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We critically assess the representative consumer with quadratic aggregate utility function which forms the foundation of a well-known class of linear oligopoly demand structures. It is argued that this approach is problematic and redundant. Regarding the latter, we show how the same demand system can be derived directly from a population of heterogeneous buyers for any number of products. Welfare analyses based on aggregate demand is shown to be sensitive to the underlying microfoundation.

This paper extends the work of Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303. by taking into consideration a large class of different utility functions of economic agents. As in Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303, instead of considering a social utility function that is characterized by constant relative risk aversion (C.R.R.A), we use the expo-power utility function of Saha, A. 1993. “Expo-power Utility: A ‘Flexible’ Form for Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 (4): 905–13. In fact, depending on the choice of the expo-power utility function parameters, we cover a diverse range of utility functions. Apart from covering the other utility functions that a C.R.R.A omits, the Expo-power utility function permits us to discern if under the other utility-regimes of economic agents, the willingness to pay remains more affected by uncertain outcomes than certain outcomes when we vary the expectation and standard deviation of the temperature’s probability distribution. Our paper has maintained the small-tailed gamma distributions of temperature and economic impact of Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303. not only because they hinder infinite future welfare losses (for an exponential utility function), but because it is easy to change some moments of the distribution (jointly or holding the others fixed) while studying how uncertainty influences the willingness to pay as explained in Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303.

Allowing downstream retailers to engage in demand-enhancing investment, this paper demonstrates that the classical conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition in a vertically related market with decentralized bargaining are completely reversed. It shows that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition, in the sense that both consumer surplus and social welfare are always higher in the former.

This paper analyzes how search costs affect skilled-unskilled wage inequality. In the basic model, we find that an increase in skilled labor’s search costs will decrease wage inequality if the skilled labor market and the unskilled labor market are separated. In the extended model, our findings are as follows: (i) Even if there exists free entry into the unskilled labor market or the endogenous provision of public goods, an increase of search costs in the skilled labor market will decrease wage inequality; and (ii) if skilled search costs are negatively related to the skilled wage, wage inequality will be increased.

We consider final goods producers’ preference for horizontal product differentiation in the presence of strategic input price determination. Final goods producers may not prefer maximal differentiation but may prefer moderate differentiation under both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the final goods market if product differentiation does not increase the market size significantly and there is either free entry in the input market or the input supplier has increasing returns to scale technology. Thus, we provide a new rationale for moderate product differentiation. Our reasons are different from the existing reasons of mixed pricing strategy, endogenous leadership, no-buy option for the consumers and the relative performance incentive schemes.

This study investigates government public policies facing competing firms’ strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and finds that the choice of CSR crucially depends on corporate profit tax. We demonstrate that strategic CSR decreases while social welfare increases with corporate tax. When the government grants uniform output subsidies, we show that bilateral CSR leads to a lower CSR level than under unilateral CSR but bilateral CSR is always beneficial to society. However, when the government grants discriminatory output subsidies which yield different levels of unilateral CSR, we show that domestic CSR leads to a lower CSR level than under foreign CSR. In an endogenous CSR choice game, domestic CSR (no CSR) is a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low (high) under the uniform subsidy, while foreign CSR could be a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low under the discriminatory subsidy.

This paper formulates a mathematical model that combines the dynamics of interest group formation with electoral politics, involving office-seeking and corrupt political candidates and voting population with well-defined policy as well as ideological preferences. The analysis provides several interesting insights into the factors affecting lobby membership, free-riding incentives of citizen-voters and aggregate monetary donations garnered by lobby groups. Besides this, the paper also explores the impact of the formation of distinct lobby groups, the presence of swing voters and the corrupt practices or financial embezzlement on the equilibrium policy choice of electoral contenders. The findings reveal that more honest spending of campaign donations by electoral contenders reduces both the size of the lobby (or membership) as well as aggregate campaign contributions in equilibrium. In contrast, a rise in the fixed cost of organization is found to augment lobby membership along with the total amount of campaign contributions. In addition, a reduction in the level of electoral uncertainty as well as a rise in the ideological or swing voter density is found to increase the effectiveness of campaign contributions in raising an electoral candidate’s perceived popularity and, therefore, a smaller lobby group with lower aggregate donations is deemed as sufficient in influencing electoral outcomes. Moreover, the results indicate that a lower utility difference derived by the citizen-voters when comparing the two electoral candidate’s policy choices translates into smaller dispersion of the voters’ ideological bias, and consequently results in an increase in the size of lobby groups and their corresponding aggregate donations. As regards the choice of equilibrium policy, evidence of full policy convergence is not found in the case when citizen-voters of the two groups have separable preferences. In addition, policy equilibrium for a more realistic case in which the two policy platforms exhibit strategic interaction by reacting to each other has also been estimated with the help of simulations. Finally, this paper helps in categorically deciphering the influence of the median voter effect (or the centripetal force) and the distinct centrifugal forces in the form of lobbying effect, swing voter effect and the financial embezzlement effect on the equilibrium policy choice by employing different parametric specifications of the model.

