Volume 17, Issue 1

We explore the migration-trade nexus in the case of Germany over the period 2000-09, disentangling the two dimensions of intra-industry trade (vertical and horizontal). We find that immigration is positively and significantly related to intraindustry trade. However, the magnitude and statistical significance of migration’s impact on trade are considerably higher for horizontal intra-industry trade and increase with the difference in the level of development between Germany and the partner countries. This pattern is consistent with the view that information flows between migrant communities and their country of origin may be more important for consumer goods (where trade in varieties prevails) and that this information effect is more important if trading countries are very different.

Status goods are often produced by firms with market powers. Taking this into account, we construct a new class of models of status goods, which refutes many important results in the conventional models without assuming market powers. Specifically, relative consumption effect normally leads to under-consumption of status goods, which is the opposite of the conventional result. Generally speaking, status goods may be over- or under-consumed, depending crucially on a widely overlooked factor in the literature- the elasticity of marginal status. More competition tends to support overconsumption and is not necessarily welfare-enhancing. Our results call into questions if, as often suggested in existing literature, a general taxation is an appropriate solution to tackle market bias from status seeking.

Many real-world decisions are made by individuals as representatives of groups. Most research, however, studies either individuals or groups as decision-makers. This paper explores whether there is a general difference between a decision made as an individual and as a representative of a group in the context of a public good game. We conducted a series of experiments to test this question and to understand mechanisms contributing to potential differences. We found that representatives contributed less than individuals when they could not communicate with their constituency. However, when they could discuss their strategy before playing, they contributed at least as much as individual decision-makers. Furthermore, when they could justify their decision after playing, they contributed even more than individual decision-makers. We discuss potential reasons for this and directions for future research.

If fixed costs are endogenous, following from profit maximization, horizontal mergers are always profitable. They cause the price to rise and consumer surplus to decrease. A case of horizontal merger in which, according to the requirement of US and EU Merger Guidelines for an efficiency defense to be acceptable, the price declines or remains constant does not exist and therefore cannot be expected by profit maximizing partners to arise following a merger. Merger control should be guided by focusing on total welfare. Permitting cooperation in R&D, although profitable, is likely to be detrimental to welfare.

In this study, I provide evidence that the educational achievement of second- generation immigrants in German-speaking Switzerland is greater than in Germany. The impact of the first-generation immigrants’ destination decision on their offspring’s educational achievement seems to be much more important than has been recognized by the existing literature. I identify the test score gap between these students that cannot be explained by differences in individual and family characteristics. Moreover, I show how this gap evolves over the test score distribution and how the least favorably endowed students fare. My results suggest that the educational system of Switzerland, relative to the German system, enhances the performance of immigrants’ children substantially. This disparity is largest when conditioning on the language spoken at home, and prevails even when comparing only students whose parents migrated from the same country of origin.

This paper extends the seminal model of vertical product differentiation by Ronnen (1991) to a two-tier supply chain. While Ronnen considers the duopoly case, we add a vertical structure such that each downstream firm procures an input from a monopolistic upstream supplier. While simultaneous up- and downstream regulation in the form of a minimum quality standard restores Ronnen’s findings, if only one firm is regulated in the vertical chain, a free-rider effect results: all the bargaining power is given to the non-regulated member of the chain, which uses it to free-ride on the pressure exerted by the regulator onto the other member.

Meaningful estimates of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) within a Phillips curve framework require an identified tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. However, observations of inflation and unemployment are equilibrium points giving rise to a simultaneity problem. We assess conventional identifying assumptions in the literature on the German NAIRU in a general bi-variate equations system of inflation and unemplyoment. We use a data-driven method for identification based on shifts in the relative volatility of shocks to unemployment and inflation to identify the tradeoff for Germany. Our results support models which estimate a contemporaneous effect of unemployment on inflation and those which model inflation and unemployment jointly.