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A Note on the Effects of State-Dependent Benefits on Optimal Law Enforcement

  • Murat C Mungan
Published/Copyright: May 12, 2010
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In the Beckerian crime and deterrence model, maximal fines are optimal. Many models have identified conditions under which this conclusion no longer holds. This note adds to the existing literature by presenting an extension to the standard crime and deterrence model, and shows that if criminals' benefits are state-dependent in a particular way, then maximal fines need not be optimal. It also provides a formal framework for analyzing state-dependent benefits within the context of crime and deterrence.

Published Online: 2010-5-12

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