Volume 12, Issue 1

Scholars and pundits have usually depicted Barack Obama as a prisoner of partisan rancor in Congress, which has been especially fierce on the Republican side of the aisle. We argue, to the contrary, that he has actively – if sometimes reluctantly – embraced the role of party leader, even in the management of the bureaucracy, the arena in which the modern presidency’s claim to transcend partisanship was nurtured. The Administration’s public celebration of unilateralism – typified by the “We Can’t Wait” initiative – is emblematic of a far-reaching development within the presidency and American politics: the rise of an executive centered party-system , which relies on presidential candidates and presidents to pronounce party doctrine, raise campaign funds, campaign on behalf of their partisan brethren, mobilize grass roots support and advance party programs. Although this development poses hard challenges to collective responsibility and the rule of law that undergirds it, Obama’s innovative administrative tactics may be the harbinger of a new paradigm that extols unilateral presidential policymaking as a habitual solution to partisan polarization.

In his 2014 State of the Union address Barack Obama pledged to act without Congress on a variety of fronts, following up his “we can’t wait” campaign of unilateralism before the 2012 election. The partisan furor this engendered tended to obscure the longstanding efforts of presidents to “faithfully execute” the law in a manner that aligns with their policy preferences. This paper examines the broad logic of those efforts, and delineates five areas where the Obama administration has been particularly aggressive: in its (1) recess appointments; (2) refusal to defend federal law (notably, the Defense of Marriage Act) in court; (3) use of prosecutorial discretion in declining to pursue violations of immigration and drug laws; (4) use of waivers; and (5) its utilization of the regulatory process to interpret the meaning of statutes, as with the Clean Air Act and the Affordable Care Act. Presidents do have flexibility in many cases; but this ends where they seek to alter the plain “letter of the law.”

This article offers an analysis of the origins, evolution, and impact of the Obama administration’s Race to the Top (RTTT) competitive grant program and places it in the broader context of the debate over President Obama’s aggressive use of executive power. Faced with divided control and partisan gridlock in Congress – which has been unable to reauthorize ESEA, the largest federal education program – the Obama administration has opted to make education policy from the executive branch. While many observers have questioned the expansive interpretation of statutory and regulatory authority that undergirds RTTT – and the NCLB waiver process – there is little doubt that the efforts have had a significant impact on the national political discourse around education and pushed many states to propose or enact important policy changes, particularly around charter schools, common core standards, and teacher evaluation processes. Along with health care, education reform is likely to be remembered as the most significant policy legacy of the Obama administration. However, while the Affordable Care Act was drafted by Congress and secured through the “normal” legislative process, the Obama education agenda has largely been designed and enacted through unilateral executive branch authority. As a result, these actions may well set significant precedents for the separation of powers as well as for education policy.

The extent to which presidents embrace the role of electoral leader of their party is important but relatively understudied. Each of the past three presidents devoted substantial time to the role of chief party fundraiser during his first 2 years in office, hoping to avoid having to govern by himself in the final 2 years of his first term. Key institutional and contextual factors drive these dynamics. Presidents are incentivized to spend time fundraising for their co-partisans because of the interaction of the high costs of campaigns and the contribution limits mandated by campaign finance laws in an era of intense partisan competition. While even unpopular presidents are in demand as fundraisers, popularity does relate to fundraising dynamics. An unpopular Bill Clinton aggressively embraced fundraising efforts behind closed doors in his first 2 years in office, supporting his fellow Democrats with a kind of hidden-hand leadership, while over 90% of George W. Bush’s fundraisers were open to the media in 2001 and 2002, as his popularity surged following 9/11. Popularity makes a difference in terms of where presidents raise money for their fellow party members as well. While Clinton and Barack Obama largely confined their efforts to states in which they had found electoral support, the more popular Bush headlined fundraisers for fellow Republicans in states across the political spectrum. Presidents’ efforts can win them more political allies in elected office, but also expose them to criticism and may make it more difficult for presidents to work across the aisle on questions of public policy.

Why has President Obama chosen to “Govern by Himself.” This essay analyzes the psychological and political elements that have led President Obama to choose this leadership strategy in the White House. The analysis is framed through the lenses of decision discretion and choice, presidential ambition, and the president’s approach to both leading and governing. It is true that the country is politically divided but the essence of president leadership is choice and President Obama, like every president, had an array of leadership and governing strategies before him from which to choose. This essay locates Obama’s choices in his conception of himself as a “great” and transformative leader. That ambition led him to pursue large legislative and foreign policy accomplishments instead of more modest, possibly bipartisan, initiatives, with equivocal and ultimately poignant results.

This article offers an overall assessment of President Barack Obama’s use of unilateral presidential directives and situates his usage in a broader historical context. It draws on academic scholarship and history to better understand the extent to which Obama’s use of unilateral presidential directives (such as executive orders, proclamations, and memoranda) comports with or departs from that of other presidents. It examines five perspectives on Obama’s use of unilateral presidential directives (namely, a quantitative overview of his executive orders and proclamations, a qualitative review of some of his more noteworthy directives, and a survey of what the president, his conservative critics, and liberals have had to say about his directives). The evidence indicates that Obama has been fairly reserved or reticent in his use of unilateral directives. Four possible explanations for the nature of his (dis)use of unilateral directives (namely, reservations of a political, constitutional, or psychological nature, as well as the use of alternatives to unilateral presidential directives are considered).

Scholars generally agree that political elites in the US are polarized. Yet most of our evidence, especially longitudinal evidence, is built on proxy measures of elite ideology that fail to identify the unique dimensions that drive the cleavages between the parties. And our understanding of when elite polarization reemerged is also unclear. This study leverages the party platforms, along with the tools of content analysis, to shed new light on elite polarization. We find that, consistent with the literature, elite polarization is an asymmetric phenomenon driven by Republicans primarily motivated by economic issues. Further, we show that modern elite polarization emerged starting with the 1980 election.