Abstract
In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, I argue that norms that exist as a matter of social fact have moral force, when they do, by virtue of what I call the ‘agency-respect principle.’ In what follows, I address the comments and criticisms of my view kindly offered by N. P. Adams, Åsa Burman, George Klosko, Katharina Nieswandt, and Titus Stahl, and which have appeared in a previous issue of this journal. My responses, just like the corresponding criticisms, will address some of the core themes of the book, including: the nature of socially constructed norms, the plausibility of the agency-respect principle, how to best understand and ground political obligation, and, in general, whether we should think that socially constructed norms have (primarily) moral normativity, as opposed to some other type of normativity.
References
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© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Focus: Shmuel Nili, Philosophizing the Indefensible: Strategic Political Theory
- Précis of Philosophizing the Indefensible
- Should we Distinguish Between Repugnant and Non-Repugnant Unreasonable Views?
- Property Rights, Fossil Fuel Imports, and Climate Change
- Civic Friendship, the Burdens of Politics, and the Ethics of Attention
- Philosophizing the Indefensible: Reply to Critics
- General Part
- What Can Historicising Rawls Achieve?
- Can Two Opposing Narratives Be Equally Valid? Reflections on Zreik’s Reflections on the War in Gaza
- Just Independence Wars and the October 7th Massacre
- Past, Present, and Future: A Reply to Heyd and Benbaji
- Proportionality and Necessity in Israel’s Invasion of Gaza, 2023–2024
- Discussion
- Response to My Critics
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Focus: Shmuel Nili, Philosophizing the Indefensible: Strategic Political Theory
- Précis of Philosophizing the Indefensible
- Should we Distinguish Between Repugnant and Non-Repugnant Unreasonable Views?
- Property Rights, Fossil Fuel Imports, and Climate Change
- Civic Friendship, the Burdens of Politics, and the Ethics of Attention
- Philosophizing the Indefensible: Reply to Critics
- General Part
- What Can Historicising Rawls Achieve?
- Can Two Opposing Narratives Be Equally Valid? Reflections on Zreik’s Reflections on the War in Gaza
- Just Independence Wars and the October 7th Massacre
- Past, Present, and Future: A Reply to Heyd and Benbaji
- Proportionality and Necessity in Israel’s Invasion of Gaza, 2023–2024
- Discussion
- Response to My Critics