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Private Information of Nonpaternalistic Altruism: Exaggeration and Reciprocation of Generosity
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Yuk-Fai Fong
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
21. Januar 2009
Applying techniques developed by Geanakoplos et al. (1989), this paper analyzes the gift exchange between agents with privately observed nonpaternalistic altruism. I find that gift giving between agents under private information of altruism can be analyzed as a conventional signaling game. After applying standard refinements of signaling games, I show that, over nondegenerate ranges of parameter values, private information introduces systematic biases in agents' behavior. First, agents tend to give larger gifts than under full information. Second, despite that fact that agents have no intrinsic concern for reciprocity or fairness, the more altruistic the recipient is, the more the donor exaggerates the gift size. The second finding gives rise to a new theory of reciprocity according to which private information of unconditional altruism can lead to reciprocal behavior.
Published Online: 2009-1-21
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Private Information of Nonpaternalistic Altruism: Exaggeration and Reciprocation of Generosity
- Satisficing: A 'Pretty Good' Heuristic
- Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
- Temptations in General Settings
- Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions
- Contracting in the Presence of Judicial Agency
- Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences
- Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values
- Topics Article
- Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks
- Why (and When) are Preferences Convex? Threshold Effects and Uncertain Quality
- A Two-Step Subsidy Scheme to Overcome Network Externalities in a Dynamic Game
- Oligopolistic Certification
- Envy-Free and Efficient Minimal Rights: Recursive No-Envy
- Risk Premiums versus Waiting-Options Premiums: A Simple Numerical Example
- Inflation, Self Insurance and the Friedman Rule in Economies with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risks
- Advertising and Cost Reduction
- Directed Search, Rationing and Wage Dispersion
- Optimism and Bargaining Inefficiency
- Fair Depreciation: A Shapley Value Approach
- Product Variety, Scale Economies, and Environmental Taxes
- Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives
- Vertical Differentiation, Social Networks and Compatibility Decisions
- Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly and Mergers
- Consumer Rationing and the Cournot Outcome
- Representations and Identities for Homogeneous Technologies
- Monitoring Gains and Decentralization
- Cross-Cultural Trade and Institutional Stability
- Universal Service Obligations and Competition with Asymmetric Information
- A Duopoly Model of Political Agency with Applications to Anti-Corruption Reform
- Simple Economies with Multiple Equilibria
- A Note on Herbert Gintis' "Emergence of a Price System from Decentralized Bilateral Exchange"
- Contributions Article
- Continuous Preferences and Discontinuous Choices: How Altruists Respond to Incentives
- Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments
- Fluctuations in Overlapping Generations Economies
- Principal and Expert Agent
- Sale of a Deteriorating Asset via Sequential Search
- The Efficiency of Observability and Mutual Linkage
- A Positive Theory of Income Taxation
- Supply Theory sans Profit Maximization
- The Dynamics of Collective Reputation
- Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods
- Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare
- Free Riding in Combinatorial First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Geometric Asymptotic Approximation of Value Functions
- Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands
