Volume 303, Issue 2 -

The article departs from the myth of „free tobacco“ how Fernando Ortiz has described it in his classic „Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y del azúcar“ (1940) as a cultural and historical commodity narrative. This myth accompanied cigars from Cuba until today – worldwide. The article deconstructs this myth by telling a history of tobacco in Cuba as part of the tobacco-Atlantic in modern times. This story was already in the 18th century, but especially in the 19th Century (until 1886), a history of „tobacco with slaves“ and a history of the Cuban tobacco industry as part of the global Second Slavery in the 19th century.

Connectivity, Competition and „free markets“ are frequently interpreted as a panacea towards achieving successful economic growth and development; they are often said to have stood at the heart of the „European Miracle“, especially the long transition of Europe towards industrialization as well as the global income disparity usually known as Great Divergence. The paper takes issue with this, calling for a re-evaluation of the role of the state as well as „free markets“ in the economic process. A first section challenges a commonly held conception of „free markets“ and economic deregulation as prerequisites for successful economic development by comparing the discursive evidence of early modern economic texts (usually written by people who have later become labelled either „mercantilists“ or „cameralists“) with select examples of economic practice and policy in early modern Europe (I). A second section challenges the common notion of „competition“, drawing upon the textual heritage of early modern Europe; arguing that competition without rules or intervening states was both unheard of as well as unthinkable (II). The modern notion of „free markets“ has led to a distorted view on the role of states and governance in the establishment and stabilization of the „free market process“: for markets to be „free“ and work effectively there must be a strong tendency for governments and political authorities to intervene (III). This can be shown empirically, mainly using the example of the early modern German Policey discourse and the theories developed by mercantilist and Cameralist authors regarding the governance of markets. The paper concludes that free markets need tight rules. This basic fact has not changed since the middle ages and is still valid today, but it has been portrayed rather differently in the public discourses regarding markets and the emerging modern economic theory since the Enlightenment (IV).

In the last one hundred years historians have argued in a highly controversial way about the causes and the responsibilities for the outbreak of World War I. One crucial factor, however, has never been taken into consideration: the precise knowledge that France had about the so-called „Schlieffenplan“. This paper explores and highlights the argument that this knowledge enabled Poincaré’s government to develop a concise strategy of war preparation and of blackmail with regard to Berlin. Its aim was not merely to guarantee French security; its main object was rather to take revenge for the French defeat of 1870/71. According to Poincaré’s calculation, the Berlin government was to be put under pressure so as to create a situation which left only one alternative: to trigger off war or to face an outstanding and unprecedented diplomatic defeat. Thus, Poincaré’s policy between 1912 and 1914 paved the way for the strategy of brinkmanship and uncontrollable offensive pursued by Berlin in the „crisis of July“ of 1914. This puts the blame on France and Poincaré to be likewise responsible for the outbreak of the war.

Most historians so far wrote the history of Stiftung Warentest founded in 1964 as a story of success, initiated by Ludwig Erhard, „father“ of the social market economy. However, in the 1950s it was Erhard himself who took a stand against all efforts in favour of comparative product testing. He considered it to be a too direct intervention on the free market. Nevertheless, in the beginning 1960s the West German government decided to found the Stiftung with state support, which caused severe financial problems for non-governmental product testing initiatives at that time. The article discusses the circumstances which led to this decision and analyzes the implications the foundation had for West German politics of consumption: While Christian Kleinschmidt has described the state-subsidized foundation as a clear sign for a „rejection from government’s paternalistic rationale in consumer politics“, the article argues that the „Warentest“ debate catalyzed a steadily intensifying governmental engagement in this policy field. The state’s initiative in comparative product testing was mostly based on the premise that German consumer organizations were too undisciplined, chaotic, and illegitimate, so the state would have to take the lead. Against this background, it is no surprise that Stiftung Warentest in particular affected the „Association of Consumer Organizations“ (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucherverbände, AgV) in a negative way. The increasing state activity in consumer politics continuously forced the leading consumer organization into the backseat.