Volume 17, Issue 4

We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision-making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making.

The German Child Benefit (‘Kindergeld’) is paid to legal guardians of children as a cash benefit. The benefit does not depend on household income or other household characteristics. I use exogenous variations in the amount of child benefit received by households in the German Socio-Economic Panel to estimate the impact of a given change in the child benefit on food expenditures of households, the probability of owning a home, rent per square meter, measures of the size of the home, as well as parents’ smoking behavior and parents’ alcohol consumption. Households primarily increase per capita food expenditures in response to increases in child benefit, and they also improve housing conditions. The effect of child benefit on per capita food expenditures is larger for low-income households compared to high-income households. I do not find a significant effect of child benefit on parents’ smoking or drinking.

This article estimates the policy reaction function of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) using real-time internal inflation forecasts and output gap estimates from 2000 to 2012. We analyze potential nonlinearities of policy rate responses to economic fundamentals using a novel semiparametric approach. We find a linear response of the SNB’s policy rate to inflation forecasts but a strong nonlinear response of the policy rate to the output gap and exchange rate changes. This finding suggests that the SNB reacts to extreme movements of these variables if they become a concern for price stability and economic activity.

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government’s future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market’s ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.