Band 8, Heft 2

We solve two “unsolvable” ( teyku ) problems from the Talmud that had remained unsolved for about one and a half thousand years despite massive and nearly continuous commentary and analysis throughout the centuries. The Talmudic problems concern the implied decision-making of farmers who have left some scattered fruit behind, and the alleged impossibility of knowing whether they would return for given amounts of fruit over given amounts of land area if we aware of their behavior at exactly one point. We solve the problems by formalizing the Talmudic discussion and expressing five natural economic and mathematical assumptions that are also eminently reasonable in the original domain. If we also allow a sixth assumption regarding the farmer’s minimum wage, we can solve two other related unsolvable problems.

This study seeks to frame the rationale of land acquisition by explicating on the market conditions necessitating the suspension of consensual exchanges in favor of the use of coercion to meet the land supply requirements of a project, and then examines the reasoning governing the use of the acquisition legislation in India. It has been argued that the law of land acquisition, by terminating the right of the seller to negotiate the conditions of the exchange and by forcibly re-allocating the land to the other party, can help in easing out land transactions only in conditions where the inordinate bargaining power of the seller, possessing the non-substitutable unit of land, is the source of the obstacles at the stage of bargaining. In Indian context, however, it is observed that the application of the land acquisition act does not fit into the economic rationale of the acquisition law as a law to correct for the specific type of land supply constraints associated with non-substitutability; rather, the concern of availing the low cost supply of land appeared to be the dominant motivation guiding the use of acquisitions.

The need to balance the positive and negative effects of patent monopoly is at the heart of design and reform of the patent system. However, by scrutinizing prior studies on optimal patent design, this paper has found that the basis for this balanced approach is flawed. Furthermore, a macroeconomic analysis of the patent system confirms that there is no trade-off in patent protection, unless the patent system generates only marginal negative effects. The implication of this finding is that a new patent system design is needed to stimulate innovation directly while minimizing deadweight loss.

In a tort-based legal system, when a party is injured as a consequence of another party’s negligence, the party should be provided with sufficient compensation so that he or she may live as fulfilling a life as possible after the injury. The moral objective underlying this supposition is intuitively appealing. It is not surprising, therefore, that this jurisprudential notion is favourably regarded and widely applied in various common law and civilian jurisdictions, despite differences in tradition and culture. Nonetheless, although the two bodies of law share a similar objective in this respect, there are a number of differences in the substantive content of the law and the configuration of the rules. The present authors argue, and provide empirical evidence to support, that there are signs of convergence as both legal systems are in fact applying the same multiplicand-multiplier approach in assessing the quantum of damages. Case studies in mainland China (concerning civil law) and in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong (regarding common law) are adopted as the research methodology to explore the broader implications of this convergence.

The main aim of this research is to seek the potential for Trade liberalization between Intra-BRICS and the impact on the Rule of Law, searching for issues that are hampering or would hamper the BRICS collaboration and economic growth. If any political and legal systems or organization that implements Loyalty to the interests of the rule of law would contribute tremendously to the progress of regional or community economic growth, lack of the rule of law can seriously hinder the idea of Trade liberalization and intra-regional or intra-community trade. I am arguing that even if trade barriers are removed from trade collaboration, and if there is no loyalty to the rule of law there will still be barriers that will hinder trade liberalization. For example, if the country is very corrupt the corrupt officials could delay goods entering the country by making unnecessary excuses so that bribe could be given thereby creating uncomfortable and unfair situations and thereby stimulating difficulties for businesses not to flow freely as it was previously anticipated. The important goal of the BRICS treaty is to stimulate sustainable economic growth of the BRICS countries. I examine the contribution to the BRICS countries integration to economic growth of the countries using subservient variables GMM regression in the framework of a growth model. I found great substantial empirical affirmation for a positive economic cooperation and growth. The results of some variables showed negative impact because of the distance that exist on members of the BRICS countries which hinders perfect cooperation and economic benefits but there were positive impacts on economic cooperation.