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Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments

  • Leonardo Martinez
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 12. Mai 2009
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Aus der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Band 9 Heft 1

This paper presents a tractable model that allows us to study career concerns when the strength of a worker's incentives depends on his employment history. More specifically, the paper incorporates standard job assignments into the main model in Holmstrom (1999). Equilibrium wages, equilibrium job assignments, and the strength of career-concern incentives are the same for all employment histories that lead to the same worker's reputation. (With reputation we refer to beliefs about the worker's future productivity.) We show that, typically, workers with better reputation have stronger incentives than workers with worse reputation. Furthermore, we show that when the strength of incentives depends on employment history, (i) a ratchet effect may appear, (ii) in spite of this ratchet effect, incentives may be stronger, and (iii) incentives may be stronger when beliefs about ability are more precise.

Keywords: career concerns; job assignments; reputation; agency; learning; dynamic games
Published Online: 2009-5-12

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Advances Article
  2. Private Information of Nonpaternalistic Altruism: Exaggeration and Reciprocation of Generosity
  3. Satisficing: A 'Pretty Good' Heuristic
  4. Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
  5. Temptations in General Settings
  6. Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions
  7. Contracting in the Presence of Judicial Agency
  8. Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences
  9. Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values
  10. Topics Article
  11. Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks
  12. Why (and When) are Preferences Convex? Threshold Effects and Uncertain Quality
  13. A Two-Step Subsidy Scheme to Overcome Network Externalities in a Dynamic Game
  14. Oligopolistic Certification
  15. Envy-Free and Efficient Minimal Rights: Recursive No-Envy
  16. Risk Premiums versus Waiting-Options Premiums: A Simple Numerical Example
  17. Inflation, Self Insurance and the Friedman Rule in Economies with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risks
  18. Advertising and Cost Reduction
  19. Directed Search, Rationing and Wage Dispersion
  20. Optimism and Bargaining Inefficiency
  21. Fair Depreciation: A Shapley Value Approach
  22. Product Variety, Scale Economies, and Environmental Taxes
  23. Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives
  24. Vertical Differentiation, Social Networks and Compatibility Decisions
  25. Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly and Mergers
  26. Consumer Rationing and the Cournot Outcome
  27. Representations and Identities for Homogeneous Technologies
  28. Monitoring Gains and Decentralization
  29. Cross-Cultural Trade and Institutional Stability
  30. Universal Service Obligations and Competition with Asymmetric Information
  31. A Duopoly Model of Political Agency with Applications to Anti-Corruption Reform
  32. Simple Economies with Multiple Equilibria
  33. A Note on Herbert Gintis' "Emergence of a Price System from Decentralized Bilateral Exchange"
  34. Contributions Article
  35. Continuous Preferences and Discontinuous Choices: How Altruists Respond to Incentives
  36. Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments
  37. Fluctuations in Overlapping Generations Economies
  38. Principal and Expert Agent
  39. Sale of a Deteriorating Asset via Sequential Search
  40. The Efficiency of Observability and Mutual Linkage
  41. A Positive Theory of Income Taxation
  42. Supply Theory sans Profit Maximization
  43. The Dynamics of Collective Reputation
  44. Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods
  45. Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare
  46. Free Riding in Combinatorial First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
  47. Geometric Asymptotic Approximation of Value Functions
  48. Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1367
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
career concerns; job assignments; reputation; agency; learning; dynamic games

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Advances Article
  2. Private Information of Nonpaternalistic Altruism: Exaggeration and Reciprocation of Generosity
  3. Satisficing: A 'Pretty Good' Heuristic
  4. Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
  5. Temptations in General Settings
  6. Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions
  7. Contracting in the Presence of Judicial Agency
  8. Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences
  9. Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values
  10. Topics Article
  11. Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks
  12. Why (and When) are Preferences Convex? Threshold Effects and Uncertain Quality
  13. A Two-Step Subsidy Scheme to Overcome Network Externalities in a Dynamic Game
  14. Oligopolistic Certification
  15. Envy-Free and Efficient Minimal Rights: Recursive No-Envy
  16. Risk Premiums versus Waiting-Options Premiums: A Simple Numerical Example
  17. Inflation, Self Insurance and the Friedman Rule in Economies with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risks
  18. Advertising and Cost Reduction
  19. Directed Search, Rationing and Wage Dispersion
  20. Optimism and Bargaining Inefficiency
  21. Fair Depreciation: A Shapley Value Approach
  22. Product Variety, Scale Economies, and Environmental Taxes
  23. Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives
  24. Vertical Differentiation, Social Networks and Compatibility Decisions
  25. Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly and Mergers
  26. Consumer Rationing and the Cournot Outcome
  27. Representations and Identities for Homogeneous Technologies
  28. Monitoring Gains and Decentralization
  29. Cross-Cultural Trade and Institutional Stability
  30. Universal Service Obligations and Competition with Asymmetric Information
  31. A Duopoly Model of Political Agency with Applications to Anti-Corruption Reform
  32. Simple Economies with Multiple Equilibria
  33. A Note on Herbert Gintis' "Emergence of a Price System from Decentralized Bilateral Exchange"
  34. Contributions Article
  35. Continuous Preferences and Discontinuous Choices: How Altruists Respond to Incentives
  36. Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments
  37. Fluctuations in Overlapping Generations Economies
  38. Principal and Expert Agent
  39. Sale of a Deteriorating Asset via Sequential Search
  40. The Efficiency of Observability and Mutual Linkage
  41. A Positive Theory of Income Taxation
  42. Supply Theory sans Profit Maximization
  43. The Dynamics of Collective Reputation
  44. Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods
  45. Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare
  46. Free Riding in Combinatorial First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
  47. Geometric Asymptotic Approximation of Value Functions
  48. Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands
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