controversy, and in particular the victory of a Nicene faction that had made the assertion of episcopal independence a central theological plank, and buttressed it with many means for delegitimizing Emperors. This essay makes its case through close readings of Maximus’ own surviving letters, of texts from Ambrose of Milan, and of the works of Sulpicius Severus. Even before his defeat and execution by Theodosius, Maximus found himself embroiled in conflicts with bishops; including the decision of Ambrose to support the “heretical” Valentinian II against him and the decision of the bishop of Rome and others to condemn Maximus’ execution of the heretic Priscillian of Avila for heresy. Maximus’ ecclesial entanglements thus paradoxically opened him up to Christian moral critique and ecclesial-judicial rejection in a manner frequently destructive of the assumptions of Late Roman Imperial rule. At the same time, through his close relationships with Nicene ascetics and bishops, Maximus accessed alternate means of gaining and maintaining power, shaping his public image, and competing with rival emperors, means that served him well while alive and preserved after his death a more extensive and positive written record of his reign than of any other Late Antique usurper.

This article re-examines the question of Emperor Julian’s knowledge of Latin, with particular focus on his supposed use of Suetonius and Aurelius Victor in the composition of the Caesares . While ancient and modern testimonies often assume Julian’s bilingualism, the evidence suggests that his mastery of Latin was limited to conversational and administrative registers, falling short of the literary Latin required to engage with authors such as Vergil, Cicero, Suetonius, or Victor. By comparing Julian’s Caesares with the Liber de Caesaribus and Suetonius’ De Vita Caesarum , this study demonstrates the absence of direct engagement with either author. The “Suetonian mirage,” whereby similarities are taken as proof of influence, is shown to dissolve under closer scrutiny, as Julian’s portrayals diverge markedly from Suetonian traditions and are more plausibly explained through Greek intermediaries. Likewise, the lacuna in Julian’s account of emperors from 235 to 260 CE underscores his lack of access to the Latin historiographical tradition epitomized by Victor. This article therefore argues that Julian, though capable of functional Latin communication, did not possess the literary training necessary to read or employ advanced Latin sources. The conclusion challenges recent claims of Julian’s reliance on Victor’s lost history and emphasizes instead the overwhelmingly Greek orientation of his paideia .