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Settling with Multiple Litigants
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Alper Nakkas
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
9. Juni 2010
This paper considers a class of complete information pretrial settlement bargaining games in which externalities can naturally arise due to the existence of multiple litigants. As opposed to earlier literature, it is shown that parties can always settle even though there are bargaining externalities.
Published Online: 2010-6-9
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Sabotaging Entry: An Estimation of Damages in the Directory Enquiry Service Market
- Corruption and the Balance of Gender Power
- Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History
- A Note on the Effects of State-Dependent Benefits on Optimal Law Enforcement
- Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation
- Settling with Multiple Litigants
