Volume 46, Issue 2 - Focus: Shmuel Nili, Philosophizing the Indefensible: Strategic Political Theory

This book asks what distinctive contributions political philosophers might make when reflecting on obvious moral failures in public policy. I defend a particular kind of contribution: I argue that political philosophers can and should craft ‘strategic’ arguments for public policy reforms, showing how morally urgent reforms can be grounded, for the sake of discussion, even in problematic premises associated with their opponents. The book’s opening chapter provides a general defense of this approach, situating it within a broader conception of political philosophy’s social responsibilities. Subsequent chapters then apply strategic theorizing to a set of diverse policy issues. These range from the abortion debate and financial regulation in the United States, through controversies surrounding the participation of Arab parties in Israel’s political process, to global issues, such as commercial ties with oil-rich dictatorships, and the bearing of such ties on global climate change.

Shmuel Nili’s Philosophizing the Indefensible: Strategic Political Theory is a thought-provoking book, calling philosophers to arms in the effort of containing the spread of ‘unreasonable’ views characterising many contemporary societies. Nili argues that philosophers can play a distinctive role by arguing from premises they reject to show how those presumptions do not lead to upholding the ‘repugnant’ policies their interlocutors back up. This paper focuses on a distinction that is key to Nili’s argument, i.e. that between ‘repugnant’ and ‘non-repugnant’ unreasonable policies. According to Nili, philosophers should be under no obligation to engage discursively in the way he envisions when their interlocutors support policies that are repugnant, i.e. they clearly violate universal human equality. The paper argues that it does not make sense to treat repugnant unreasonable views as normatively different from non-repugnant premises. The repugnant/non-repugnant distinction is untenable and too subject to ‘reasonable’ disagreement to offer concrete normative guidance.

Shmuel Nili claims that when a country buys fossil fuels from dictatorships it becomes complicit with property rights violations in those dictatorships. Thus, Nili argues, people who have a strong commitment to property rights should support a ban on fossil fuel imports from dictatorships, and a transition to renewable energy. This article critically discusses Nili’s argument. The argument fails to consider competing moral reasons that some people may have to oppose a ban on fossil fuel imports from dictatorships, such as moral preference for family and compatriots. The argument also mistakenly assumes that renewable energy would be overwhelmingly economically attractive when fossil fuel imports are forbidden, and that switching to renewable energy would not involve importing stolen goods too. The article ends more propositively, by elaborating an alternative argument that Nili dismisses too quickly, and which may help persuade those who are strongly committed to property rights of transitioning to renewable energy: the argument that transitioning would help avoid violating those rights through contributions to harmful climate change.

In Philosophizing the Indefensible Shmuel Nili proposes strategic political theory as a productive and respectful manner for political philosophy to engage with unreasonable political views. One objection to his proposal he considers is that strategic political theory gives ‘excessive attention' to unreasonable views. In this paper I offer a perspective on this objection which Nili does not consider and which, I believe, has important consequences for his account. The strategic theorist pays engaged and respectful attention to unreasonable views for the sake of showing respect and upholding ties of civic friendship with unreasonable citizens. Yet such attention might inadvertently disrespect and damage ties of civic friendship with those disadvantaged by the indefensible policies of the unreasonable. I consider how this consideration bears on Nili’s argument for strategic theorizing based on the practical necessity to alleviate what he calls ‘the burdens of politics'.

This essay responds to the central critiques of Philosophizing the Indefensible advanced by Nuti, Kapelner, and Garcia-Gibson. Nuti and Kapelner pose general challenges to the strategic method driving the book. Garcia-Gibson focuses on this method’s application to green energy policies. I explain why I believe that both the general account of strategic theorizing presented in the book and its specific green-energy arguments withstand the critics’ scrutiny.

