Band 17, Heft 2

We propose a semiotic externalist approach that takes cognition as semiosis, gives central importance to the notion of temporal distribution, describes the elements of distributed cognitive systems (DCSs) as signs, and identifies the DCS itself as a system that enacts a sign. This is a semiosis-centered, and thus a non-agent-centered account of DCSs. In order to develop and illustrate our argument, we describe an example of DCS – the Brazilian verbo-musical improvisational tradition of repente – considering it first as embodiment of the formal structure of a cognitive task, and then as embodiment of a semiotic process. The latter corresponds to a semiotization of the description of repente sessions as DCSs, that focuses on how the DCS can embody a meta semiotic process, semiosis that supervenes on, and determines, distinct types of smaller-scale semiotic process.

This article seeks to outline the effective integration of semiotic methods, particularly the Peircean approach, with research on human creative cognition. The aim is to elucidate the involvement of the mind and neurological mechanisms in the process of semiosis. By examining how the mind externalizes thoughts and ideas, the article offers a fresh perspective on how external models and representations serve as essential anchors of meaning. Furthermore, this integrated approach provides a deeper understanding of how meaning is constructed and communicated, highlighting the importance of considering both internal cognitive processes and external manifestations in the study of semiotics.

Experimental studies of animal episodic memory test the behavioural expression of a what-where-when ‘memory content’. This is to say, autobiographical memory in some species (mainly birds, rodents, and great apes) has been understood on the basis of how the subject’s actions demonstrate their long-term awareness of already enacted and yet-to-be enacted scenarios. However, such behavioural focus has come at the expense of discussing the interdependent role of two equally important episodic hallmarks: ‘memory structure’ (mental representations), and ‘memory flexibility’ (adaptive choice-making). This paper provides a semiotic characterization of those less discussed hallmarks, in terms of the Peircean concept of virtual habit or the mental enactment of non-present episodes. It is argued that the behavioural expression of a ‘memory content’ (as object in a process of semiosis) cannot be accounted for without understanding the phenomenological or experiential support of memory structure (as a representamen), and the teleological or purposeful self-control of memory flexibility (as interpretant). Based on this, a new cognitive model of animal episodic memory is proposed, consisting of interrelated modalities called Virtualiter, Habitualiter, and Actualiter. Capitalizing on multispecies evidence, possible applications and new directions of the model are suggested.

Recent cognitive science research suggests that occasional “blindness” to choice manipulations indicates a lack of awareness in choice making. This claim is based on participants’ tendency not to detect choice manipulations and the similarity between their justifications for choices they made and those they were tricked into believing they made. Using a cognitive-semiotic framework, we argue that such conclusions underestimate the embodied, intersubjective nature of human meaning-making. We support this by investigating choice awareness beyond language to include non-verbal behavior. Forty-one participants were asked to choose from pairs of photographs of human faces the one they found most attractive and then to justify their choices, without knowing that for some of the trials they were asked to justify a choice that they had not made. Verbal responses were categorized as (i) non-manipulated, (ii) detected manipulated, and (iii) undetected manipulated trials. Bodily expressions, assessed using five different Categories of Bodily Expression (CBE): Adaptors, Torso, Head, Face and Hand expressions, revealed differences in: (a) duration, (b) rates of occurrence and (c) variety of the CBEs across trials. Thus, even when manipulations were not verbally detected, participants took longer to assess choices, showed increased bodily expressions, and engaged more body parts in undetected manipulations compared to non-manipulated choice trials. This suggests a degree of awareness to the choice manipulation, even if pre-reflective, manifested in participants’ bodily expressions.