Volume 12, Issue 3

Political scientists often use the lens of generations when studying how the political views of citizens develop and how the polity as a whole evolves. This essay provides an overview of the topic: distinguishing work on lineage generations from that on political generations while also addressing their intersection; describing the Age-Period-Cohort (APC) framework used to study political generations and illustrating the difficulty of distinguishing cohort from age and period effects; and reflecting on the difficulty of explaining generational differences. The essay closes with a discussion of the many ways in which America’s youngest citizens are politically different from their elders.

According to scholarly wisdom, family socialization accounts for the formation but not the further development of political norms and practices. Thus, although it yields high levels of partisan similarity between parents and children, its influence diminishes as the offspring accumulate experience with politics. This study is an attempt to qualify this view, suggesting that parental legacy is enduring and can help us understand key moments in individual’s political trajectories. In so doing, parental socialization operates both as a channel of continuity and a channel of attitudinal change. Examples from different cohorts and periods illustrate the nuanced role of parental politicization on the formation of offspring’s political outlook.

Born between 1946 and 1964, “baby boomers” represent the largest 20-year age cohort in US history and still account for over 30% of the adult population. Drawing on over half a century of survey data from the American National Election Studies I explore the political legacy of this generational cohort as measured by 16 indicators of political engagement. The results suggest that while evidence of lasting generational differences in political attitudes and behaviors between boomers and those who preceded or followed them exist, they are generally small to modest, with variation over time driven more by the times in which people live than the times in which they were socialized.

The last decade has witnessed renewed interest in the concept of political generations and the role of generations in foreign and domestic politics. The purpose of this article is to discuss a number of patterns and insights concerning political generations in American politics that derive from my own research in international relations. In pursuit of this goal, I summarize a theory of political generations and explain how it was applied empirically. In the second half of the essay, I discuss what generational analysis might tell us about the study of political change and stability, the presidency, voters, social movements, parties, and bureaucracies. Finally, I briefly engage the methodological problems that can arise from the fact that political generations are in important respects socially constructed through public discourses, in the context of the work on the “Millennial Generation” conducted by the Pew Research Center. While this article can only suggest patterns and initial ideas for further development and research, the hope is that it will help to push forward research on political generations across disciplinary sub-fields.

Periods of American politics marked by recognizable surges of ideas and activists are not driven solely by winners. Barry Goldwater and George McGovern were among the biggest losers in the history of American presidential elections, yet they produced surges that continue to affect American politics decades later. These losing candidates had three things in common: 1) Their candidacies represented more than individual attempts to gain the presidency, 2) they altered their parties’ electoral coalitions and strategies, and 3) they each made distinctive arguments that laid the groundwork for future party and movement successes.

Younger voters today, defined as under the age of 30 and often labeled the Millennial Generation, have shown high support for Barack Obama and for certain statements about activist government. Are we witnessing some generational effect for a significant percentage of the Millennials, stemming from their growing up during impressionable years under first George W. Bush and then Obama? To study this question with a historical analogy, I use the ANES to compare under-30 cohorts under Jimmy Carter as a benchmark and then Ronald Reagan much more extensively. I find evidence consistent with categories advanced by Sears (1983). The Reagan years disproportionately shifted this age group’s symbolic attitudes, including partisanship, self-reported ideology, and approval of Reagan himself, but not most specific policy opinions. If this finding generalizes, recent events may leave a Democratic imprint on the Millennials, but their current measures of policy liberalism should not be attributed overmuch to Obama’s influence.

Large partisan congressional “classes,” once common, have become more the exception than the rule over the past 60 years. Thus, when they come along, as in 1974 and 1994 (and perhaps 2010), they receive a lot of attention. Moreover, they often do help to change the institution of the House in dramatic ways. After a few years, all such classes lose their distinctiveness and meld into the legislative flow of the era. Still, these cohorts may have lasting effects in a host of ways, from movement into House power positions, to successful attempts to run for the Senate in large numbers, to the dispersion of many individuals into the Washington milieu of lobbyists and lawyers, where they can continue to affect policy. This article takes a first cut at how large partisan classes affect the institution of Congress, as well as at the careers of their individual members. Both the 1994 and 1974 cohorts were important as they burst upon the scene. Yet they have had differing impacts as the “long tail” of these classes continues to make a mark on politics and policy.

Large partisan classes in the House of Representatives are, in important ways, products of the congressional politics of preceding years. The class of 1994 is an example: understanding its origins requires a look at previous classes, especially the often-overlooked class of 1978. The class of 1994 did have a major impact on American politics, but as the fresh-faced outsiders became insiders, their power waned and their personal fortunes darkened.

As a result of its size and close ties to the Tea Party movement, the freshman cohort of House Republicans elected in 2010 had a significant impact on the chamber. Compared to other Republicans, the districts the freshmen represented did not tilt more toward the GOP or the Tea Party, nor was their roll call ideology during 2011–2012 statistically distinguishable from that of their more senior colleagues. For votes that were Tea Party priorities, however, the effects of freshman status were often large. And the most consequential impact of the class was over party strategy and agenda. The role played by the 2010 House freshmen has implications for how we should think about party influence in Congress.

In the aftermath of the polarization that has taken hold in Congress, some have pointed to the changing social connectedness of Congressional members as a possible cause, effect, or both. In this article, we take an initial look at this element of the story by analyzing one aspect of change over time in what are known as CODELs. We outline our data collection of these foreign trips taken by House members in two distinct periods and show how the use, users, and locations of these trips have changed. Among other changes, we find that more members are traveling than in the past, but that these trips are on average much shorter in duration. As a result, members of Congress are spending less time together during foreign travel, potentially reducing the opportunities for building relationships among them.