This essay explores the implications of historicising John Rawls’s theory of justice. While historical research on Rawls and his social context has provided valuable insights, some scholars argue that historicising carries significant philosophical consequences. This paper critically examines one such argument that contends that historicising Rawls’s theory demonstrates its contextual nature, undermines its diagnostic powers, and leads to its complete dissolution. We offer a reconstruction of this argument and show that it fails. Further, while we argue that this argument fails, we go on to suggest that historical evidence may contribute to a defensive argument against appeals to expert opinion. By examining the appropriate relationship between historical research and philosophy, this essay contributes to the evaluation of the historicist critique and offers insights into the broader role of historical research in philosophical discourse.

The article critically examines the arguments of Raef Zreik regarding the 2023 war in Gaza. It first analyzes the use of the concept of narrative in defending political causes and actions. It shows that due to their subjective nature two opposing narratives can be equally valid as long as they satisfy conditions of internal coherence and fidelity to the facts. It then shows that Zreik’s argument of ‘fragmentation’ is double edged and cannot be used for laying full responsibility on Israel. It then proceeds to criticize the claim that Zionism is a colonialist enterprise and shows that Zionism does not consist of all the basic characteristics of colonialism. Finally, it analyzes the common argument of self-defense as the only justification of starting a war and shows the limitation of such an argument in a theory of war, mainly because in most wars both sides have the right to defend themselves, including the allegedly unjust party. All that remains after showing the weakness of most arguments for this or that side to the conflict is the conclusion that compromise is the only way out of the deadlock, having the virtue of being pragmatic rather principled.

This essay explores a view held by many critics of Israel, which posits that the October 7th massacre is a war crime that is part of a just war of independence, fought by Palestinians against Israel for over a century. Raef Zreik recently presented such a view in these pages. However, this essay argues that a proper understanding of traditional just war theory renders this view false. Even if Zionism is considered a colonial wrong, Palestinians did not have a just cause for war against Zionism until after the Six-Day War in 1967 and perhaps later. Furthermore, the essay contends that the massacre is not a part of this war, as Hamas lacks the moral power to represent the Palestinian people and to fight in their name.

In this paper I respond to the replies of David Heyd and Yitzhak Benbaji to my paper ‘War and Self-Defense: Reflections on the War on Gaza’. Heyd’s relativizing of narrative overlooks the epistemic hierarchy among narratives and their important role in establishing facts, and his claim that Israel’s history is not colonialist in character fails because it is based on a misunderstanding of colonialism in general and settler colonialism in particular. Historically, I outline how Benbaji’s appeal to the legal status of the Mandate is problematic, because it ignores the illegitimacy of the legal regime behind it, such that accepting his argument would be to legitimize colonialism. Theoretically, I defend the view contrary to Benjabi, that instead of their being a moral tie between two equal sides, the Palestinians have always had fundamental legal and moral rights that the Zionist project violated ab initio and continues to violate.

This article seeks to show that Israel’s war in Gaza in 2023 and 2024 has been an unjust war because it has violated both the requirement of proportionality and the requirement of necessity. The article explains the nature of proportionality, arguing that the main form of proportionality in war is simply the limit to the amount of harm inflicted on innocent people that can be justified either as the lesser evil or, more plausibly, on the basis of the special relations between combatants and their fellow citizens. The argument of the article is that, even on the basis of assumptions about moral justification and the numbers of innocent people who have been killed or saved by the war that are highly favorable to Israel, the war has nevertheless been highly disproportionate and morally unnecessary.

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms , I argue that norms that exist as a matter of social fact have moral force, when they do, by virtue of what I call the ‘agency-respect principle.’ In what follows, I address the comments and criticisms of my view kindly offered by N. P. Adams, Åsa Burman, George Klosko, Katharina Nieswandt, and Titus Stahl, and which have appeared in a previous issue of this journal. My responses, just like the corresponding criticisms, will address some of the core themes of the book, including: the nature of socially constructed norms, the plausibility of the agency-respect principle, how to best understand and ground political obligation, and, in general, whether we should think that socially constructed norms have (primarily) moral normativity, as opposed to some other type of normativity.