Band 72, Heft 3

The article discusses the role of Immanuel Kant’s practical philosophy in recent attempts to reformulate the critique of instrumental reason formulated by Max Horkheimer from a metaethical point of view. Here, the focus is on the determination of the relationship between normative and rational aspects with regard to the deontological conception expressed by the imperatives. Using the example of the differing readings of Christine Korsgaard and Konstantin Pollok on the relevance of the hypothetical imperative introduced by Kant in the second section of the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten for questions concerning metaethics and the theory of action, the author shows that Kant’s practical philosophy can be interpreted both as an affirmative theory and as a criticism of instrumental reason. With Pollok, the article argues on the one hand for a reading of Kant that emphasises the prevalence of the categorical imperative over the instrumental forms of action. Simultaneously, it points to the problems of relating Kantian theorems to the socio-philosophical problems of a critique of instrumental reason that takes an overarching view of philosophical, scientific and social developments.

People who, by intention or negligence, deceive themselves put other people at risk of being misinformed. The paper argues that this kind of misinforming other people is to be avoided for largely the same reasons for which lying is to be avoided – regardless of what exactly these reasons are. This makes the ethical evaluation of self-deception in part dependent on the ethical evaluation of lying. In order to bring out this result as clearly as possible, detailed characterisations of the concepts of attempted deception, lying, and self-deception are given.

From a decolonial perspective, Habermas’ theory is seen by many as Eurocentric and in philosophical alliance with colonial rule. In particular, his theory of progress is seen as offensive because it devalues non-Western ways of understanding in comparison to their modern Western counterparts. On the one hand, this is true. On the other hand, Habermas’ actual concept of progress can also be used to formulate a critique of colonialist development imperatives. Moreover, his concept of “systematically distorted communication” can make an interesting contribution to understanding colonial rule: even colonial rule is communicatively mediated, with the constant risk of dissent precariously held in check by racist discourse barriers. Fanon already provides strong starting points for this communication-theoretical view of colonial rule. With him, the decolonial struggles against racist discourse barriers also come into view.

This paper compares the theories of Hervaeus Natalis and Franz Brentano on intentionality. It considers three questions: the status of the intentional object, the question of the definition of the intentional relation, and the identification of the mark of the mental. Throughout the study, the analysis of Aristotle’s works serves as a tertium comparationis between the two authors. Although the comparison reveals some similar approaches to the matter, it shows distinct strategies regarding the distinction between what is mental and what is not.

This paper offers an assessment of some of the central aspects of Edith Stein’s conception of intentional acts proposed in Potency and Act. Studies Towards a Philosophy of Being . Her account hinges upon a combination of Thomistic and Husserlian concepts. She borrows from Aquinas two conceptual pairs that are central to his metaphysics and theory of knowledge: the actuality-potency dichotomy; and the distinction between sensible and intelligible species. The distinction and relevant articulation between sensible and intelligible species provide Stein with the basis to present her own conception of intentionality (with special focus on perception): the sensible species is regarded as the correlate of the object’s Gestalt; by contrast, the intelligible species is mobilised to account for what Husserl labels noesis-noema correlation. But Stein’s ambition is also to inscribe her account of the species sensibilis within an overall (critical) interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation, financing the project “Intentionality and Person in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology” (GAČR 21-08256S).

In his 1956 book Das Gemüt , Stephan Strasser presents an original phenomenological investigation into human happiness and pleasure. We will examine Strasser’s theory of happiness in more detail and reveal how he incorporates important phenomenological insights from Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the passions of the soul. Both Strasser and Aquinas view happiness as the fulfilment of intentional striving and differentiate between various feelings associated with the pursuit and attainment of a goal, such as joy and pleasure. However, while Aquinas believes that only an imperfect form of happiness can be attained in this life, Strasser aims to determine the essence of the highest form of happiness possible for human beings as the felt anticipation of perfect happiness in the future. Strasser, therefore, interprets Aquinas’ theory through the lens of an existential-phenomenological approach.