Volume 34, Issue 3 - Special Issue: The relevance of the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead; Guest Editors: Gabriel Bianchi, Lennart Posch and Paul Stenner

This contribution offers a sense of the scope and transdisciplinary relevance of the philosophy of British mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead by providing an overview of the three main phases of his career. The contribution goes on to distinguish process thought from the substance thought which dominated modern philosophy, and to outline some of the ways in which Whitehead has influenced thought from across the full spectrum of academic disciplines.

Whitehead’s process philosophy offers a wide range of speculatively generalized concepts that allow for an application in transdisciplinary research. The notion of projection is an often-overlooked detail of his philosophy that not only appears in his far-reaching theory of perception, but also constitutes an integral part of his theory of extension as the formal foundation of his metaphysical project. His perceptive theory relies on the idea of projection as the fundamental ontological relationship that lifts the past into the present. Projections of sensa describe one side of the ‘double-barreled’ theory of perception and the spatial relations of the contemporary world. The microscopic projection is just as fundamental for perception and for the integrity of a relational theory of becoming, as the perceptual projection is necessary ingredient for symbolic modes of experience. The simple projection in the mode of presentational immediacy is the basis of temporary stability of events and of any perceptual situation in the biological realm. Whitehead was aware of the possible misconceptions that this term might lead to. Discussing his remarks on the hierarchical variety of different modes of projection can resolve those misconceptions and throw a new light on the importance of projection for interdisciplinary inquiries.

This article seeks to clarify the role of the notion of rhythm in Whitehead’s philosophy, considering the mediating character it has between the order of events and that of objects. Deleuze and Harman, when commenting on Whitehead’s ontological system, have highlighted the value of events and objects, respectively. Here, we pretend to elucidate the limits of these readings and give relevance to the category between both planes, which is rhythm. This concepts evolve from a naturalistic view to a more metaphysical conception in Whitehead’s later work, and its applications go from science to education and aesthetics. Thus, rhythm can be understood as a complex that has an eventual face and an objectual face, internally defining itself as a system of contrasts that mobilizes creation and intensity through time. This rhythmic process of creation leads us to think a poetics of experience, considering its aesthetic and compositional nature.

The topic of critical thinking has engaged philosophers, psychologists and educators for well over one hundred years. Amid polarized political attacks on the teaching of controversial issues, however, education in critical thinking appears to be nearing a new low, not only in the United States, but also in other countries being torn by partisan politics. This article reviews the ebb and flow of critical thinking efforts, suggests explanations for their discouraging results, and proposes a way forward that treats critical thinking as an integrative process advanced by Mary Parker Follet, and more recently espoused by Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway. In the exploratory spirit of John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead, I am introducing this essay, not with analysis or theory, but with a narrative of educational events in all their richness of context. These events describe how middle school students addressed the question of whether wolves should be removed from the endangered species list in the Northern Rocky Mountains of the United States. In the course of this discussion, I wish to demonstrate that thinking critically requires moving beyond winning, losing, or compromising to resolution of conflict, and furthermore, understanding that even stable resolutions must be revisited as events change.

In the Harvard lectures of 1924–1925, Alfred North Whitehead proposed that our various intellectual activities amounted to an attempt to understand the world and our experiences through hypothesizing. He explained the importance of hypothesis in scientific research and extended the idea of hypothesis to the philosophical method called “speculative philosophy.” For Whitehead, philosophy was the attempt to formulate general hypotheses that can transcend disciplines. This paper is intended to explore the possible influence of Victorian philosophers on Whitehead. Victorian philosophers such as John Herschel, William Whewell, and John Stuart Mill discussed the role of hypothesis in scientific discovery. Was Whitehead aware of this tradition? Was he influenced by it? This article indicates that Whitehead at least indirectly inherited the Victorian idea of hypothesis, notably in the thought of Whewell, as mediated by Charles Darwin.

I argue that Robert Nozick, in his well-known book “ Anarchy, State, Utopia ”, is working with Locke’s notion of the natural right to property merely instrumentally. I use the term “instrumentally” in the sense that the pieces of the source are not used within the context of the original work but are used atomically to support one’s argument or theory. Instrumental use of Locke’s theory causes incoherence in his theory. This paper introduces the incoherence in the question and explains how this incoherency is inherent to Nozick’s interpretation and usage of Lockean Proviso.

This article argues that Richard Rorty’s philosophy has a blind spot regarding our relationship with nature. It examines his distinct version of pragmatism to find ways to address this shortcoming. Rorty’s antirepresentational “pragmatism as anti-authoritarianism” and its anthropocentric character are discussed. His linguistic instrumentalism is problematized since it entails an unapologetic Baconian view of knowledge as power and nature as a manipulable object. While Rorty’s Darwinian image of the human being somewhat relativizes this Baconian humanism, it does not address the dependence of the human species on its natural environment. According to the romantic dimension in Rorty, the human being is rather exalted, and the imperative of infinite self-creation ignores natural limits. However, there are valuable resources in Rorty’s philosophy that can limit this imperative and his instrumentalism. For instance, Rorty’s anti-authoritarianism reminds us of the moral responsibility of choice about (our) nature. Furthermore, his inclusivist ethic of solidarity implies the potential extension beyond the human species. Lastly, his notion of philosophy as cultural politics could foster democratic discussion on the pressing issues of technological advance.

Lévinas’s philosophy emerges from his critique of the traditional sources of Western philosophy and employs phenomenological methods to transcend the conventional theology and ethics of subjectivity. Through a series of inquiries, Lévinas expands the narrow philosophical vision and problem domain related to the philosophy of the Other. This study examines the profound impact of Lévinas’s philosophy on contemporary philosophy and human society, particularly its elucidation of people’s anxiety, confusion, and overwhelm with the ethical dimension of life in postmodern society. In today’s rapidly evolving landscape, characterized by increased reliance on AI, decreased face-to-face communication, and significant shifts in lifestyle, the study of Lévinas’s philosophy gains heightened relevance. As we navigate these changes, Lévinas’s insights into anxiety, responsibility, and ethical encounters with the Other offer reflections on human connection and ethical engagement, urging us to reconsider our relationship with technology and prioritize meaningful interactions amidst societal transformations.