Volume 57, Issue 4

We may take tables for granted. However, due to a variety of factors, tables were a rarity in the history of ancient Greek culture, used only limitedly in very special contexts and generally in a non-systematic way, except in astronomy. In this paper I present the main types of tables that can be found in ancient Greek texts: non-ruled columnar lists (accounts and other types of informal tables), ruled columnar lists (mostly astronomical tables), and symmetric tables (mainly Pythagorean displays of numbers).

Anaximenes famously taught that the sun and other ‘stars’ do not move under the flat earth but around it and explained the night thereby. What he had in mind remains conjectural; the testifying fragments are ambiguous and apparently contradictory. The past 200-odd years have seen a plethora of dissenting interpretations. The bulk of these are here categorised into three groups: that the sun circles at a fixed height above sea level; that it follows the familiar inclined path by day and clings to the northern horizon by night; and that it revolves in a circular orbit inclined relative to the earth. The first two scenarios are repudiated, while the third is fortified with several suggestions. It is argued that Anaximenes’ terms for ‘above’, ‘below’ and ‘around’ did not differentiate the altitudes of celestial bodies relative to the horizon, but the sizes of their orbits – as indicated by their projections on the earth’s plane. The point would have been that bodies in space are far enough from the earth to stay away from anyone’s zenith or nadir – perhaps with exceptions, following pseudo-Plutarch. This approach reconciles the variant readings in the fragments and obviates the need for emendations. The sun would still move through the north at night, but in an arc below the horizon – not horizontally over the Ocean or behind mountains, as some had it. Thus, Anaximenes would have enhanced Anaximander’s discovery that space facilitates inclined circular orbits by surrounding the earth on all sides. Awareness of the far-northern midnight twilight and the aurora borealis may have fed into all of these worldviews, the former legitimately and the latter fallaciously.

The Stoic theory of movement has never been the object of a deep investigation despite the considerable number of sources in Neoplatonist commentators. This paper explores for the first time the Stoic notion of ἐνέργεια, which plays a fundamental role in the Stoic conception of movement and generally in the characterization of interaction between bodies. I will show that the Stoics identified movement and activity, so that everything that is active is necessarily moved. This implies that the Stoics merely characterized ἐνέργεια in a dynamic or kinetic sense, namely by connecting it with movement. In order to prove the coherence of this philosophical position to the Stoic doctrine, I will display the compatibility of Neoplatonists’ reports with other sources. Accordingly, I will claim that the Stoics conceived this peculiar sense of ἐνέργεια in reaction to Aristotle, who clearly distinguished between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις in his physical theory.

Epicurus held that justice came into being when individuals made compacts with one another to secure the benefit that comes from not harming one another. He also distinguished just laws from those that are not just; and he recognized a virtue of justice. This much is well supported by our evidence. There is also much that is controversial. At the very basis, there is disagreement on his conception of justice. There are also basic questions on how compacts are related to the justice of laws, as well as to the virtue of justice. Plato and Aristotle severed compacts from virtue; and some modern thinkers consider the justice of institutions prior to that of individuals. What was Epicurus’ position? This paper will sketch an outline of Epicurus’ theory of justice as a path to the goal of a pleasant life. As Phillip Mitsis (1988) suggested, Epicurus sought to harmonize a contractual view of justice with the virtue of justice. My aim is to investigate further the coherence of this endeavor. As I will argue, Epicurus presents a unitary theory of justice, composed of a number of steps that develop out of each other in a consistent way. As a developmental path, it admits of much variation. By tracing its basic features, I seek to show how Epicurus puts individuals in charge of attaining their goal, pleasure.

This article presents a new account of the Stoic theory of case. It argues that cases belong to the Stoic class of lekta and that they play a twofold semantic role. Firstly, they relate words to the world in a process akin to reference. Secondly, they encode syntactic information which captures structural elements of the world, contributing to language’s ability to represent reality and its structure by enabling it to capture both objects and the ways in which these objects relate to each other.

Plato’s theory of recollection is classically treated as an account of “concept-acquisition” or “concept-possession,” explaining how the mind is able to employ general concepts, despite the senses only perceiving particulars. Against this, recent scholars (esp. Dominic Scott) have argued that recollection is not necessary for ordinary reasoning. Recollection is not about ordinary concepts that humans use; rather, recollection is a rare, prototypically philosophic affair that is satisfied by becoming aware of Forms or principles associated with them, which most people never experience. On this view, most people do not recollect. A third position accepts both views: there are two types of recollection in Plato, one concerned with ordinary cognition, and one concerned with philosophical awareness of the Forms. This paper argues for the narrow reading, focusing on the Phaedrus .

Aristotle offers apparently inconsistent explanations for paronymous expressions derived from matter: on the received picture , derived from Metaphysics Θ.7, such expressions are used in all and only cases of substantial change, because predicating the matter directly of a substance would be false; on the error picture , derived from Metaphysics Z.7, the same expressions are used in all and only cases of change from an unclear and nameless privation, because ordinary language users conflate such privations with matter. I propose a resolution: the received picture explains why the usage is fitting , but the error picture explains how the usage originated .