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Response to My Critics

  • Laura Valentini EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: November 22, 2024
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Abstract

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, I argue that norms that exist as a matter of social fact have moral force, when they do, by virtue of what I call the ‘agency-respect principle.’ In what follows, I address the comments and criticisms of my view kindly offered by N. P. Adams, Åsa Burman, George Klosko, Katharina Nieswandt, and Titus Stahl, and which have appeared in a previous issue of this journal. My responses, just like the corresponding criticisms, will address some of the core themes of the book, including: the nature of socially constructed norms, the plausibility of the agency-respect principle, how to best understand and ground political obligation, and, in general, whether we should think that socially constructed norms have (primarily) moral normativity, as opposed to some other type of normativity.


Corresponding author: Laura Valentini, Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft, LMU Munich, Munich, Germany, E-mail: 

References

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Published Online: 2024-11-22
Published in Print: 2024-11-26

© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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