Volume 34, Issue 4 - Special Issue: Art as a Remedy for the Corruption of Consciousness’; Guest Editors: David Collins and Stephen Leach

This paper sets in context the melodramatic conclusion to R. G. Collingwood’s The Principles of Art (1938) and his exceptional praise of T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922). I suggest that the background to this conclusion, with its emphasis on the role of emotion in human agency, must embrace an extraordinary series of essays composed in the mid nineteen-thirties, and which until their publication in 2005 were known as the “folktale manuscripts.” Collingwood’s critique of anthropological method in these essays, with his discussions of ritual, magic and the alleged madness of the so-called “savage mind,” feed into the anxieties about civilization’s condition felt through his reception of Eliot’s poetical diagnosis, and they are developed in Collingwood’s own compelling essay of 1936, “Mad Goes Mad.” The essay is Collingwood’s account of a disease of mind which Art, in the event, proved powerless to cure.

In this paper I explain what the duty of artists could be according to the philosopher R.G. Collingwood. My aim is not only to focus on Collingwood’s writings on the philosophy of art, but to show the parallel between the concepts used in his aesthetics and his ethics. In fact, the major role of “emotion” in both his art and moral theory gives me the occasion to develop an understanding of artists’ tasks within their communities. Moreover, it provides an occasion to define what, for Collingwood, the subject of ethics is and to explore an almost uncharted part of his work: his “Lectures on Moral Philosophy” delivered from 1921 to 1940.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief account of part of Collingwood’s philosophy of art, in particular that dealing with the relationship between art, craft and magic, in relation to the corruption of consciousness, and to consider some of the implications for the aesthetic evaluation of ‘works of art’ produced as moral or political propaganda. I shall try to do this by drawing on the work of Matthew Kieran in relation to art and morality. I will not so much analyse or criticise Collingwood’s conception of the corruption of consciousness as presuppose it as the conception which makes sense of Collingwood’s understanding of the relation between art and morality.

It is surprising that the connections between Collingwood’s aesthetics and his political philosophy have been little explored, considering the distinctly social focus of the final chapter of The Principles of Art (1938) and the political motivation behind Collingwood’s worries about the “corruption of consciousness,” to which he sees art as a potential remedy. This essay explores this connection, arguing for a strong parallel between this idea of the corruption of consciousness and what Collingwood, in The New Leviathan (1942), calls “barbarism.” I argue that bringing out this parallel helps shed light on the central importance that Collingwood saw art having for civilization itself.

In this article I enquire into the notion of ‘political art’, by drawing on ideas from R. G. Collingwood’s often neglected Principles of Art . I show that his characterisation of ‘expression’ reveals what I call the ‘Narrow Aretaic Structure’ (NAS), distinguishable from a ‘Wide Aretaic Structure’ (WAS). Whatever satisfies NAS satisfies WAS, but not vice-versa. Though we have reasons to call ‘art’ anything satisfying WAS, Collingwoodian ‘art proper’ must also satisfy NAS. I then suggest that the distinction between WAS and NAS is more interesting than the distinction between art and non-art and even as a criterion for ‘aesthetic’ (though this is not my main issue). The main issue is articulating a view of when the ‘politicalness’ of ‘political art’ is relevant in light of its being art, or, in Collingwoodian terms, ‘expression’ (under the NAS model). Collingwood allows us to give an alternative answer to these questions; one that does not appeal to ‘messages’ in art and their hypothesised effects on the audience. In other words, an answer that avoids the consequentialist ‘template’, which is restricted to the WAS model. As case studies, I use some of Aleksander Deineka’s ‘Socialist-Realist’ mosaics, as well as other examples of political artworks, and the recording of a work song.

Collingwood’s concept of corruption of consciousness is introduced, followed by an extended example from art history. While the typical Renaissance nude enabled, or even encouraged, corruption of consciousness on the part of the male spectator, the nudes by Goya and Manet led the viewer to confront his disowned feelings, thus serving as a medicine for the corruption of consciousness. Finally, I examine the role of corruption of consciousness in the treatment of antisemitism in Elia Kazan’s 1947 film Gentleman’s Agreement .

Collingwood argues that art is a remedy for what he calls a “corrupt consciousness.” Consciousness becomes corrupted when agents do not admit that they are starting to experience an emotion. Instead of becoming conscious of the emerging emotion, which is usually a difficult one, agents become conscious of an emotion that is easier to handle. Collingwood sees the corruption of consciousness as epistemically and morally problematic mainly because it is a form of dishonesty that infects the activity of the imagination and the intellect. While highlighting the importance of Collingwood’s notion of the corruption of consciousness, this paper argues that this notion would benefit from being situated in an explicitly top-down model of attention and emotion as opposed to the bottom-up model that Collingwood proposes. This shift preserves the central insights of Collingwood’s aesthetics – most especially his emphasis on the specificity involved in the expression of emotion – while ironing out some of the implausibility in his underlying analysis.

We argue that the proper context for understanding Collingwood’s The Principles of Art is his claim that it has bearing “upon the condition of art in England in 1937”. We thus argue that he formulated a philosophical argument that underpins avant-garde dramatic poetry and theatrical practices (Eliot, Auden and the Group Theatre), taking his interpretation of Spinoza’s Ethics 5 prop. 3 to be the book’s central thesis: it is through art that one knows, against the ‘corruption of consciousness’, what emotions one feels and recognizes them as one’s own. Collingwood further believed that this could only be achieved through collaboration between the artist and the community, validating new theatrical practices involving interaction with the audience. We analyse these views in the context of England in 1937: in an era marked by the rise of Fascism and Nazism, Collingwood believed that art thus conceived could help restoring emotional support for the defense of liberal democracies. We conclude with an exploration of parallels with and divergences from the Spinozist idea of ‘mobilizing affects’ in contemporary ‘left populism’ (Mouffe).

This paper addresses the views of R.G. Collingwood and Theodor Adorno on the role of amusement and art in what each of them saw as the crisis of contemporary Western civilization. We will begin by showing how the aesthetic theories of Collingwood and Adorno develop out of their shared concerns about the harmful effects of amusement and bad art on the consciousness of human beings. We will argue that a productive dialogue between these two figures clarifies that the value of art consists in its ability to remedy the corruption of the mental and emotional lives of human beings and in helping to fashion a different social and political order. As part of this, we will show how, despite appearances, Adorno’s aesthetic cognitivism and Collingwood’s expression theory of art agree with and complement one another in significant ways. In establishing this point, this work will leave us with an understanding of art that is more comprehensive and better equipped to address the crisis of contemporary Western society.

The publication of Art as Experience in 1934 marked a theoretical turning point away from the disinterested spectatorship of Kant towards an aesthetics of everyday life. Dewey’s major claim therein is that “aesthetic experience” is privileged and ought to be taken as paradigmatic for all experience because it is controlled by an affective unity that he calls “pervasive quality” which harmonizes thought and action with its social and environmental context. In 1935 Walter Benjamin argued that pre-industrial works of art have an “aura” that exerts an affective lure on consciousness, and that the remnants of this aura in the post-industrial age may lead to the abandonment of critical thought and seduce the masses into the sway of fascism. This paper considers John Dewey’s aesthetic theory in light of the critical perspective developed by his contemporaries in the Frankfurt School. I will consider whether Dewey’s reliance on the qualitative dimension of experience undermines the critical reflection that, theoretically, prevents the “aestheticization of politics” that leads to the spread of fascism, and propose that pragmatist aesthetics would benefit from greater tolerance for the “negativity” exemplified by the critical theorists.