We examine free riding for entry deterrence in license auctions with heterogeneous incumbents. We establish the monotonicity of randomized preemptive bidding equilibria: an incumbent with a higher entry-loss rate has greater free-riding incentive, choosing a lower deterring probability. We then identify conditions for the existence of a series of fully or partially participating equilibria such that two or more incumbents with bounded heterogeneity in their entry-loss rates participate in randomized preemptive bidding. As an application, we examine a simple case of a bipartite group of participating incumbents consisting of one “leader” and many “followers”. We show that the policy of limiting the leader’s participation (set-asides for entrants, limiting participation of incumbents with excessive market shares, etc.) may or may not increase entry probability.

The Laffont–Tirole regulator observes the accounting costs of a firm but she can neither observe its true cost-type nor its chosen effort level. This paper considers a Laffont–Tirole regulator who could employ an expert to obtain better, albeit not perfect, knowledge about the firm’s true cost type. Both the welfare gains through superior allocations from better knowledge but also the knowledge acquisition costs increase in the ‘marginal deadweight losses from taxes’ parameter λ  ≥ 0. We derive a closed-form expression of the overall welfare benefits from knowledge acquisition as a function in λ . We characterize parameter conditions such that knowledge acquisition could improve social welfare in dependence on the value of λ . For this case we show that knowledge acquisition strictly increases social welfare if and only if λ falls into the interval ( λ * , ∞) whereby we present a sharp characterization of the critical threshold-value λ *  ≥ 0. In other words, information acquisition through a regulator only increases welfare for economies with comparatively high deadweight losses from taxation whereas welfare is decreased whenever these deadweight losses are low.

This note analyzes the effect that the specification of technology has on the long-run growth rate and the asymptotic speed of convergence in the one-sector endogenous-growth model. We compare three otherwise identical economies – with the same baseline and parameter values – but with different production technologies: CES, VES or Sobelow, respectively. The long-run growth rate and the asymptotic convergence speed under CES production are lower than the corresponding ones under Sobelow production which, in turn, are lower than those under VES production. This is because a higher elasticity of substitution entails a higher easiness to substitute capital for labor which, in the end, results in a higher long-run growth rate.

We study hours worked by drivers in the peer-to-peer transportation sector with cross-side network effects. Medallion lease (regulated market), commission-based (Uber-like pay) and profit-sharing (“pure” taxi coop) compensation schemes are compared. Our static model shows that network externalities matter, depending on the number of active drivers. When the number of drivers is limited, in the presence of positive network effects, a regulated system always induces more hours worked, while the commission fee influences the comparative incentives towards working time of Uber-like pay versus profit-sharing. When the number of drivers is infinite (or close to it), the influence of network externalities on optimal working time vanishes. Our model helps identifying which is the pay scheme that best remunerates longer working times and offers insights to regulators seeking to improve the intensive margin of coverage by taxi services.

When consumers have preference costs, two opposing effects need to be assessed to analyse the incentives of firms to set collusive prices. On the one hand, preference costs make a deviation from collusion less attractive, as the deviating firm must offer a large enough discount to cover the preference costs. On the other hand, preference costs lock in consumers and make punishment from rivals less effective. When preference costs are low, the latter of the two effects dominates and collusion is more challenging to sustain than in a situation with no preference costs. With high enough preference costs, collusion is a (weakly) dominant strategy. These results do not eventuate in a model with switching costs.

In this paper, I show the validity of and the relationship between two previously unrelated claims in monetary theory. The first claim, made by Earl Thompson, is that privately-issued bank notes pay a positive rate of return in a competitive equilibrium. The second claim, made by Fischer Black, is that it is possible to have a gold standard in which the gold reserves of the central bank are near zero. I show that both of these claims are correct under the assumption of complete markets and perfect commitment. The link between these claims is the Black-Scholes equation applied to convertible bank notes. In commodity-based monetary systems, bank notes are perpetual American options. I extend the model to consider the implications of a lack of commitment on the part of the bank and incomplete markets. I show that both arguments break down when banks lack commitment to redemption or markets are incomplete. I conclude with implications for macroeconomic theory.