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A Note on the Effects of State-Dependent Benefits on Optimal Law Enforcement
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Murat C Mungan
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
12. Mai 2010
In the Beckerian crime and deterrence model, maximal fines are optimal. Many models have identified conditions under which this conclusion no longer holds. This note adds to the existing literature by presenting an extension to the standard crime and deterrence model, and shows that if criminals' benefits are state-dependent in a particular way, then maximal fines need not be optimal. It also provides a formal framework for analyzing state-dependent benefits within the context of crime and deterrence.
Published Online: 2010-5-12
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Sabotaging Entry: An Estimation of Damages in the Directory Enquiry Service Market
- Corruption and the Balance of Gender Power
- Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History
- A Note on the Effects of State-Dependent Benefits on Optimal Law Enforcement
- Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation
- Settling with Multiple Litigants
