Volume 97, Issue 4

Abstract: In this essay I consider the relation between three portraits of the philosopher found in Plato: Socrates the intellectual midwife of the Theaetetus , the philosopher of Socrates’ digression in the Theaetetus (hereafter also called ‘the pre-eminent philosopher’), and the expert in the science of dialectic ( hē dialektikē ) of Republic VI–VII. A particular aim of this essay is to show exactly how Socrates the intellectual midwife differs from the philosopher of the digression. This essay further shows that the philosopher of Socrates’ digression is not straightforwardly identifiable with the expert of dialektikē . What is Plato’s reason for not presenting a uniform philosopher, a uniform conception of philosophy? Philosophy, according to Plato, is not to be identified with just one art or science. In fact, in the Theaetetus Plato shows us that there exist various philosophoi corresponding to various disciplines or branches of philosophia , all of which come together under one general aim: the pursuit of wisdom and virtuous betterment.

Abstract: I offer here an account of the methodology, historical context, and content of Kant’s so-called “Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space” (MECS). Drawing on Critical and pre-Critical texts, I first argue that the arguments making up the MECS rest on a kind of conceptual analysis, one that yields (analytic) knowledge of the essence of space. Next, I situate Kant’s MECS in what I take to be its proper historical context: the debate between the Wolffians and Crusius about the correct analysis of the concept of space. Finally, I draw on the results of previous sections to provide a reconstruction of Kant’s so-called “first apriority argument.” On my reconstruction, the key premise of the argument is a claim to the effect that space grounds the possibility of the co-existence of whatever things occupy it.

Abstract: While Kant refutes the traditional proofs for the existence of God he uses the traditional monotheistic notion of God for his own moral teleological conception of rational religion. The essay discusses Kant’s implicit claim that the monotheistic notion of God is an integral part of (moral) rational religion. Against Kant’s strong approach the essay reveals monotheism as a mere possibility of representing the notion of God legitimately for rational religion – beside adjusted forms of nontheism and polytheism. Nonetheless, Kant’s arguments for a monotheistic representation seem to be appropriate from a pragmatic point of view.

Abstract: Is Hobbes a normative egoist? That is: does Hobbes think that an agent’s normative reasons are all grounded in her own good? A once-dominant tradition of Hobbes scholarship answers ‘yes’. In an important recent work, however, S. A. Lloyd has argued that the answer to the question is ‘no’, and built an alternative non-egoistic interpretation of Hobbes that stresses reciprocity and mutual justifiability. My aim in this paper is to articulate and defend an original ‘middle way’ interpretation of Hobbes that steers a course between an excessively egoistic and what we might call an excessively ‘moralistic’ interpretation. According to the interpretation I defend, our obligations have their source in self-interest in the sense that they are all self-assumed results of covenants, our reasons for making which are solely self-interested. But the obligations that result from such covenants can sometimes require us to act against our self-interest.