Volume 72, Issue 1

The article outlines the basic lines of a phenomenology of driving. The starting point is the thesis that “driving” does not occur in nature and is therefore a form of movement reserved for humans, which is linked to the invention of the wheel. This invention expanded the possibilities of mobility in technical and social terms. We argue that, on the one hand, travelling on wheels strengthens individuality and the feeling of freedom, but on the other hand it has a strong socio-political component that is often ignored: Efficient driving requires a dense road network, and this only emerges as the achievement of a community. Referring back to Matthew B. Crawford’s philosophy of driving and Günther Anders’ philosophy of technology, the question of whether the “autonomous car” restricts or expands the freedom of drivers is discussed. Finally, it is shown that the concept of driving, as manifested above all in the automobile, has also had a significant influence on our concept of social progress. However, this concept has fallen into crisis due to the ecological collateral damage of combustion technology.

Theories that treat Artistic Research (AR) as their object have been experiencing a boom since the beginning of the 21st century. Increased interest in AR resulted from a historical situation interconnecting at least three fields. First, the art world, which, starting in the 90s, produced AR as a phenomenon in the first place; second, higher education policy, which, in the implementation discussions concerning the Bologna reforms from the 90s onwards, drew on reflections on AR; and third, Germanophone aesthetics, which, during the 2000s, paid increased attention to heteronomy aesthetics. Within these fields, multiple factors are to be accounted for to understand both the sudden increase in pertinence as well as the concrete shape that these theories took in the Germanophone sphere.

This paper reevaluates Adorno’s theory of non-identity following from a critical examination of his reading of Hegel. The main discussion revolves around two theses central to both philosophers: 1. Conceptual thinking forms the centre of philosophical thought (identification). 2. Philosophical thought aspires to become everything (totality). The analysis of two distinct interpretations, one stricter and one more moderate, demonstrates that Adorno takes the hardline view. With the moderate view, however, not only do the limits of Hegelian philosophy become more pronounced, they also reveal novel systematic connections with pivotal concepts inherent to Critical Theory – connections that have notably lacked substantial consideration within relevant research.

In this article, Breny Mendoza examines and critically discusses María Lugones’ concept of the “coloniality of gender.” Lugones’ influential thesis asserts that the binarity of gender was introduced in the colonies as part of colonial rule and displaced previously predominant egalitarian systems of gender relations. As Mendoza outlines, this thesis has been challenged in recent years by Latin American and indigenous feminisms (such as the Argentinean anthropologist Rita Segato, and indigenous feminists from countries such as Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico). In light of these new perspectives, Mendoza expounds and acknowledges Lugones’ ideas, while also pointing out their pitfalls and limitations, since such an approach can lead to a romanticisation of pre-colonial orders, presenting them as the “absolute other” of colonial violence. In contrast, drawing on the analysis by Bolivian Aymara feminist Julieta Paredes, Mendoza argues that the imposition of gender can only be understood as an “entanglement of patriarchies.” Finally, Mendoza applies these discussions to issues surrounding sexualised violence, i.e., feminicide, in Latin America proving them to provide a fruitful framework for understanding and addressing these current forms of violence.

In this article, Laura Quintana elaborates on a conceptual distinction between violence and rage. Along with this distinction, she recognises that while rage may possess a destructive potential, it can also be politicised in emancipatory practices that confront conditions of injustice and structural violence. Her analysis centers on contemporary political movements in Latin America, which she views as collective manifestations of rage. Within these movements, the manifestation of rage is intertwined with forms of care and communal labor. Quintana characterises such movements as embodying a “dignified rage” (digna rabia) that calls for an emancipatory transformation of the status quo. She contends that these practices can be understood in terms of the notion of “anti-violence,” as it has been coined by Étienne Balibar. In this she diverges from Judith Butler, since, according to Quintana’s analysis, such practices challenge the demand for non-violence that has often served to neutralise the disruptive force of such manifestations and movements.

In this article, Carlos Pereda introduces the concept of “colonial reason” and explores how philosophical practices and modes of thought are entwined with colonial political structures of exploitation, exclusion, and oppression. Pereda argues that philosophy in Latin America risks perpetuating and reinforcing the colonial gesture, either by turning to the European centers of thought (thus pursuing debates that always take place elsewhere) or by isolating itself and idealising the “own.” According to Pereda, both approaches fail to dismantle colonial violence within philosophy. In his alternative approach, Pereda outlines principles and methodological criteria for the decolonisation of reason and philosophy. He emphasises the importance of methodological prudence that discerns between innocent, paralysing, and strategic uses of identity expressions and advocates for modes of reading and argumentation that conceive philosophy as an inclusive and ongoing dialogue. In Pereda’s terminology, this entails fostering “permeable reason” that manifests itself through “nomadic thinking,” a form of thinking that is capable of questioning itself and being questioned.