Volume 97, Issue 3

Abstract: Modern scholars are puzzled by the Epicurean claim that all perceptions are true. They find it hard to make any sense of it and therefore often reject Epicurus’ argument as ‘simple minded’. However, a very similar claim can be found in Aristotle’s De anima . Aristotle distinguishes between the different objects of perception, and he considers inerrancy to be a distinctive feature of the perception of proper sensibles. But contrary to Aristotle, Epicurus stresses not only that all perceptions but, moreover, all phantasiai are true. The special role attributed to phantasia in epistemology is a feature Epicurus shares with other Hellenistic schools and which crucially distinguishes them from Aristotle. A distinctive mark of phantasia is that, contrary to perception, a twofold object is involved: on the one hand the represented object and on the other phantasia itself. For this reason, the Stoics compared phantasia with light that at the same time reveals the object and itself. This paper will shed some light on Epicurus’ theory of perception by concentrating on different objects of phantasia . It will be argued that these objects refer to distinct ontological levels to which different conceptions of truth are applied.

Abstract: This paper considers Hobbes’ scientific study of the human mind and the method that structures it. I argue that Hobbes approaches the mind – as he approaches the inanimate natural world – in accordance with the method of “physics” as set out in the fourth and last part of De Corpore . I discuss this method and show how and why it applies to the study of the human mind, in particular in his most famous exposition of the topic in Leviathan . This understanding of Hobbes’ method allows us to reconsider and reject a number of criticisms of his work: first, that Hobbes’ scientific study of the human mind is inconsistent because it also relies on introspection; second, that his approach fails because it is not, and cannot be, fully deductive, as a result of which the introduction of psychological concepts is unwarranted; and, finally, that his scientific study of the mind is superfluous because he never sufficiently shows it is important for his moral and political philosophy to understand the mind in accordance with the method of physics.

Abstract: Proposition 28 of Part One of Spinoza’s Ethics is considered to be one of the most central propositions of this magnum opus primarily because it is key to establishing the determinism pervading Spinoza’s universe. Commentators have taken for granted that what is being described here is an infinite regress of efficient causation among bodies or events. I propose an alternative reading of this fundamental feature of Spinoza’s philosophy, which, given its centrality, has far-reaching implications. I claim that the relation between finite things expressed in 1P28 must be understood as constitutive of the individuation of finite modes rather than describing the interaction between already established finite singular things.

Abstract: I discuss the relation between Kant’s trust in the rational capacities of ordinary agents and education. First, I show that Kant is very optimistic regarding our common moral capacities. Then I discuss what room this leaves for moral education. I argue that a discussion of Kant’s conception of moral education should distinguish between different functions of education: (i) education is necessary for agents to make the transition from a purely instrumental to a pure practical use of reason (Basic Education); (ii) education can strengthen the motivational force of the moral law by presenting the moral law in all its dignity and clarity (Motivational Education); (iii) education can instruct agents about the source of morality and offer an abstract formula of the Categorical Imperative (Philosophical Education); and (iv) education can enhance agents’ capacity to apply general moral principles to concrete cases (Education of Judgement).